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THE WAR
FIRST YEAR

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FIRST YEAR

By

EDGAR MCINNIS

With a Foreword by

RAYMOND GRAM SWING

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TO MY MOTHER

FOREWORD

WITH the outbreak of the war, many Americans set themselves deliberately not to believe most of what they read or were told about it. The memories of the World War were already blurred, but there could be no forgetting the propaganda of that period. Since then, propaganda had been polished to a new perfection by the totalitarian states. With the war came censorship, which necessarily meant suppression. Since the truth was in any case to be incomplete, and was also to be artfully distorted, the best attitude, these people thought, was one of aloof skepticism. Newspapers reminded their readers that their own foreign dispatches were not to be trusted, radio stations, before the reading of news, repeated the reminders, and for the first part of the war, news was subjected to an initial welcome of incredulity.

How much was lost in this time it is too early to say. Surely it was much. The awareness of the nature of the conflict was dulled. Few permitted themselves to weigh the effect it was bound to have on American life. Not till the catastrophe of France and the extreme peril of Great Britain did many Americans shake themselves loose from their detachment. They began supporting measures of self-defense which a less suspicious attitude would have permitted earlier.

It happens that the news produced by the war, for at least the first six months, was voluminous and informative. No war in history has been waged in such a glare of publicity. No war has been waged

which so many people in so many countries could follow in detail. It is an anomaly that the United States, where communications are developed to the highest point ever reached, and which had reports of the war surpassing in promptness, intelligence, informed analysis and specific facts, any war reports ever given to a country, should have been determined to discount what it was receiving. Only after many months did the warnings against propaganda become less strident, and the pre-conceived suspicions die down. That was when the war of itself had taken shape and meaning. It had become too clear and too menacing to be dismissed as the product of suppressed truth or the diabolical twisting of fact.

News is the raw material of history. The historian has an advantage over the daily journalist, in that he can write about many completed actions, which for the journalist were pending. The journalist's task is more exciting, because he works in almost continual suspense. The very incompleteness of actions which the historian sees whole is part of his appeal. But that holds only for the lesser episodes. History itself is incompleted action. It is more deeply moving than journalism, and though it deals in fewer unknowns, the unknown future for the historian is even more formidable than for the journalist. To the journalist, a battle, a campaign or an election may be at stake; to the historian, a war, an empire, or indeed a civilization.

A history of the first year of this war is bound to take on some of the character of journalism. Journalism gives an interim report, and a history of an unfinished war that breaks off at an arbitrary date is a chronicle rather than an interpretation. But the history of the first year of this war can be a penetrating chronicle because the information about the war has been copious. Anyone who doubted the validity of the news which it produced will read with some surprise a history of one year of it. He will see that it has form, pattern, character, organic development, it is not something shaped in still-unbroken secrecy, but a stupendous conflict of the greatest forces of the human race, operating, on the whole, close to the surface of revelation.

That is not to say that the history of this year is exhaustive. That it never will be. Later, when the archives are opened, many a minor

fact will be dug out. But the history of this first year of war is essentially formed already. It is unlikely that anything that will be learned about it, even when the archives are open, will change the basic judgment now obtainable of what has happened. The reader of Professor McInnis' brief history will sense this, as he will welcome the author's high achievement as a chronicler. Professor McInnis had ample material for his sources, but what makes his work outstanding is that he had the perception to appreciate his material. His history will be found scrupulous in detail, as should be expected from a craftsman; but it also has balance and depth and it is that which makes it an achievement.

Having said this, it is not amiss to suggest where the later historian will, however, reveal what still is not yet recorded or fully enough appraised about the pre-War period and its first year. The most important single episode in the first year of the war was the conquest of Poland. It was not more conclusive, of course, than the collapse of France or the Battle of Britain, but in a sense, France collapsed in Poland, and the assault on Britain was made possible there. In Poland, the Hitler war machine roared out of its guarded seclusion and performed its utmost in a blazing light. Six full months were to elapse before the machine would be thrown against Holland, Belgium and France. This was ample time to extemporize a defense against it, and to prepare the diplomatic groundwork. The story of Hitler's triumph against France is one aspect of the story. Another aspect is the failure of France and Britain to use these six months. French and British production were not stepped up as they needed to be, fortifications and deep ground defenses on the Belgian frontier were not designed, and no diplomatic preparation was made to secure the western front. On the contrary, the Belgian government probably was given a pledge not long after the Polish campaign that it would be defended by French and British armies, which actually courted the disaster later to befall these armies. The history of these months needs to be chronicled in terms of this inaction, what was said and thought by Gamelin and Daladier, Gort and Chamberlain, what was said to labour in both countries, and what labour replied. Hitler would not

have been invincible on the Western Front if the lesson of Poland had been read, understood and applied. That it was not is far more serious than the appeasement. One can understand the French and British not wishing to fight unprepared before Munich. But once in the war, they cannot be pardoned for under-estimating the enemy, and disregarding the evidence profligately presented to them of his equipment and technique. These six months are the sorry period of Western Civilization, and the well-intentioned, innocent, plausible, democratic leaders of Britain and France in this period will no doubt walk the later pages of history as the real creators of Hitler's early victories.

Further back is the still dark passage of the dealings with the Soviet Union. The men in the Kremlin are now emerging in their true character, as having brutally direct minds, unequipped to distinguish in the western countries what is and is not trustworthy, obsessed with tremendous internal dangers, equally obsessed with their immediate external dangers, and for all their veneer of socialist internationalism, unschooled in any knowledge of international co-operation. Yet they could have been dealt with. And that the pact with Germany could be made, was a triumph for Hitler, which, like the victory over France, also is a defeat which was avoidable. The incompetence of British diplomacy to understand the Soviet Union for what it is, and to adjust itself to it, made possible a fatal blunder. That was to give the guarantee to Poland before coming to an understanding with the Kremlin. British diplomacy failed in this task, after failing for years to grasp something so tangible and simple as the Nazi revolution.

These are only some of the failures in the preparation for the conflict. There is one still greater, the failure of democratic statesmanship to grasp the essential problem of peace. Democracy can only function normally in a world of peace, a truism if there ever was one. For democracy cannot wage war. It must democratically suspend itself, transform itself, and assure its rebirth at the conclusion of the war. Democracies have waged war in the past and safely come through this risky experience. Indeed the British Empire came out

of the World War to found the British Commonwealth, the most substantial contribution to democracy in the field of colonial policy to have been made. After the World War, the opportunity to build peace was at hand, and it was squandered, like an inheritance, a bit at a time, until it finally was completely dissipated. The coming of this war is again only one aspect of it. The deeds of the Japanese extremists and of Hitler and Mussolini, which led up to martial conflict, are the positive points of the story, but they are not more of it than the negative points, the inability of democracy to understand the nature of peace and to cope with the swelling flood of aggression. Peace itself might have been preserved if men of good will who were leading the democracies had also been men of good sense.

It would make for a poor understanding of the world crisis if these failures were not continually borne in mind. Judged superficially, Hitler has been invincible. Hence the Nazi doctrine, since it triumphs, must have in it values and virtues. Hence the Nazi organization of society must be supreme and the democracies must submit to it. But Hitler has not been invincible. True, he came to power because democracy in Germany was too shallow to keep him out. True, he established his power internationally because democracy was too shallow to understand the nature of peace. He then won his first great victory in Poland, but he should have lost the war there because he had shown of what his strength and methods consisted. Again, the democracies, by their incomprehension, presented him with his subsequent triumphs. But Hitler is only invincible if democracy is incapable of understanding the nature of conflict, as it was for twenty years after the World War, as it was in the crisis which produced this war, and as it was in its blindness to the meaning of the defeat of Poland.

After Norway British democracy seriously faced battle for the first time. The reorganization of the British Government with the co-operation of Labour ministers in key positions as to domestic policy, marks not only the turning point in immediate British policy, but the final choice out of the mass of doubts and scruples in democratic minds everywhere of a unified defense. It was a late

choice but it was vindicated on the beach of Dunkirk and it was to be more than vindicated in the defense of London by the remarkable Royal Air Force (with remarkable factories behind it) and by its heroic citizens.

A full critique of democratic policy cannot be written as yet, but anyone reading the history of the war so far will do well to bear in mind that he is not following the dreadful development of an inevitable doom, but is reading the consequences of policies and concepts for which he himself has had a measurable share of responsibility.

RAYMOND GRAM SWING

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THE WAR
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I

BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN

Whoever lights the torch of War in Europe
can wish for nothing but chaos.

ADOLF HITLER, May 21, 1935.

ON January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. That date marks, as well as any single date can mark, the end of the "post-war" period in European history. For the past fourteen years, statesmen had been thinking in terms of the Great War, its lessons and the problems which it had left for solution. From 1933 on they found themselves forced to think more and more in terms, not of the last war, but of the next.

The Search for Peace

The outstanding problem which the nations had to face after 1918 was the creation of a peace world. The phrase "a war to end war" had behind it a deep emotion born of a revolt against the barbarity of war as a means of settling disputes. But if a repetition of that appalling catastrophe was to be avoided, the conditions which had made it possible must be removed. In particular, the sovereign right

of any nation to disturb the peace in pursuit of its own national ends was something which must be abolished. The insistence upon this right, and the refusal of the Great Powers to subordinate their individual ambitions to the general welfare, had resulted in the international anarchy out of which came the war of 1914. The permanence of peace could only be assured by the elimination of violence, and the substitution of the rule of law in international affairs.

Thus one of the major themes in the history of the post-war world is the effort to establish a method for the peaceful adjustment of disputes. The Covenant of the League of Nations asserted in its preamble the desire of the signatories to promote international co-operation "by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war" and "by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments." The Covenant sought to give effect to these principles by laying down a definite procedure for peaceful settlement, and by providing for penalties, or "sanctions", against any state which violated these provisions. By the Pact of Paris, or Kellogg Pact, sixty-two states agreed to renounce war as "an instrument of national policy"—that is, as a method for enforcing their claims or attaining their ambitions—and promised that a settlement of disputes between them would never be sought except by peaceful means. In addition to these general agreements, specific treaties of conciliation and non-aggression were concluded by numerous states with their neighbours. Even then the possibility of war under certain circumstances still remained; but if these agreements were faithfully carried out, they would represent a long step toward the elimination of war from the modern world.

In these developments the German Republic had played a commendable part. The bitterness which followed the war, and which found expression in continued and profitless conflict between victor and vanquished, had begun to subside by 1924. The Allies recognized the need to accept Germany as a normal member of the European society of nations. Germany on her part, under the guidance of Stresemann, abandoned her attitude of resistance and revenge in

favour of a policy of "reconciliation and fulfilment". The immediate result of this change was the Locarno Treaties of 1925. Germany exchanged mutual pledges with Belgium and France, in which both sides promised never to resort to war against each other, and to settle by peaceful means "all questions of every kind which may arise between them". German arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia formed part of the same settlement. In 1926 a non-aggression treaty was signed between Germany and Russia. In the same year Germany entered the League of Nations and accepted the obligations of the Covenant. In 1928 she was one of the original signatories to the Pact of Paris; and in 1929 her peaceful relations with Russia were further strengthened by a treaty of conciliation between the two Powers. From such actions it might have appeared that Germany was ready to take an active if not a leading part in the cause of peace.

Behind these hopeful developments, however, other and less promising factors were at work. Much of the old pre-war habit of thought survived. The attitude of suspicion and fear which was a legacy from the war was slow to subside. Not least in importance, the attempt to create a peace world started from the situation established by the treaties of 1919. It is not necessary here to discuss the wisdom or the justice of the treaties. It is enough to recognize that one of the motives behind them was the desire for security against any renewal of attack by the defeated Powers. The victorious nations felt that they must remain strong enough to defeat any such attempt—or still better, that their enemies must be rendered powerless to repeat their aggression of 1914. If a system of permanent peace could be established, this attitude of distrust could perhaps be abandoned. But until they could be confident of the effectiveness of a system of collective security, in which a state endangered by its neighbour could count on other states to protect it, the nations felt that they must continue to rely upon their own superior strength.


— The result was that the idea of settling disputes by negotiation rather than by force had a very limited success in practice. The victorious nations were reluctant to concede any substantial advantages

which their former enemies might some day use against them. This meant that Germany on her part became disillusioned with the whole idea of peaceful settlement. Stresemann had carried his policy with difficulty against a strong nationalist element which believed in forcible defiance rather than in conciliation. When Stresemann's policy failed to produce the expected results, and when in addition Germany was plunged with the rest of the world into the depression of 1929, the way was paved for the overthrow of his policy of moderation and a return to hatred and violence.

Hitler's Philosophy

This was the spirit which brought Hitler into power. He embodied an outlook utterly hostile to the ideals which had animated the attempts to establish a permanent peace. Against the concept of a community of nations he stood for a fanatic nationalism. Against the idea of the rule of law he stood for the supremacy of armed force. The efforts which had brought into being the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris were based on a belief that peace was not only desirable but possible, and that disputes between nations could be settled by peaceful negotiation. The spirit which Hitler represented refused to admit that Germany's desires could be compromised by concessions to other nations. Those desires became "rights" which could not be foregone, which were not even subjects for negotiation, but which must be yielded at Germany's demand—or the consequence would be war.

The Germans who took this view found a concrete object of attack in the Treaty of Versailles. By this treaty Germany lost one-eighth of her pre-war territory, including lands which had been hers for generations, even for centuries. She had lost over six million of her population, including many Germans who were now cut off from the fatherland. The surrender of territory meant the loss of important resources such as coal and iron; and in addition the loss of her former colonies deprived Germany of further sources of supplies. These losses helped to disrupt her pre-war economic organization; and her chances of recovery were gravely hampered by the reparations burden which was imposed upon her. In addition, the treaty fastened upon her such



GERMANY'S LOSSES AFTER THE WAR OF 1914-18
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humiliations as the "war-guilt lie", by which she accepted the responsibility for the war of 1914; the restrictions on the size of her army and navy and the prohibition of military aircraft; the creation of a permanent demilitarized zone on both banks of the Rhine, in which neither troops nor fortifications were to be allowed; and an allied army of occupation which would continue on German soil for at least fifteen years after the peace.

The first objective of Nazi Germany was to break these fetters imposed by the peace settlement. Even if Germany recognized the loss of Alsace-Lorraine as final, she was unwilling to accept indefinitely a situation which left her western frontier defenceless against invasion. On her eastern frontier Germany was completely unreconciled to the boundaries of 1919. The loss of Danzig, the dismemberment of Silesia, the creation of the Polish corridor separating German lands, were all looked on as intolerable affronts to German national rights. The ultimate return of these territories now became a consistent objective of German foreign policy.

But Hitler's aims went far beyond this. Although he adopted both the militaristic attitude and the Pan-German ambitions which had existed in pre-war Germany, he broke completely with the objectives of pre-war diplomacy. Bismarck, after his victory over France, had renounced any desire for a further extension of Germany's boundaries. Describing her as a "satiated state", he had concentrated on building up alliances and friendships which would insure her against attack. When his successors embarked on a policy of expansion, it was in the colonial rather than in the European sphere. Hitler in *Mein Kampf* pours scorn on both policies. It is not enough for Germany to win back the lands which she lost as a result of the war. "The demand for the re-establishment of the frontiers of 1914 is a political lunacy. . . . The frontiers of 1914 mean for the future of the German nation nothing whatever." And in his eyes the return of colonies, for the moment at least, is equally meaningless. "For Germany the only possibility for carrying out a sound territorial policy lay in the winning of new land in Europe itself."

Behind this idea lay Hitler's racial and nationalist theories: race as the foundation of all human progress, and purity of blood as the

foundation of race. "The people do not perish by lost wars, but by the loss of that force of resistance which is contained only in the pure blood." The highest race, the exclusive creator of modern culture, is the Aryan or Nordic, which finds its purest embodiment in the German. It is a sacred duty for the German to maintain that purity and to assert his supremacy over the lesser breeds surrounding him.

It is also a fundamental duty for this superior race, not only to survive, but to expand. The State "must assure for the race that it comprises an existence upon this planet." Germany must have all the land it needs to support its people in comfort and security. "The *right* to land and soil may be changed to *duty*, if without an extension of soil a great nation seems doomed to ruin." And this applies not only to Germany's present population, but to its future growth. "Today we number 80 million Germans in Europe. But the correctness of that foreign policy will not be established, until, a bare century hence, 250 million Germans are living on this continent."

This is the doctrine which is summed up in the phrase "blood and soil". It involves the determination to unite all Germans in a single state, and to acquire enough land to support them at a standard worthy of their racial superiority. "Obviously, such a territorial policy cannot find its fulfilment in the Cameroons, for example, but almost exclusively only in Europe." But where in Europe can Germany find lands for her expanding population? Only in that great northern plain which stretches eastward from Germany's borders. "If we speak of land in Europe today we can only think in the first instance of Russia and the border states under her influence. Fate seems here to point the way for us." And the inferior peoples already living on these lands have no rights against the needs of the superior German. As Alfred Rosenberg bluntly expressed it: "Racial honour demands territory and enough of it. In such a struggle there can be no consideration for worthless Poles, Czechs, etc. Ground must be cleared for German peasants."

Such a revolutionary program clearly leaves no room for methods of moderation. Stresemann, with his limited aims, might hope for their ultimate attainment by peaceful negotiation. Hitler could have no such hope, and in fact had no desire to adopt this course. He

deliberately repudiates it in favour of a forcible solution. "The re-conquest of lost territories", he says in *Mein Kampf*, "cannot be achieved by solemn appeals to almighty God or pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only by armed force." And in fact this method is not only necessary but admirable. "He who wants to live should fight, and he who does not want to battle in this world of eternal struggle does not deserve to be alive. . . . In eternal warfare mankind has become great—in eternal peace mankind would be ruined."

Germany and Disarmament

To anyone who realized the significance of this program, it must have been clear that the Germany of Hitler would have to be dealt with in a very different way from the Germany of Stresemann. Yet in spite of their concern over Hitler's accession, the Powers showed little recognition of the fundamental nature of the change which had thus taken place, not only in Germany, but in the international situation as well. They were perhaps less ready than ever to make any far-reaching concessions which might weaken their existing safeguards; but the method of gradual adjustment by negotiation was still the one which they tried to apply in their dealings with the new régime.

And in fact, in spite of the growing impatience of Germany, this method had already brought important benefits to her. Most notable was the disposal of the reparations question. Efforts had been made to modify and regularize Germany's burden by the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929; and when the latter plan broke down as a result of the depression, it was finally realized that the whole policy of reparations had become impracticable. It was abandoned as a result of the Lausanne conference of 1932; for though a certain claim was in form maintained, and though an attempt was made to link the settlement with the war-debt problem, the settlement meant for all practical purposes that the problem of reparations was at an end.

Another field in which an important though far more limited advance had been made was that of disarmament. The victorious nations had placed themselves under a moral obligation to take effective steps in this matter. The Covenant of the League asserted

that it was necessary to the maintenance of peace. The clause in the Treaty of Versailles which imposed disarmament on Germany asserted that this was done "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations". In a note to Germany on the subject of this clause, the Allies had said:

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps toward that reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

When therefore the disarmament conference met in February 1932, Germany felt that she had a right to demand either that this promise should be implemented, or that Germany should be released from the limitations imposed upon her. It proved difficult to adopt the first course, and France in particular was reluctant to accept the second. None the less, an agreement was reached on December 11, 1932—just seven weeks before Hitler came to power—by which Britain, France and Italy agreed to the principle of "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations". The step was taken only after Germany had withdrawn from the disarmament conference, and the effective application of the principle was likely to encounter still further delay. But even the acceptance of the principle was a very real concession. It was no longer possible to resist indefinitely the claims of Germany in this field.

It soon became apparent, however, that Hitler had little intention of waiting on the slow progress of negotiation—if indeed he had any desire for a negotiated agreement at all. By March 1933 his defiance had gone so far that Britain was impelled to produce an entire new series of proposals in an effort to solve the deadlock. On May 13 a speech of Vice-Chancellor von Papen caused the world to look forward with breathless alarm to an address which Hitler was to deliver to the Reichstag four days later. A direct appeal by President Roosevelt had the effect of moderating Hitler's language, but not his fundamental

attitude. Already he was bringing into play those tactics which were to become familiar, of putting forward apparently reasonable proposals and then preventing all effective negotiation by rejecting everything which would have meant an assurance of his good faith. The climax came on October 14, 1933. In the morning there had been discussed at Geneva a new British proposal which contemplated a gradual general disarmament on condition that Germany refrain from arming in the interval needed to carry this out. In the afternoon of the same day, Berlin announced the withdrawal of Germany, not only from the conference, but from the League of Nations as well. It was the signal that Hitler had abandoned all pretence of collective action in favour of defiance based on force.

Two other efforts to keep Germany in association with the concerted efforts of the other Powers had met with failure in the meantime. In June a World Economic Conference had met in London. In August it adjourned in an atmosphere of disappointment and frustration. But in the course of the conference Germany had revealed her idea of economic remedies in a memorandum which demanded the return of German colonies and what was practically a free hand against Russia. In July a meeting had been held in Rome at which Mussolini sought an agreement which would pave the way for the mutual achievement by Italy and Germany of their desire to revise the peace settlement, with the benevolent support of Britain to overcome the opposition of France. But the idea had led only to a Four Power pact so harmless that none of the Powers even took the trouble to ratify it. By October, Germany was convinced that for the moment she would travel faster by travelling alone.

Germany Rearms

In spite of the gravity of the situation, the British government deliberately chose to continue looking on the bright side. They refused to admit that the breach was permanent or that methods of conciliation were likely henceforth to be ineffective. "Germany is not a target for dictation," said Sir John Simon. "She is a partner in discussion. . . . We welcome the assurances of Herr Hitler that Germany's one desire is for peace and that she has no aggressive

designs." Britain therefore undertook the role of mediator in an effort to iron out the difficulties, particularly those between France and Germany. "The central political issue", as Sir John said, "is how to reconcile Germany's demand for equality with France's desire about security." To that end, Britain actively encouraged direct negotiations between the two states on the basis of accepting a limited and controlled measure of rearmament by Germany.

Nothing came of these efforts. France was determined to keep German rearmament below the danger point. Germany on her part accompanied her offers by conditions which seemed to nullify effective limitations. Under the circumstances, France became more determined than ever to make her security absolutely certain before she was confronted by a rearmed and aggressive Germany; and in 1934 the French premier, Barthou, embarked on active efforts toward this end.

The result was the project for an Eastern Locarno. The growing concern of Russia over the rise of Nazi Germany had made her increasingly willing to join in efforts to establish collective security. Hitler's profession of peaceful intentions gave an opportunity to present the new project as a test of his sincerity. France may have been sceptical of the outcome, but Britain was anxious to leave no effort untried. While she was unwilling to accept new commitments herself, she gave a benevolent approval to the idea of a pact of mutual guarantee between Germany and her eastern neighbours, including Russia, and to an accompanying treaty of guarantee between Russia and France which Germany would have an opportunity of entering, and which would be linked up with Locarno and the Covenant. But any hope for a comprehensive settlement on these lines was dashed on September 10, 1934, when a German note laid down so many conditions for discussing the proposal that it practically amounted to an outright rejection.

Meanwhile signs were multiplying of Germany's intention of carrying her aggressive policy to the farthest limit that she dared risk in her state of comparative weakness. The fact that she had already begun to rearm in spite of treaty limitations was revealed by the German budget of March 1934. At the same time a speech by Hitler

stressing the provocative topics of boundary changes and racial unity increased the alarm of both France and the small states on Germany's borders. It was not long before this feeling of menace was deepened by concrete examples. The German campaign in the Saar, where a plebiscite was held in January 1935, was marked by the Nazi tactics of bullying and threats; and though the vote which returned that area to Germany meant a peaceful disposal of what might have been a dangerous problem, it was perhaps an unfortunate encouragement to Nazi methods and aspirations. Nazi pressure on Danzig had become a seriously disturbing factor. Nazi agitation over Memel amounted almost to a threat of attack on Lithuania. Most serious of all, the Nazi provocations in Austria led in July 1934 to the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss and the prospect of a German invasion. It was not surprising that during this year the small states began to forget their differences and to draw together for mutual protection. The formation of a Balkan pact in February and a Baltic pact in September, and—still more striking—a belated rush by these small nations to recognize the Soviet Union, showed how the lesser states felt the wind was blowing.

Yet the British government continued to hope for the best, and the return of the Saar to Germany seemed to present an opportunity for new efforts. Hitler, at the time of his withdrawal from the League, had asserted that the Saar represented Germany's only territorial demand against France. "When the Saar territory has been restored to Germany, only a madman would consider the possibility of war between the two states." If Hitler was sincere, there seemed no reason why agreement should not be reached.

Accordingly, as a result of a meeting in London, France and Britain issued a series of proposals on February 3, 1935. They proposed "a general settlement freely negotiated between Germany and the other Powers", which would involve a removal of restrictions on German armaments in return for Germany's return to the League and her abandonment of all aggressive intentions by entering into a series of treaties of non-aggression and mutual assistance.

The formal German reply was, as usual, plausible and specious. Expressing a sincere desire "to promote the safeguarding of peace", it proceeded to argue in favour of bilateral pacts as preferable to a general treaty. But the real German reply was in the form of an action which showed the difference between words and deeds. On March 10 General Goering announced that Germany had already, in defiance of the treaty, created a military air force. And on March 16, while Sir John Simon was expecting to go in a few days to Berlin to discuss the recent proposals, a German decree announced the restoration of conscription and the creation of an army of about 550,000 men.

Britain's Conciliatory Policy

The result showed the success of that step-by-step policy which was the foundation of Hitler's tactics. "A clever conqueror", he had written in *Mein Kampf*, "will always, if possible, impose his demands on the conquered by instalments. For a people that makes a voluntary surrender saps its own character; and with such a people you can calculate, that none of these oppressions in detail will supply quite enough reason for it to resort once more to arms." In applying this principle, he amplified it by constant efforts to divide and isolate his opponents, and an attempt to disarm them after each stroke of violence by representing it as the last of such actions and offering an apparent basis for future peace.

It soon became apparent that in this case there was no danger of a resort to war. Though Britain protested, she would not join France in considering the possibility of punitive measures. Britain, France, and Italy met at Stresa in April to condemn Germany's action—a condemnation echoed a week later by the League of Nations. Germany was undeterred; and the events which followed might in certain aspects have suggested that Germany was on the road to still further advances as a result of her defiant resort to power politics.

For there was after all the question: now that Germany has her arms, how is she likely to use them? Anyone who believed that

Hitler's real aims were expressed in *Mein Kampf* was bound to anticipate that a rearmed Germany would follow a policy of aggression based on force. But against the language of the book could be set the expressions of devotion to peace so frequent in Hitler's speeches. In spite of a series of actions which must have seemed curiously at variance with this aspiration, a section of British opinion strongly favoured taking Hitler at his word and pursuing the efforts, hitherto futile, to find a permanent basis of agreement.

In consequence, only nine days after Germany announced her rearmament, Sir John Simon and Mr. Anthony Eden visited Berlin and conferred with Hitler and his officials. Although it was announced after the meeting that "the aim of both governments is to secure and strengthen the peace of Europe by promoting international co-operation," no specific results were achieved; and the alleged friendliness of the conversations did not prevent Britain from joining in the censure of Germany at Stresa and Geneva. But in May a new opportunity arose to explore further the prospects of conciliation.

This opportunity was presented by Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on May 21, 1935. Once more he disclaimed all aggressive designs, and insisted that a strong satisfied Germany was a contribution to European peace. Further, he summed up German policy under thirteen points which seemed on the surface to offer a real basis for constructive agreement. Reiterating his demand for real equality, Hitler coupled this with an implied promise to return to the League if this were separated from the Treaty. He promised to respect in future, not only the territorial clauses of Versailles, but all treaties voluntarily signed; and it was made clear that this involved acceptance of the demilitarized zone along the Rhine. He renewed his offer to conclude non-aggression pacts with Germany's neighbors, and added the further offers of an air pact to supplement Locarno, the acceptance of a just and practical scheme for the limitation of armaments, and "an international arrangement which will effectively

prevent and render impossible all attempts to interfere from outside in the affairs of other States."

These offers, encouraging at first glance, turned out to be remarkably elusive as soon as attempts were made to translate them into actuality. The idea of an air pact never got beyond an exchange of views; and a British questionnaire intended to get a more precise explanation of Hitler's ideas was met by continued evasion. One agreement did follow shortly; but it could hardly be viewed as curbing Hitler's advance or contributing to collective security.

This was the Anglo-German naval agreement. During Sir John Simon's visit, Hitler had put forward his demand for equality with France in the air, and for a navy equal to 35 per cent. of British strength. These demands were repeated in his speech of May 21. Britain had no expectation of getting France to agree to German air equality; but she had also before her eyes the fact that Germany had created an effective air force in spite of all objections. She became convinced that Germany was going to rearm; the only question was whether that rearmament would be limited by a definite agreement or freely pursued without effective restraint. Britain therefore decided to negotiate on the naval question; and her decision was reinforced when she was informed that orders had already been given in April to assemble twelve German submarines of which the parts had been manufactured during the previous winter. The outcome was the Anglo-German naval treaty of June 18, 1935. Germany got not only the right to build up to 35 per cent. of British strength; she also secured the right to equality in submarines, on condition that for the present she would not go beyond 45 per cent.

"We regard this agreement," the First Lord of the Admiralty told the British public, "essentially as a contribution to world peace. . . . We have to deal with the essentially practical problem that Germany is already constructing a fleet which is outside the limits laid down in the Versailles treaty; what we have done is, by agreement with Germany, to circumscribe the effects which might flow from this unilateral decision." Not everyone was satisfied by this explanation.

The British people, remembering the havoc wrought by the submarine during the war of 1914, were shocked to see that weapon restored to Germany. France on her part was outraged at this acceptance of a new treaty violation by Germany, concluded without consulting France and less than two months after Britain had joined in condemning Germany at Stresa. These reactions, and the fact that the British government chose to brave them, were a measure of the desire to find a settled and stable basis for relations with Germany, even at the price of the gravest concessions.

Locarno and the Rhineland

The French approach was quite different. Since the end of the war, France had been afraid of German military recovery and determined to guard against it. Failing to get a military guarantee from Britain, she fell back on alliances with the small states of eastern Europe, who were themselves in need of protection against the desires of the defeated Powers to regain their lost lands. These connections were somewhat weakened when France seemed unwilling or unable to offer effective opposition during the early period of Hitler's rule. By the summer of 1934, however, France was making new efforts, not only to strengthen existing friendships, but to draw Russia in as well. Britain, determined to avoid the division of Europe into two such hostile camps as had existed before 1914, insisted that the treaty must fit into the framework of the League Covenant, and that it must be open to Germany on equal terms. By an extremely ingenious bit of drafting, these conditions were triumphantly met. On May 2, 1935, a treaty was signed by which France and Russia promised mutual support against aggression in terms which were specifically linked to the Covenant and compatible with German entry.

But Germany was in no way mollified by this provision. Her objection that the treaty was really directed against Germany might be an implied admission of aggressive intentions, but was none the less heated for that. Hitherto her various advances had been successfully achieved in the face of France and Britain. Now she would have to take account of Russia in addition; and if her activities should provoke war, it would again be a war on two fronts such as Bismarck

had always sought to avoid, and such as his more inept successors had precipitated in 1914.

Besides, a highly emotional factor was involved. Hitler and the Nazi movement were the declared and mortal enemies of Bolshevism. The pages of *Mein Kampf* are filled with diatribes against the communists and attacks on the rulers of Russia as "common blood-stained criminals, the scum of humanity". The spectacle of France seeking the aid of the Soviets was only less shocking than the realization that the Soviets were now assured of the aid of France.

Hitler's first move in reply was one of bold simplicity. He accused France of breaking a treaty. In a memorandum of May 29, 1935, the German government expressed the opinion that any military action taken under the Franco-Soviet pact would be "a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Locarno". If this had stopped at the assertion of a principle, it might have been merely one more amusing example of Satan rebuking sin. But this claim carried with it a practical implication of vital importance to both France and Germany.

By the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forbidden to build forts or maintain armed forces in the Rhineland or in a strip 50 kilometres east of the Rhine. In spite of rearmament and conscription, Germany's western border was thus open to a French invasion. With the entry of Russia into the picture, this presented a graver danger than ever. If Germany was to have a free road to the east, she must at all costs bolt and bar the open road in the west.

It had already been made clear that Germany had no scruples about violating the Treaty of Versailles. But the demilitarized zone was guaranteed by the Treaty of Locarno—the treaty which Hitler had promised on May 21 to respect. If, however, France had really broken the Treaty of Locarno, Hitler could feel that he was released from its provisions. This was the view which he determined not only to adopt, but to act upon. On March 7, 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland in what was described as a "symbolic" occupation—symbolic, within a week, to the extent of ninety thousand men.

The German general staff had opposed the move, convinced that this time France would fight. The French general staff wanted to fight. But Hitler had chosen his time with characteristic shrewdness. France and Britain were already involved in the situation created by the invasion of Ethiopia and the League adoption of sanctions against Italy. A vote imposing oil sanctions, which Britain was advocating, might even lead to war. Under the circumstances it was unlikely that Italy, though one of the guarantors of Locarno, would take action against Germany. The other guarantor, Britain, was being pressed by France for promises of action, but had shown a rooted aversion to committing herself. And France was involved in the political turmoil preceding an election which weakened the hands of her government in foreign affairs.

So Hitler gambled and won. Italy took no action. Britain associated herself with a French appeal to the League, and approved the French offer to submit the question of Locarno's validity to the Hague Court, but refused to consider military action or to ask for League action against Germany. The usual German offer of a new peace basis, including a series of non-aggression pacts, may have contributed to this moderation. Undoubtedly Britain was less impressed than on former occasions. Hitler's speech of March 24 showed how little a signed document could be expected to bind him. "If the rest of the world clings to the letter of treaties, I cling to an eternal morality. I as the representative of the German people must assert the nation's right to live—its honour, freedom and vital interests." Expressing "some doubt as to the conception held by the German government of the basis upon which the future settlement should be founded", Mr. Eden addressed to that government a searching questionnaire which called for precise explanations of Hitler's various points, pointing out at the same time that negotiations for a treaty would be useless "if one of the parties hereafter felt free to deny its obligation on the ground that that party was not at the time in a condition to conclude a binding treaty." It is not surprising that Germany, after contemplating an evasive answer to these awkward inquiries, decided not to reply at all. In spite of this,

Britain still pursued her efforts to arrive at some basis of understanding.

Britain Guarantees France

But along with these efforts went a new development of major importance. Britain did not admit that the Treaty of Locarno had become invalid. If Germany repudiated the treaty, she could of course claim no advantages under it. The guarantees to France and Belgium, however, still remained, and their importance was if anything increased. On March 19, Britain promised aid to Belgium and France in case of unprovoked aggression, and inaugurated military conversations between the General Staffs. But, whereas under Locarno there was no obligation on France to help Britain if she were attacked, the new arrangement, which reached a precise basis by the end of November, made these obligations reciprocal. In effect, Germany's action had transformed Locarno from a guarantee in which she shared into an alliance against her—an alliance which France had vainly sought ever since 1919. In July 1934, as an aftermath of the Dollfuss murder, Mr. Baldwin had asserted that Britain's frontier lay on the Rhine. The German occupation of the Rhineland, followed as it was by the lengthening of military service to two years and the inauguration of a Four Year Plan on lines of war economy, now made Britain recognize that she might have to stand with her full strength behind that line.

Thus was inaugurated the dual policy which was later defined by Lord Halifax. "Our first resolve is to stop aggression. At the moment the doctrine of force bars the way to settlement. But if the doctrine of force were once abandoned, all outstanding questions would be easy to solve. British policy rests on twin foundations of purpose. One is determination to resist force. The other is our recognition of the world's desire to get on with the constructive work of building peace." The military conversations were the expression of the first purpose. The second was embodied in British attempts to get a conference at which a new Locarno might be framed—attempts which finally collapsed as a result of the Spanish Civil War.

The Rome-Berlin Axis

The vital significance of the Spanish struggle was vividly summarized in a memorandum which Captain Liddell Hart wrote for the British War Office in March 1938. "People who talk of preventing another Great War", he asserted, "are already twenty months out of date. The second Great War of the twentieth century began in July 1936. . . . The direct assistance which Italy gave with aircraft, and the indirect assistance which Germany gave with warships, in transporting Franco's troops across from Africa to Spain, were the first operations of the present war. . . . That we in this country have failed to see this 'war in progress' is due to the fact that we are still thinking politically, whereas the dictator states are thinking militarily."

Whatever the basis of their thinking, there was one earnest and overwhelming thought in the minds of the British and French governments, and that was to prevent the Spanish war from spreading and engulfing Europe. For this purpose they advocated a general policy of non-intervention. It was a policy admirable in theory, but its effectiveness in practice was nullified by the utter refusal of Germany and Italy to abide by their promises. For the sake of peace the democracies refrained from action while the dictators poured men and materials into Spain. The policy prevented open war, but it helped to bring the ultimate conflict a long step nearer; for the co-operation of Mussolini and Hitler led to the Rome-Berlin axis and brought an end to German isolation.

An alliance between Germany and Italy is one of the essential objectives laid down in *Mein Kampf*. For three years Italian suspicion of Germany's designs on Austria stood in the way. But by 1936 Italy's attention had strayed from the Danube and was concentrated on the Mediterranean. Events had shown how useful these two powers might be to each other. German refusal to participate in sanctions over Ethiopia had greatly diminished their effectiveness. German action on the Rhineland had halted a further stiffening of sanctions which might have had the most serious consequences.

Germany on her part had been given a clear illustration of the usefulness of Italy as a check on Britain and France. And now the two states were fighting side by side to crush the Republican government in Spain. It was only a step to extend that collaboration into the general European sphere.

Steps toward that end had in fact been taken early in 1936. Interchanges of official visits started in March. Agreements on commerce and aviation were reached in June. A compromise on Austria was arranged in July. German recognition of the conquest of Ethiopia was a friendly and welcome gesture. On October 25 an accord provided for united action in the diplomatic sphere, and for co-operation in Spain and on the Danube. On November 1, Mussolini at Milan proclaimed the rapprochement as "an axis around which all European states animated by a desire for peace may collaborate".

The immediate consequence of this collaboration was the disappearance of Austria.

The Annexation of Austria

The accession of Hitler to power had brought a decline in Austrian enthusiasm for union with Germany but had increased Nazi pressure on Austria, both within and without. As early as May 1933 there were rumours of a possible Nazi coup. Nazi organizations were active within the country; from across the border came a continual stream of radio propaganda and abuse; a thousand-mark visa fee on German tourists going to Austria hit at an important source of revenue; an "Austrian legion" of Nazi refugees was formed on German soil. Austria soon felt the need of substantial backing against her aggressive neighbour.

By 1934 the appeals of Chancellor Dollfuss had made some impression on the Powers. On February 17, France, Italy, and Britain announced that they took "a common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties". But something more than

expressions of views was wanted. In March a series of agreements between Austria, Hungary, and Italy, embodied in the Rome protocols on economic and political collaboration, showed that Dollfuss had thrown himself into the arms of Mussolini.

The protocols failed to save Dollfuss himself, but they probably, for the moment, saved Austria. In July an attempt at a Nazi rising resulted in the murder of Dollfuss but failed to overthrow the government; and the prompt massing of Italian troops on the frontier was an effective warning to Hitler not to interfere. The event somewhat increased the concern of France and Britain for Austrian freedom. On September 27 these two Powers and Italy reaffirmed their declaration of the previous February. In January 1935, France and Italy promised to consult in case of a threat to Austrian independence. On February 3, Britain agreed to join in such consultations. The pledge was reaffirmed at Stresa in April. And in March of 1936 the reaffirmation of the Rome protocols seemed a surety of Mussolini's continued support.

In actual fact, however, the budding friendship between Hitler and Mussolini had already diminished the latter's zeal on behalf of Austrian independence. He was now anxious to have Austria settle with Germany even at the price of concessions. In consequence, Chancellor Schuschnigg, who had succeeded Dollfuss, felt obliged to conclude the Austro-German agreement of July 11, 1936. In this Hitler recognized "the full sovereignty of the Austrian Federal State"; but Austria's vague promise in return to recognize that she was a German state, and act accordingly, held possibilities sufficiently alarming for those who hoped for her continued independence.

Here again was the question of how far Hitler's promises could be trusted. He had said in the spring of 1933 that he had no thought of invading any country. In his speech of May 21, 1935, he asserted: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss." At the time of the occupation of the Rhineland he announced that the German struggle for equality was concluded, and that "we have no

territorial demands to make in Europe.” And to the specific pledge to Austria in July might be added his assurance on January 30, 1937, that “the period of so-called surprises is now over.”

But against this might be set the reiterated insistence by the Nazis on the union of all Germans in a single Reich. On the first page of *Mein Kampf* Hitler had written: “German-Austria must return to the great German motherland. . . . Common blood belongs in a common Reich.” It was thus a question whether to credit Hitler’s written or spoken words. And in this as in most cases, it was the people who believed *Mein Kampf* who were right.

Within a year of his latest assurances, Hitler had decided to move on Austria. General von Fritsch, head of the German army, and Baron von Neurath, foreign minister, were both opposed. In February 1938 they were dismissed as part of a general shake-up in the higher posts. Once more Hitler was backing his own judgment against the experts who feared that action would mean war.

Action now came swiftly. On February 8, Chancellor Schuschnigg was invited to an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. On the 12th he arrived. He expected to confound Hitler by presenting evidence of a Nazi plot which violated the agreement of 1936. Instead he was subjected to a tirade heavy with menace. Under threat of invasion, Schuschnigg agreed to remove restrictions on the Nazi party and to admit two Nazi sympathizers to ministerial posts. In return Hitler promised to reaffirm Austrian independence.

It was soon apparent that this was only the beginning. Hitler’s speech of February 20 contained loud claims to be the protector of all Germans, but no specific pledge of Austrian freedom. Sensing betrayal, Schuschnigg decided on courage and firmness. He opened negotiations with the leaders of the working class, whose organizations had been smashed in the bloody days of February 1934; and he announced a referendum for March 13 on the question of Austrian independence.

The last measure precipitated action. Mussolini called it “a weapon that will explode in your hands”. Hitler was sure that this time there

would be no Italian troops on the Brenner Pass. Von Ribbentrop in London was assuring the British government that Hitler had no intention of attacking Austria. France, as a result of the resignation of Premier Chautemps, was without a government. Nazi demonstrations broke out in Austria. The German press screamed about Austrian atrocities. An ultimatum issued at noon on March 11 demanded that the plebiscite be called off. At four o'clock a second one demanded that Schusschnigg resign by seven-thirty. Rejection of either would mean a German invasion. Sooner than cause bloodshed, Schusschnigg complied. A hastily-formed government under Nazi leaders invited Hitler to send troops into Austria to preserve order. On the morning of the 12th the invasion began. On the 13th Austria was formally annexed. On the 14th Hitler rode in triumph into Vienna, his first bloodless conquest.

It needed only a glance at the map to show that Czechoslovakia would be the next.

The Crisis of May 1938

The very existence of Czechoslovakia was an affront to some of the most basic elements in the Nazi creed. Within the borders of that state, principally in the western area known as the Sudetenland, were more than three million inhabitants of German race. They and their ancestors had been there for centuries. Up to 1919 they had been subjects, not of Germany, but of the Hapsburg empire. But the idea of people of German blood living under Slav rulers outraged the Nazi racial doctrines. The policy of reuniting all Germans in a single state was bound to extend to the Sudetens.

But besides the call of blood, there was the call of soil. To the Nazi program of eastward expansion, Czechoslovakia presented a formidable obstacle. This "fortress built by God in the heart of Europe", as Bismarck called it, was strengthened by modern defensive works and manned by a well-equipped army. More than that, it was in alliance with France, and thus an instrument of a possible war on two fronts. It must be detached and crushed if the way was to be cleared for the realization of Nazi ambitions.

But above all, Czechoslovakia had entered into close relations with Russia. A treaty, concluded at the time of the Franco-Soviet alliance, provided for mutual aid on condition that France should also fulfil her obligations. The idea that a small neighbouring state should accept Bolshevik help roused the Nazis to fury. More and more, Russia was being presented to the German people as their ultimate mortal enemy, and the spoils to be won from Russia were dangled enticingly before their eyes. The proceedings at the Nuremberg rally in September 1936 were chiefly composed of diatribes against the Soviets. Hitler declared "If we had the Ural mountains with their incalculable store of treasures in raw materials, Siberia with its vast forests, and the Ukraine with its tremendous wheat fields, Germany under National Socialist leadership would swim in plenty."

This hostility to Bolshevism found expression in the Anti-Comintern pact, signed by Germany and Japan in November 1936. Although formally directed against Communism rather than against Russia specifically, its promise to take severe measures against Communist activities "at home or abroad" was none the less menacing because of its vagueness. Italy joined the agreement in 1937; Spain, Hungary, and Manchukuo later affixed their signatures. In contrast to these allies in the struggle, Czechoslovakia appeared to Hitler as a state that was being "used by Bolshevism as its point of entry. It was not we who sought a contact with Bolshevism, but Bolshevism used this state to dig a channel into Central Europe." Rumours of Russian airplanes and bases on Czech soil were used to lend point to this accusation. The idea that Czechoslovakia was an instrument for Russian attack on Germany was easily expanded into a belief that the Czechs themselves were Bolsheviks.

At the time of the seizure of Austria, Germany had given assurances that she had no designs on Czechoslovakia. It was soon apparent that this promise had about as much value as previous Nazi pledges. The tactics already used against Austria were brought into play. A stream of insults was directed by German officials and the German press against the Czechs and their leaders. Reckless accusations of Czech atrocities were spread broadcast. Internal discontent

was stirred up among the Slovaks and the Germans; and among the latter the instrument was the Sudeten German party led by Konrad Henlein.

This group had achieved new prominence as a result of the depression and the rise of Hitler. From 1933 on it had the increasing backing of the German state. Its demands, however, were for the present limited to greater freedom within Czechoslovakia. Autonomy, not annexation, remained its official aim up to the eve of Munich.

The annexation of Austria encouraged Henlein to new boldness. On April 25, 1936, his Carlsbad program embodied a claim to almost complete independence for all Germans within the state, on a basis which would practically hand them over to Hitler's direction. In May the organization of Sudeten storm troops was a further sign that trouble was in store.

The Powers, and particularly Britain, were still reluctant to meet this trouble half way. Five days after the seizure of Austria, Russia proposed a conference to consider means for checking further aggression. Britain regarded this as premature, and refused to take on new obligations in eastern Europe. The Soviet proposal, said Chamberlain on March 24, "appeared to involve less consultation with a view to settlement than concerting of action against an eventuality which has not yet arisen." But while refusing any prior guarantees, he added the warning: "Where peace or war is concerned legal obligations are not alone involved and if war broke out it would likely not be confined to those who have assumed such obligations." In other words, though Britain would not promise to join, neither would she promise to stand aside.

The extent of the danger was shown in the crisis which culminated May 21. Czech municipal elections were due on May 22. On May 19 came word of the concentration of eleven German divisions on the frontier. To British inquiries, Germany replied that the troop movements were "routine". But a frontier shooting incident, and the refusal of Henlein to continue negotiations which had been in progress with the government, convinced the Czechs that an invasion

was in prospect. On Friday, May 21, they manned their frontier fortifications and appealed to Britain and France. The French government promised to stand by the Czechs. Britain agreed to come to the support of France. French action would bring in Russia as well. By Monday the crisis was over, with Germany indignantly denying that she had any designs on Czechoslovakia, and Henlein agreeing to renew negotiations with Premier Hodza.

Munich

But this was only a temporary easing of the tension. The Sudeten question had brought Europe to the verge of a general war. In the British view, a new attempt at "consultation with a view to settlement" was urgently called for before a new crisis should make war unavoidable. France was equally anxious for a peaceful solution. A German suggestion that the four western powers should "arbitrate" the issue was rejected on July 22. But the Czechs were urged to make the utmost possible concessions to the Sudetens; and on August 4, in the role of "investigator and mediator", Lord Runciman arrived in Prague.

The record of the next six weeks is one of increasing Czech concessions answered by increasing Nazi aggressiveness. On September 5 a liberal scheme giving the Sudeten Germans local autonomy and a full share in the central government was put forward. But by this time the German press was screaming atrocity stories and denouncing the Czechs as liars and torturers and murderers who wished to wade in German blood, and disorders provoked by Germans seemed designed to pave the way for intervention.

"We are convinced", said Sir John Simon on August 27, "that, given good will on all sides, it should be possible to find a solution which is just to all legitimate interests." But Germany was determined on a solution on her own lines, even at the risk of war. The final stage was opened by Hitler's speech at Nuremberg on September 12, 1938. The Nazi state, he shouted, was beset by plotters, from democrats to Bolsheviks. The Sudeten Germans were being treated like wild beasts.

Germany would not submit to such treatment. Her fortifications in the west had been rushed to completion since May. "In no circumstances shall I be willing any more to regard with endless tranquillity a continuation of the oppression of German compatriots in Czechoslovakia."

The speech was the signal for outbreaks in the Sudeten area. Apparently it was expected that the German army would at once move across the frontier. But there was no invasion, and the Czech police soon restored order. On September 15, Henlein for the first time definitely demanded annexation. The Czech government answered by ordering his arrest, and he fled to Germany. In spite of Hitler's menaces, Prague was standing firm.

It was a question, however, whether a firm stand did not merely increase the danger of war. On September 14, Premier Chamberlain decided on a personal attempt to reach an agreement with Hitler. "In view of the increasingly critical situation," he telegraphed, "I propose to come over at once to see you with a view to trying to find a peaceful solution." On the 15th he arrived by air and met Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

In the interview which followed, Chamberlain discovered that "the situation was much more acute and much more urgent than I had realized." Hitler impressed him as determined to annex the Sudetenland and as contemplating an immediate invasion. The most he would promise was that, if Britain agreed to his demands, and if nothing new happened to force his hand, he would refrain from active hostilities until Chamberlain had time to consult his cabinet. "I have no doubt", Chamberlain later told the House of Commons, "that my visit alone prevented an invasion for which everything had been prepared."

On the 16th Lord Runciman communicated the substance of the report which he later embodied in a letter to the Prime Minister on September 21. In this document he pointed out that the Czechs had agreed to practically all Henlein's demands, and that for the most recent difficulties Henlein and his followers were directly to blame. But, he went on, "there is real danger, even the danger of civil war,

in the continuance of this state of uncertainty. Consequently there are very real reasons for a policy of immediate drastic action." That action Lord Runciman concluded, by a curious process of logic, should consist first of all in giving in to Henlein by handing over the Sudeten area to Germany.

With this decision taken, the British government conferred with the French Premier and Foreign Minister, who came to London on the 19th. The outcome was the presentation next day to the Czech government of a series of demands whose nature was that of an ultimatum. These included the transfer of all areas with over 50 per cent. of German inhabitants; the adjustment of the frontier by an international body; and the guarantee of the new boundaries by an international guarantee, in which Britain and France would join. When the Czech government protested, and proposed arbitration under the German-Czech treaty of 1925, Mr. Benes was told in a message delivered at 2.15 A.M. that Britain and France would refuse support if he rejected the proposal. On the 21st the Czechs yielded, and next day Chamberlain flew to Godesberg to get a final agreement from Hitler.

He found that Hitler was not yet satisfied. A new memorandum, accompanied by a map, embodied demands for still further concessions, including immediate military occupation of the areas to be ceded. This last condition opened up that very prospect of an armed clash which Chamberlain was striving to avert. But his protest to Hitler got for reply only a long diatribe against the Czechs and a threat of immediate action.

Chamberlain returned from Godesberg with peace still in the balance. The new demands were sent to Prague, with the remark that "the French and British governments cannot continue to take the responsibility of advising them not to mobilize." It was an implied promise of support in case the Czechs, as they were almost bound to do, rejected the demands. Czech rejection and mobilization did in fact follow; and on September 26 the promise was made definite by an announcement in London that if Germany attacked Czecho-


slovakia, "the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France."

Hitler showed few signs of retreat. A proposal for a conference of powers came to nothing. On September 26 Hitler demanded surrender by October 1, and promised that "if this problem is solved there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany." He was later reported to have told Mussolini that he had decided to begin the invasion on September 28. Two messages from President Roosevelt failed to shake his attitude. The British fleet was mobilized. France called up reserves and manned the Maginot Line. Chamberlain appealed to Mussolini to use his influence, and wrote to Hitler: "I feel that you can get all the essentials without war and without delay." But it almost looked as though Hitler wanted war as well.

On the 28th the tension broke. Hitler invited Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini to a conference at Munich. On the 30th, shortly after midnight, the agreement was signed. The ceded areas were to be occupied by stages between October 1 and 10. A commission was to define the frontiers and to decide in what areas plebiscites should be held. Provision was made for acquisitions by Poland and Hungary. Britain and France renewed their promise of a guarantee. In addition, Britain and Germany signed a declaration that the accord was "symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again."

Even this treaty failed to curb Hitler's demands. In the end he took over, not only areas with a German majority, but purely Czech areas as well. The international commission on boundaries failed to check German rapacity. A force to police the plebiscite areas was raised in Britain and then disbanded. No plebiscites were held. The guarantee treaty was never drawn up. And on December 19 Mr. Chamberlain said of the Nazi government: "I am still waiting for a sign . . . that they are prepared to make their contribution to peace."

The sign was never forthcoming. German pressure on the remnant of Czechoslovakia—now reorganized into a federal state—continued in a series of economic and political demands. On September 26



CENTRAL EUROPE, 1918-1939

Hitler had said: "We are not interested in oppressing other peoples. We do not wish at all to have other nationalities among us. . . . At the moment that Czechoslovakia has solved her other problems . . . the Czech state no longer interests me. We do not want any Czechs any more."

In March 1939 Hitler annexed Bohemia and Moravia and proclaimed a protectorate over Slovakia.

The Absorption of Czechoslovakia

The steps leading to this action followed a pattern now becoming familiar—the fomenting of internal disorders and of violent Slovak demands for autonomy, the unleashing of a campaign in the German press charging "a bloody Czech terror" and "an orgy of Hussite insolence", the summoning of Premier Hacha from Prague to Berlin, the extraction from him of a "request" for German intervention while troops were already on the move. But the implications were new; and when Mr. Chamberlain asserted that "public opinion in the world has received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered to it even by the present régime in Germany," he expressed a realization that German policy had entered upon a new stage which the old methods were no longer adequate to meet.

The first stage of Hitler's policy culminated in the occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. It was concerned with the removal of the internal restrictions which the Treaty of Versailles had imposed upon Germany. In 1938, in the second stage, came the attack on the frontiers established by the treaty, on the ground that they violated "self-determination" and the right of all Germans to unite in a single state. But neither national independence nor racial unity could be put forward as a reason for the new annexations. They were based on a claim to more soil which opened up a prospect of indefinite expansion. "Bohemia and Moravia", said Hitler in his proclamation, "have for thousands of years belonged to the living space of the German people. Force and unreason have arbitrarily torn them from their old historical setting. . . . It is in accordance with the principle of self-preservation that the Reich is resolved to intervene decisively, to

re-establish the bases of a reasonable Central European order." On such grounds it would be easy to envisage a German attempt to re-establish the Holy Roman Empire over the whole of northern and eastern Europe.

Thus any fancied security which the small states enjoyed from the belief that Hitler wanted only Germans in the Reich disappeared completely. "These recent happenings", said Chamberlain, "have, rightly or wrongly, made every state which lies adjacent to Germany unhappy, anxious and uncertain about Germany's future intention." The seizure of Memel from Lithuania on March 21 was hardly likely to quiet these emotions. The states of the Danubian and Balkan areas looked with concern on the new developments. Already an aggressive trade drive by Germany had linked them closely to the Nazi economic system. The effort at complete Nazi domination, not only economic but political, seemed likely to be pressed more actively than ever. This was shown by the report that on March 17 Germany had presented a virtual ultimatum to Rumania which would have placed the economic life of that country completely under German control. The report was denied by Germany, which later negotiated a more moderate trade treaty with Rumania. But German denials had now ceased to carry any weight with the governments of Europe.

The prospect of an indefinite expansion of German control was bound to affect the policy of the other Powers, including Britain. At the height of the Munich crisis, Mr. Chamberlain had said in a broadcast speech: "I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me. But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted." Now, in condemning the new annexations, he asked significantly: "Is this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new? Is this the last attack upon a small state, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?"

There seemed to be only too little room for doubt about the answers. The whole basis of conciliation and good faith, on which the

Munich agreement was presumed to rest, had now been demolished. Hitler's assurances, said Chamberlain, had been thrown to the winds, and British confidence was completely destroyed. A new basis of British policy was clearly indicated.

The Peace Front

The nature of that basis was defined by Lord Halifax on March 20. "If and when it becomes plain to states that there is no apparent guarantee against successive attacks directed in turn on all who may seem to stand in the way of ambitious schemes of domination, then at once the scale tips the other way, and in all quarters there is likely immediately to be found very much greater readiness to consider whether the acceptance of wider mutual obligations in the case of mutual support is not dictated, if for no other reason, by the necessities of self-defence."

The dual policy of Britain, in fact, now changed its nature. It was not abandoned, but the emphasis was directly reversed. Hitherto the chief stress had been placed on conciliation, with the prospect of resistance held reluctantly in reserve as a last desperate resort. Now it was clear that resistance was the first necessity; but there was still hope that, when the strength and determination of that resistance was made overwhelmingly apparent, a return to conciliation, with some prospect of success, would be possible.

One result was the acceleration of British rearmament. Already foreshadowed in the spring of 1935, the definite decision had been taken in 1936; and by 1937 an expenditure of one and a half billion pounds over a five-year period had been decided upon. Already in February 1939 it was apparent that this was likely to be exceeded. The events of March provided a new impetus; and from £283,500,000 in the previous year, British defence estimates rose to £382,456,000, with nearly £600,000,000 in prospect for the following year. British forces were increased at the end of March. Negotiations for the accumulation of a reserve of raw materials were begun with the United States in May. And on April 27 the most unprecedented step of all was taken when Britain announced the adoption of peace-time

conscription. The nation was mobilizing its forces for the coming emergency.

Meanwhile the united front of Britain and France was being steadily consolidated. On February 6 their mutual commitments were confirmed by Chamberlain in a statement that all the forces of each country would be at the disposal of the other in case of war, and that "the solidarity of interest by which France and this country are united is such that any threat to the vital interests of France, from whatever quarter it came, must evoke the immediate co-operation of this country." The meaning of this solidarity was shown on March 7, when plans were revealed for a British expeditionary force of 19 divisions—a possible 300,000 men. The adoption of conscription was a further earnest of British intentions. From that time on, Britain and France, in all matters of diplomacy, must be understood to be acting as one.

The most acute question in diplomacy was now Poland. Immediately after his triumphs in Bohemia and Memel, Hitler had turned his attention to his eastern neighbour. He demanded the return of the Free City of Danzig, the cession of a strip of land for a motor road across the Polish Corridor, and increased rights for the German minority in Poland. The Poles rejected the demand, called up troops, and notified France and England. France was already bound to Poland by an alliance. Now England came to her side. On March 31, Chamberlain stated: "In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered vital to resist with their national force, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all the support in their power."

This was the beginning of the peace front whose aim was to check further aggression, if necessary by force. In the following month, similar guarantees were given to Rumania and Greece by France and Britain, and an agreement on mutual aid in the Mediterranean was reached between Britain and Turkey in May. These pledges were a departure in British policy almost as revolutionary as conscription. Ever since the war, Britain had steadily refused to accept remote and

indefinite commitments in central and eastern Europe. Her reversal of that policy was the measure of her determination at all costs to check the threat of Nazi domination of Europe.

Danzig and Poland

Hitler's reply was characteristic: he repudiated another set of treaties. In his speech on April 28, he used the British guarantee to Poland as an excuse for denouncing both the declaration of friendship which Germany and England had issued at Munich, and the Anglo-German naval treaty of 1936. This was something which Britain could take calmly, as she had taken the German announcement the previous December of an intention to raise German submarine strength to the level of Britain's. More serious was the denunciation of the German-Polish non-aggression treaty of 1934. Here was an agreement concluded for a ten-year period, to which Hitler was accustomed to point with special pride as a proof of his will to peace. In May 1935 he said: "We recognize the Polish state as the home of a great patriotic nation with the understanding and the cordial friendship of candid nationalists." In February 1938 he said that the understanding "has succeeded in removing all friction between Germany and Poland and made it possible to work together in true amity." In the following September he asserted: "We are all convinced that this agreement will result in a lasting appeasement." As late as the end of January 1939, Herr von Ribbentrop had said in the course of a visit to Warsaw: "I can assure the Germans in Poland that the agreement of 1934 has put a final end to enmity between our two peoples." Now, in April, Hitler tore up that agreement on the ground that it had been infringed by the British guarantee and was "thereby no longer in existence".

The campaign against Poland now took on a familiar intensity. The German press screamed about the frightful maltreatment of Germans in Poland and the intolerable provocation which Poland was offering to Germany. Herr Forster, leader of the Danzig Nazis, shuttled between that city and Berlin in a manner reminiscent of Konrad Henlein. Hitler's hands were strengthened in May by the

conclusion of a military alliance with Italy, by which each was strictly bound to help the other in case of armed conflict. Mutual expulsions of Poles and Germans took place. "Tourists" closely resembling storm troopers were suddenly moved to visit Danzig in great numbers. Arms were smuggled into the city in increasing quantities. Clashes within Poland multiplied; a conflict threatened between the Danzig authorities and the Polish customs guards; border shootings added an ominous touch. "Germany" said Hitler after these had served their tragic purpose, "was determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on her own frontier, and, what is more, to do so not only in the interests of order, but also in the interests of European peace."

Britain meanwhile, in her efforts to complete the peace front, had opened negotiations with Russia.

Negotiations with Russia

On March 18 the British government had asked what the Soviet government would do in case of an unprovoked attack on Rumania. Russia had replied with a suggestion for an international conference to consider the question of German aggression. This the British government, with a singular choice of adjectives, described as premature; but following a conference with the French President in London on March 21, Britain decided to suggest that France, Poland, and Russia join her in a statement which would include a pledge to consult in case of new aggression. With the decision to guarantee Poland and the other states, a closer agreement with Russia and a more positive basis of action became urgently desirable. Already, in a speech on foreign policy on March 10, Stalin had said: "We support those peoples who have become the victims of aggressions in their fight for independence." The chance for an agreement now seemed hopeful on both sides.

The full reasons for the collapse of these hopes will only be known when a complete account of the negotiations is available. One factor, however, soon became clear. The Soviet government wanted to extend a binding joint guarantee to cover the Baltic states, and to

cover them from indirect as well as from overt aggression. The Baltic states on their part loudly refused to accept any unasked aid, particularly from Russia. Britain sought some compromise arrangement. "I hope that it may be possible now", said Chamberlain on June 7, "to suggest a formula acceptable to the three Governments which, while having regard to the rights and interests of other States, will assure co-operation between those Powers in resistance to aggression." Still the talks dragged on. Soviet impatience had found expression on May 3 in the replacing of Litvinoff by Molotoff as foreign minister. On June 12 Mr. William Strang, an official of the Foreign Office, left for Moscow with new proposals. On July 31, with the difficulties still unsolved, Britain and France decided to send a military mission to Moscow. But by the middle of August the question was still deadlocked and the crisis entered a new and final phase.

On August 16, while the mobilization of Europe's armies, for the third time in a year, was gathering headway, Germany announced a new series of demands which implied the annexation of the Polish corridor as well as of Danzig. On the same day the British Ambassador in Berlin reported a conversation with the Secretary of State, Baron von Weizsacker. "He seemed very confident and professed to believe that Russian assistance to the Poles would not only be entirely negligible but that the U.S.S.R. would even, in the end, join in sharing the Polish spoils. Nor did my insistence on the inevitability of British intervention seem to move him." On the 18th, German troops occupied Slovakia and began to mass on Poland's southern border. On the 19th a Russo-German commercial treaty was concluded. And on the 21st the two countries announced that they had decided to conclude a non-aggression pact.

Germany and Russia, in actual fact, had had a non-aggression pact since 1926. But in view of Hitler's diatribes against communism it had been regarded on all sides as a dead letter. The announcement of the new agreement, particularly at this time, lent it a vital significance; and the actual pact, which was dated August 23, was far more comprehensive and binding than the old one. It was a

clear indication of Hitler's determination to eliminate Russia as a prelude to definite action on Poland.

The Coming of War

If Hitler expected Britain and France to back down he completely miscalculated. The first result was the reaffirmation of the guarantees to Poland and their embodiment in a definite treaty. France called up fresh reserves. Britain made her stand clear in a note to Germany on August 22:

It has been alleged that if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914 a great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any truth in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to employ without delay all forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged.

This warning, however, was accompanied by a plea for a truce and for direct negotiations between Poland and Germany, with an offer of British co-operation to achieve a settlement. It was embodied in a personal message from Chamberlain to Hitler which Sir Neville Henderson carried by airplane to Berlin. His reception was stormy, and the reply he received was uncompromising. Danzig and the Corridor were interests which Germany could not renounce. British actions had encouraged Polish aggression. Britain's intention to mobilize was "a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich". The suggestion of a truce was completely ignored.

Other leaders now added their efforts to the cause of peace. King Leopold of Belgium, acting for the Western neutrals, broadcast an appeal on the 23rd. Next day over the radio the Pope uttered the reminder: "Nothing is lost by peace—everything may be lost by war." On the 24th, while eleven million men gathered under arms in Europe and the British battle fleet steamed to its stations, President Roosevelt sent out three messages. He urged the King of Italy to try to prevent war. He asked President Moscicki of Poland to adopt methods of peaceful settlement. He sent a similar appeal

to Hitler. Next day, when Poland's acceptance had arrived, he appealed again to Hitler—for the fifth time within a year. Neither message was answered. A personal letter from Daladier to Hitler, as one old front-fighter to another, brought a reply which conceded nothing whatever.

British diplomacy continued its efforts. On August 25, Sir Neville Henderson carried to London a message in which Hitler promised that when he had been satisfied on colonies and had settled with Poland, he would guarantee the British Empire and accept a reasonable limitation of armaments. Britain replied on the 28th that she would willingly discuss these topics, but there must first be a fair settlement of the Polish question, and that no offer of special advantages could persuade Britain to go back on her guarantees. The Poles, Hitler was informed, were ready to discuss matters; and meanwhile Britain was urging them to avoid any action which might lead to a clash.

Blackouts were now general in the great European cities. Civilians and children were being evacuated from Paris and London. Germany was waiting for Russia to ratify the non-aggression pact. On the 29th a fresh German note was handed to the British Ambassador. The state of affairs created by the barbaric actions of Poland "was unbearable for a great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take necessary steps for the safeguarding of justified German interests." (The passive onlooker was now fully mobilized. But when, next day, Poland ordered partial mobilization, the German radio denounced it as a "grave and wholly unjustified provocation"). The German government, however, agreed "to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers". They expected him to arrive next day.

The British government seized on this last straw. During the day of August 30 they sent five telegrams to Berlin, telling of pressure on Poland to avoid all frontier incidents and pleading for more time. In a telegram and a further note sent off that evening,

they urged that the procedure was unreasonable and that Germany should take the ordinary course of negotiating through the Polish ambassador, and renewed the proposal for a truce during negotiations.

When this note was presented at midnight on August 30, Herr von Ribbentrop replied by producing a long document which he read rapidly in German. This was the 16-point proposal for a settlement based on the return of Danzig to Germany, the retention of Gdynia by Poland, and a plebiscite in the Corridor with certain rights safeguarded for both sides whatever the outcome. But when Sir Neville Henderson asked him for the text of these proposals, Ribbentrop answered that it was now too late, since the Poles had not sent an envoy to Berlin. The alleged offer was thus never presented to Poland at all. At the urging of the British government, the Polish ambassador, after repeated efforts, at length obtained access to Ribbentrop next evening, August 31. But the Russian pact had now been ratified and Germany's way was clear. When the Polish ambassador tried to get in touch with Warsaw he found that communication had been cut off by the German government. At dawn next morning the German invasion of Poland began. "No other means is left to me", announced Hitler, "than to meet force with force."

Britain and France were now bound to come to Poland's aid. In a last desperate hope, however, they waited two more days. Mussolini, who had already decided on neutrality in spite of his treaty with Germany, suggested a conference. Britain and France accepted on condition that Germany withdraw her troops from Poland. At the same time, Britain and France sent a direct demand to Germany for withdrawal or war. They waited in vain for a reply until Sunday September 3, and then set definite time limits. The British time limit expired at 11 A.M., the French at 5 P.M. When these hours had passed, the nations were at war.

2

SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 1939

The Belligerents

THE German invasion of Poland on September 1, and the entry of France and Britain into the conflict on September 3, marked not so much the beginning of a new war as the opening of a more intensive phase of a war that was already in progress. How long it had actually been going on was a matter of interpretation. One possible opinion was that it had never stopped at all during the years since 1914. A more moderate view, such as that voiced by Captain Liddell Hart, might take the outbreak of the Spanish revolt in July 1936 as the starting point. But to any informed observer it was at least clear that the struggle had been waged, bloodlessly but with growing intensity, for a considerable period before the resort to armed hostilities.

For it was now universally recognized that modern war consisted in something more than the clash of armed men. It was a struggle of nations using all the resources at their disposal to beat down their opponents and to protect themselves from destruction. As Hobbes once wrote, "The nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto." Armies and navies and air fleets

were the final reserves to be thrown into the scale. But although these might secure the ultimate decision, they could not secure it unaided. They were only the spearhead which must be backed by the shaft of the whole national effort. Upon the extent of the national resources in industrial capacity and economic staying power, even more than upon the numerical strength of the armed forces, depended the strength of that shaft and the degree of striking power behind it. A summary of the war potential of the belligerents at the outset of the conflict involves an estimate of their economic resources and their strategic position no less than of their strength in the field.

∩ To begin with, all three major belligerents were, in varying degree, industrial nations. In a war in which the fighting forces were dependent upon mechanical weapons and on the vast quantities of munitions and supplies which those weapons demanded, this was the first essential. As far as plant went, Germany undoubtedly had the advantage. Her industrial capacity, second only to that of the United States, was roughly equal to that of Britain and France combined. Moreover, while the efforts of British and French industry were directed chiefly to satisfying the ordinary peace-time needs of the community, German industry was already organized for purposes of war. The Four Year Plan of 1936, which placed the whole of the German economy under the direction of General Goering, was intended to make Germany immune from defeat either by arms or by blockade.* Guns instead of butter was its slogan. "We are living in a fortress," said Goering; and in this fortress the energies of the eighty million inhabitants were directed first of all to the purposes of defence.

∩ In contrast, the Allies had taken few steps to control their economy for war-time ends. The governments of France and Britain had indeed been granted wide powers of regulation over industry and imports and foreign exchange. But apart from the steps toward the nationalization of the arms industry which had been taken by the Blum government, France had done little to apply these controls. Even the plans for specific war industries which Britain had evolved in connection with

* "The Four Year Plan is a result of our thought along the lines of war economy, and is meant to bring us what other states have in their countries, and what every country needs in order to hold its own in the world."—General Thomas, head of the Economic Division, German General Staff.

rearmament had been given only a moderate application, and it was not until June 1939 that central co-ordination was provided through the establishment of a Ministry of Supply. The economy of these two countries was still essentially on a civilian basis when war broke out.

But although in this respect Germany might seem to have an initial advantage, it had to be qualified in a number of ways. In the first place, the very fact that consumer goods had already been so drastically reduced in favour of armaments left little margin for further intensification of productive efforts for war purposes. Something could of course be done by rationing, which would cut down ordinary consumption still further and leave both workers and materials available for war industries. General von Fritsch had once remarked: "Though you can finish a war with ration cards, you daren't start with them." But General von Fritsch had been out of favour since his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief in February 1938 as a result of his opposition to the invasion of Austria. And not long after the war began it was revealed that he had met his death in Poland while carrying out a dangerous reconnaissance operation. What was the nature of that operation, or why a general of his eminence should be engaged on it, were questions on which the outside world was left to speculate unaided.

So the war, as far as Germany was concerned, started with ration cards. A series of decrees placed drastic restrictions on such articles as food, clothing, soap and motor cars. "Of meat", the rotund Goering told a German audience on September 9, "it can be said that we eat far too much of it in any case. With less meat we shall get thinner and so need less material for a suit." But with living standards already close to the minimum, and a labor shortage even before war broke out, Germany seemed almost at the peak of her economic effort.

France and Britain, on the other hand, had still a very considerable margin, and one which could be further increased by effective co-operation. Already they had agreed to co-ordinate their military efforts in case of war. When war broke out, they proceeded to extend this co-ordination to the economic sphere. A trade accord on November

17 was followed by a financial agreement on December 12. Together they constituted an arrangement of unprecedented scope. It practically amounted to a pooling of their joint resources in war materials, food, and shipping tonnage as well as in credits abroad. A common policy on foreign purchases was intended not only to avoid competitive buying, but to aid in regulating imports in relation to production schedules and in planning an even distribution between the two countries of the commodities which both would need. Assets in foreign exchange were to be used in common; the exchange rate was fixed at 176.5 francs to the pound; consultation and common action on prices and credit were provided for; and the burden of financial aid to other countries was to be divided in the ratio of 40 to France and 60 to Britain. "By this means", said the Allied communiqué of the November accord, "arrangements have been carried into effect two months after the beginning of hostilities for the organization of common action by the two countries which was achieved during the last conflict at the end of the third year." The December agreement carried this far beyond anything that existed during the Great War.

In the second place, industry, whether in peace or war, depends on raw materials; and here Germany was at a distinct disadvantage. Even her food supply was estimated as only 83 per cent. adequate, with deficiencies in fruits, in vegetables, and especially in fats. In industrial raw materials Germany normally imported one-third of her needs, in spite of her efforts to increase home production and to develop substitute materials. Of essential supplies, she had a surplus only in coal, potash and magnesite. She was deficient particularly in such vital materials as cotton, rubber, oil and iron ore. It was true that the actual territories of Britain and France also lacked many of these supplies. But some were available within their empires, and they still had access to the sources of others abroad. For Germany such access was a far more difficult problem so long as her enemies retained command of the sea.

On the military side, Germany again had an initial advantage which seemed unlikely to extend to the long run. With regard to the army, indeed, any disparity which existed seemed to favour the Allies.

Germany's standing army of 850,000 stood against a French force of 708,000 and a British of 250,000. Each side could make between two and three million men available under full mobilization. In theory Germany, with her population of over eighty million, should be able to maintain equality of numbers. But in fact the demands of home production were expected to be more serious in Germany than in France or Britain. A tentative estimate placed the total available German man power at three and a half million as against five million for Britain and France. And in the case of these reserves the absence of universal military training in Germany after 1919, though modified by the existence of semi-military organizations, was thought to have affected the quality of her recruits as compared with that of the French. Another defect attributed to Germany was the shortage of competent officers in the responsible grades from captain to colonel. The German General Staff might retain all its old brilliance, but the field officers appeared to be a decidedly weak link in the military machine.

Where Germany had the greatest preponderance was in the air. Although accurate statistics were lacking, she probably had between 10,000 and 12,000 planes, of which perhaps 6000 were first-line. Combined British and French strength was certainly short of this, perhaps by as much as 20 per cent. Shortage in quantity, however, may in certain respects have been modified by superior quality. There was ground for belief that British planes were more soundly constructed, and that the speedy German fighters lacked the flexibility in manoeuvres of their British counterparts. And here again Germany's rapid expansion involved a problem of trained pilots, and particularly of squadron leaders. In this respect, and in that of its staff, the British air force was probably, for its size, the most formidable in Europe.

In the air, losses and deterioration combined were expected to be in war-time as high as 90 per cent. monthly. In replacement capacity, as in initial strength, Germany started with an advantage, but one expected to be only temporary. Against her production of 1000 to 1200 planes a month was Britain's 700 to 800 and a French production

of possibly 200. At the close of the year, reliable estimates placed Allied production only slightly behind Germany's estimated 1500 a month, and credited them with some 8400 planes against a possible 9300 for Germany. In addition, Britain was developing in Canada an aeroplane industry and training-ground for pilots whose contribution would certainly be of the first importance. On even a moderate estimate it was thought that any German superiority which remained was unlikely to last beyond spring.

The Strategic Position

In considering the demand which the war would make upon these varied resources, one difference between the two sides was immediately obvious. If Germany had no imperial possessions, she was also free from imperial obligations. She had no need to scatter her forces to protect colonies or to defend trade routes. As in 1914, she could concentrate her effort; and once again her geographical position allowed her to operate on interior lines. A consideration of the strategic situation, in fact, was hardly possible without comparing it with that of 1914.

The first and most obvious fact was that in 1939, in contrast to 1914, Germany stood alone. The alliance with Italy, enthusiastically praised by both partners as a "pact of steel", was less than four months old when the war broke out. At once, in spite of protestations of her continued loyalty to the alliance, Italy took up an attitude of determined neutrality—an attitude symbolized by the ministerial changes of October 31 which eliminated the chief partisans of Germany from the government. Count Ciano's speech to the Chamber of Corporations on December 16 revealed that Italy had stipulated for three years of peace in order to complete her military preparations, that Germany went to war with Poland in spite of Italian efforts to avert hostilities, and that the German-Soviet agreement had been anything but welcome. The official tone of Italian pronouncements was still favourable to Germany, but that appeared to be motivated less by affection for the Reich than by a continued irritation at Britain

and France. It seemed increasingly probable that Italy would once more accept the most attractive terms offered by either side.

This attitude on the part of Italy, and even more the German-Soviet pact, had an important influence on another member of the Anti-Comintern group. General Franco's victory in Spain had been hailed by himself and his supporters as a triumph over Bolshevism. Any prospect which Germany entertained of Spanish help in gratitude for her aid to France was gravely diminished by the treaty with Russia. It might in any case have been questionable whether Spain would move unless Italy moved as well. As it was, Spanish neutrality was for the moment assured. These developments for the moment relieved the Allies of the vital threat which might otherwise have developed to their position in the Mediterranean—an outcome which was due at least as much to good luck as to good management.

At the other end of the Mediterranean the situation was definitely more favourable to the Allies than it had been in 1914. Then Turkey had entered on the side of Germany. Now she was not merely a neutral, but a neutral who was pledged to resist any German aggression in the Balkan area. A definite treaty of mutual assistance in the eastern Mediterranean, including specific guarantees to Greece and Rumania, was concluded between Turkey and the Allies on October 19. It was followed by a trade treaty between Turkey and Britain, and by military conversations between the three states. The Allies were thus assured of a co-ordination of defence efforts in the Balkans and the Near East.

The other ally of Germany in 1914 was Austria-Hungary. The Hapsburg empire had been liquidated at Versailles; but one ultimate result had been the absorption by Nazi Germany of those former Hapsburg territories, Austria and Czechoslovakia. This might be regarded as partially offsetting the disappearance of Germany's former ally, particularly from the strategic point of view. The domination of Bohemia, that "fortress built by God in the heart of Europe", was thus once more assured. There were economic advantages also in the acquisition of both industrial plant and natural resources, though

these advantages were by no means unmixed. From the purely military point of view, on the other hand, the increase in manpower was far from the equivalent of the old Austrian army. On the contrary, the presence of a hostile and resentful population in Austria and Czechoslovakia might become a serious problem which would hamper the war effort of the Reich.

But if Germany stood alone, she stood against fewer enemies. In the west, of course, their comparative strength had every appearance of being greater than in 1914. Britain's naval preponderance was more overwhelming. France's army was rated almost unanimously—the Germans alone dissenting—as the finest in the world. France's land defences, a monument to the convictions and the determination of André Maginot, were believed to be so strong as to make a direct assault suicidal; and while this might make a flank attack through Belgium or Switzerland more tempting, it was assumed that the French High Command would be fully prepared for such a move. To balance against all this, however, was the fact that if Germany could not invade France, France would have equal difficulty in invading Germany. And in the east, whence Tsarist Russia had launched an invasion in 1914, there now stood the Soviet Union in the full flush of a newborn friendship with the Third Reich.

This eliminated the danger, with which the General Staff had been so concerned, of a major war on two fronts. It did not eliminate the second front entirely. But at least Poland seemed to offer a less formidable problem; and Germany, by throwing all her weight against the weaker enemy, might hope to eliminate her from the picture before the major antagonists could bring their full weight to bear in the west.

The Polish Campaign

The Poles as a nation had long been used to living dangerously. Their situation on the Baltic plain had made their land a natural highway of armies marching east or west; their lack of natural defences had made them a prey to powerful and greedy neighbors. Between 1772 and 1796 Austria, Russia and Prussia had combined to



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extinguish the original Polish state. Their oppression continued throughout the nineteenth century. But although the Poles were conquered and divided, they were never subjugated. The spirit of Polish nationalism survived all efforts to crush it, and the dream of a revived Polish state remained the goal of all Polish patriots. With the outbreak of the war of 1914 their opportunity had come. A military leader emerged in the person of Pilsudski; a Polish National Committee was formed in France and enlisted the support of the Allies for Polish independence; and in 1919 a free Polish state once more came into being.

From then until his death in 1935 Pilsudski was the dominant figure in Poland. After his death the task of leadership devolved on two men—Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, and Marshal Smigly-Rydz, head of the army. Their task was to maintain the independence of the nation in a situation that was becoming increasingly threatening. An attack by either Germany or Russia; a war between Germany and Russia; an agreement between Germany and Russia at the expense of Poland—all these were possible, and all of them threatened Poland's existence. The Polish leaders sought to prepare for such eventualities by building an efficient army, by maintaining a correct and where possible a friendly attitude to both Germany and Russia, and by seeking support from Germany and France. Though they hoped for peace, they were not prepared to buy peace by sacrifices which might threaten Polish independence. When Hitler launched demands which involved such a threat, the Poles were fully resolved to fight rather than surrender.

The Poland on which the German avalanche descended was a country of thirty-five million people, two-thirds of whom lived by agriculture. It was anything but a wealthy land. The standard of living of the Polish peasant was well below that of the German. It was a country with few industrial resources, and with little available capital to finance industrial growth. The acquisition of Upper Silesia had meant the possession of an industrial area with important coal deposits. There were some oil deposits in the south, near the

Carpathians. An effort had been made by the government to build up a heavy industry in the south central region—an industry whose nature and location were both influenced by military considerations. But although some progress had been made, Poland's economic organization was still anything but adequate for war purposes.

From a defensive standpoint geography was of little advantage to the Poles. The Carpathians formed a natural boundary to the south; but the German absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, and the occupation of Slovakia which took place on August 18, made this a flanking extension of a frontier already too long to hold in force. On the west there were some fortifications covering Silesia, and a number of important towns had also been fortified. But there was nothing resembling a Maginot Line to check the invader. The main shock must be taken directly by the Polish army.

The Polish army was well trained and good in quality. With thirty-two first-line divisions and thirty reserve divisions, it totalled nearly a million men; and further mobilizations brought this figure to a million and a half. But it was still inferior to the German forces not only in numbers but in equipment. Heavy artillery, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, were all deficient. Although in theory it possessed one armored division, it had chosen or been forced to forego extensive mechanization and to rely for a mobile force on cavalry. Above all, its air force, though composed of 1200 planes, was to prove a fatally weak spot in Poland's defence organization.

German strategy called for a smashing blow which would achieve a speedy and complete elimination of Poland as a belligerent. It counted on achieving this during the period needed by France and Britain to move their forces into position, and before any major offensive could be launched by those Powers in the west. For this purpose, of the 90 infantry divisions plus 8 armored divisions available, three-fourths, or over a million men, were concentrated against Poland, leaving the bulk of the defence in the west to 20 reserve divisions of older troops.

The German plans were based on an enveloping attack by two main armies in the direction of Warsaw. Each of these main forces

was in turn to conduct a series of converging attacks leading up to the grand final movement. In the north, the Corridor was to be cut by simultaneous attacks from Pomerania and East Prussia, while a second force in East Prussia was to create a diversion by driving directly toward Warsaw. In the south, two forces were to envelop Silesia and then drive northeastward to join a third force attacking toward Lodz. Armies of north and south would then converge in a final movement to shatter what remained of Polish resistance.

To meet this attack, the Poles planned a delaying resistance at a number of points near the frontier. Behind these advance forces, three main bodies would take up a position covering Warsaw and the industrial triangle to the south. In a series of delaying actions these forces would fall back on the interior river line of the Narew-Bug-Vistula-San where the decisive battle would take place.

Three factors were primarily responsible for the disorganization of this defensive plan. First, the Polish mobilization was still incomplete when the blow fell. German mobilization had begun as early as August 9, and was well under way by August 20. But in a desire to avoid provocation—a desire in which they were encouraged by Britain and France—the Poles had delayed general mobilization until August 31, the day before the German attack. Although the preliminary steps had been taken during the preceding week, this meant that the Poles lacked time to carry out their full plan. Second, the effectiveness of the German air attack was devastating and complete. The bombing of the Polish railways disrupted transport and communications and made co-ordination difficult. The attacks on Polish air bases, aided by a most efficient spy service, destroyed almost the whole of the Polish air force before it even left the ground. Within two days the Germans had complete mastery of the air and the Polish army was left blind. Third, the speed and daring of the German mechanized advance was beyond all calculation. The Poles had counted on bad roads and on the Polish mud to bog down tanks and transports. But the rivers were low and the rains held off, and these natural obstacles failed to play their full part. The reckless dashes of the German mechanized columns

at times carried them completely out of touch with their main body, and in many places proved extremely costly; but their contribution to the disorganization of the Polish forces was fully worth the price.

The first two days of the campaign showed the smashing nature of the German attack. Striking at the still unprepared Polish forces before they could establish themselves in adequate defensive positions, they drove the first line of defenders toward Warsaw and the line of the Vistula. In the north, the combined movements from Posen and East Prussia threatened to outflank the Polish forces and forced them to retreat southward. This allowed the German forces to join hands by September 5 and to cut off the Corridor, though resistance still continued there around Gdynia and the Hela peninsula. In the south the Germans moved swiftly on the industrial district of Silesia, and with the capture of Cracow on September 6 the entire region was in their hands. On both fronts, mechanized German forces pushed forward to sever Polish communications and cut off retreat. These two pincer movements in north and south cleared the way for the main advance in the centre, which by September 7 had progressed as far as the important city of Lodz.

The first phase of the campaign was thus completed within a week. The initial Polish resistance had been overwhelmed and areas containing important resources had been overrun. The Germans had not, however, succeeded in destroying or even separating the chief Polish armies. Their resistance was showing signs of stiffening, and they were falling back on shorter defensive lines to meet the concerted German attack which now closed in on them.

The second phase saw an extension of the flanking attacks which drove the Poles steadily back and gradually closed in on the armies operating in the Warsaw area. A mechanized raid reached the suburbs of the capital on September 8, though it was not until the 15th that the German army arrived before the city. Meanwhile raids from the north pushed eastward as far as Brest-Litovsk, and in the south a strong mechanized thrust was directed toward Lwow with the object of cutting the route to Rumania. By the 16th the Warsaw area was

practically surrounded and the southern advance had pushed well beyond the Vistula. But although Polish communications had been disrupted and the military command was showing signs of disorganization, the increasing severity of resistance gave hope that an effective defence could still be organized in Eastern Poland.

That was the situation when, on September 17, the Soviet Union launched an invasion from the east. The Russian government announced that in their view the Polish state had ceased to exist, and treaties with it, such as the non-aggression pact of 1932, had ceased to operate. In consequence the Soviet Union found it necessary to intervene to protect their blood brothers in Poland. At the same time Berlin stated that the intervention had taken place with the full knowledge and approval of the German government.

For the fate of Poland this was the decisive stroke. Although the advancing Russians met with little resistance from the Polish troops, this new invasion completed the disorganization of the Polish defences and the chance of creating an effective front in the east. It is true that in the Warsaw area stubborn fighting continued for nearly three weeks. Although the Germans had demanded its surrender by the 17th, Warsaw itself maintained a heroic resistance under constant bombardment and increasing privations until the 27th. The fortress of Modlin held out until the 29th; resistance continued on the Hela peninsula until October 2; and a force of 16,000 Poles north of Lublin kept up the fight until October 5. But these were now isolated struggles, and the effort of the Polish state as such collapsed with the Russian invasion.

Even before the fighting was over, the spoils had been divided by the conquerors. After a temporary "military division" which brought Russia to the Vistula, the agreement of September 29 fixed a frontier farther to the east and following general ethnographic lines. Thus Russia contented herself with less than half Poland, leaving to Germany far the richest portion but acquiring a population of some twelve million, racially and economically akin to the Russian peasants. From the remaining portion Germany proceeded to annex the western


sections direct to the Reich, and to create in the centre a theoretically autonomous province of 112,000 square kilometres and over thirteen million population, as a sort of Pale in which Poles and Jews would henceforth be segregated from the other inhabitants of the Reich.

It was expected that when Hitler had done with Poland he would make a peace appeal to the Allies, on the ground that the original object of the war had now disappeared. Such an appeal was foreshadowed in Hitler's speech at Danzig on September 19; and on October 6, in an address to the Reichstag, he suggested a settlement on the basis of Germany's existing conquests and remaining needs. So little did this approach to a practicable basis that Italy, two days before, had practically disclaimed any intention of associating herself with a German peace effort. "The proposals of the German Chancellor's speech", said Mr. Chamberlain on October 12, "are vague and uncertain, and contain no suggestion for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and to Poland. . . . It would still be necessary to ask by what practical means the German Government intend to convince the world that aggression will cease and that pledges will be kept." Under such conditions peace was still clearly far to seek; and with the end of the Polish campaign the military effort would now be concentrated on the Western front.

The Western Front

At the start of the war, the immediate problem of the Allies in the west was to give effective help to Poland. Direct aid was clearly impossible unless they were prepared to risk the hazardous enterprise of forcing the Baltic. Indirect aid could only be made effective by bringing such pressure in the west as would force the Germans to relinquish their grip on Poland and devote their chief energies to defending the Rhineland. But here again was an enterprise whose cost might be nothing short of ruinous if it involved a frontal attack on the permanent defences of the Westwall or Siegfried Line.

These defences were the German answer to the French Maginot line. The latter had been constructed over a period of years at a cost



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of some \$500,000,000. It consisted of a series of underground forts interspersed with casements and pillboxes, covering the frontier from Luxembourg to Switzerland, and extending in places to a depth of twenty-five miles. In these inter-connected fortifications a garrison could maintain itself for a prolonged period without help from outside; and behind their shelter the French armies could concentrate and manoeuvre without fear of a surprise attack. The German lines were a series of independent positions constructed on the principle of defence in depth, and so placed as to bring a deadly cross-fire to bear on any force which penetrated that area. They had been rushed to completion since 1937 with as many as half a million men engaged on them during the crisis of 1938. Though differing in construction, both had this in common—a progressive stiffening of defence against an assaulting force, with the intention of wearing it down to the point where it could be destroyed by counter-attacks before the last of the fortifications had been pierced.

It was against this position that the French armies began to move at the outset of war. On September 5 a French communiqué announced: "Our troops have made contact everywhere on our frontier between the Rhine and the Moselle." During the next ten days they occupied an area of about 100 square miles within the German frontier. The advance was marked by a cautious deliberation which showed a determination to avoid any reckless waste of life, and to complete each stage of the operation before proceeding to the next. By the 12th strong German resistance was reported, and German counter-attacks began on the 15th. By the time Polish resistance collapsed, only the advance posts had been taken and the main fortifications still lay ahead. But with Poland gone the immediate urgency disappeared, and Germany was free to move the bulk of her armies to the west. By the middle of October a series of local offensives was launched against the French. In the meantime, however, the French command had decided "to withdraw to other positions those French divisions which had taken the offensive on German territory in order indirectly to assist the Polish armies". By the end of the month they had

retired to their own frontier, and operations were reduced to occasional raids or patrol clashes interspersed with artillery duels.

While the French were conducting these operations, British troops were moving in a steady stream across the channel. On October 11 Mr. Hore-Belisha announced that during the first five weeks of war 158,000 men had been transported to France, and implied that further movements were in progress. On December 10 it was announced that British troops were in occupation of a section of the Maginot Line and were in contact with the enemy.

The enemy in the meantime showed no zest for a direct assault on the Maginot Line. Instead there were signs that the idea of a flanking attack through the Low Countries was once more exercising its attraction over the German leaders. As troops transferred from Poland began massing on the Belgian and Dutch borders, and as German press abuse of Holland for her weakness in accepting British violation of her rights grew in intensity, the alarm of these countries increased. On November 1 the Dutch government, which had carried out preliminary inundations, proclaimed a state of siege in certain frontier districts. On November 6 the King of the Belgians paid a sudden and secret visit to Queen Wilhelmina at the Hague, and the following day the two sovereigns sent to the belligerent Powers a peace appeal and an offer of their good offices. On the 9th Belgium increased her forces to 600,000 men, and Holland flooded further areas.

There were persistent assertions that Germany had decided to attack on November 12; but if that was true, a change of mind intervened. Possibly the solidarity of the two neutral governments had its effect, even though their peace appeal had no result. Cautious replies by Britain and France on the 12th were followed on the 14th by a German rejection on the ground that the British and French answers constituted a refusal. But although the tension subsided, the German troops remained on the frontier. It was perhaps by way of warning, in view of the continued danger, that France announced at the beginning of December the strengthening and extension of the Maginot Line to cover the Swiss and Belgian frontiers with a line of

defence which, the French spokesman said with cautious optimism, "may well be described as formidable".

In connection with these land operations there was one notable feature—the absence of any intensive air activity. The deadly raids that had been expected on civilian centres failed to materialize. Even communications behind the lines were spared from bombing. The French were able to bring up their troops, the Germans were permitted to move their forces from Poland to the west, without interference from the air. Each side seemed unwilling to begin, either from fear of reprisals or through concern for neutral opinion. There were active reconnaissance flights, and the Royal Air Force conducted extensive "leaflet raids" for the distribution of propaganda over German territory. But apart from occasional clashes of patrols, the military operations had little accompaniment in the air. It was in connection rather with naval warfare that the air arm engaged in the greatest activity.

The War at Sea

The naval preponderance of Allied sea power was far greater in 1939 than it was in 1914. British and French fleets together totalled nearly two million tons; the German fleet was a bare 235,000. Against the fifteen capital ships of Britain and seven of France (not including eight aircraft carriers) Germany had seven capital ships, of which two dated from the last war and three were pocket battleships. The disparity was not so great as these figures might indicate, for the Allies had to guard the main sea routes, including the Mediterranean, and there was no way of forcing the inferior German fleet to a decisive battle. But although Germany might be in a position to do serious damage, she was hardly likely to threaten the Allied mastery of the seas.

To bring this threat to its maximum effectiveness was the task of Erich Raeder, the head of the German Admiralty. There were many signs that he was prepared to carry on and to develop the Tirpitz tradition. He was an experienced sailor who had fought at the Dogger Bank and at Jutland during the last war, and who nursed the

memories of the battle in which his ship had been sunk and of the final defeat which had sent the fleet of Imperial Germany to be scuttled in Scapa Flow. He was apparently prepared to wage the war at sea with unchecked ruthlessness, using every weapon which seemed likely to break British sea power or to defeat the British blockade. In particular he had made a thorough study of submarine warfare as the most likely means of accomplishing these ends.

Against him on the British side stood Winston Churchill. On the outbreak of war the man who had been First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914 was again called to the Cabinet to occupy the same post and to bring the weight of his experience once more to the task of keeping Britain's sea lanes open and sweeping German ships from the oceans. It was a task which he had once undertaken with vigour and imagination under far more difficult circumstances. If these qualities could again bring success, Mr. Churchill had them in abundance.

Germany's chief striking weapon against the British fleet was the submarine, of which she had an estimated 65 when war broke out. Though its effectiveness against capital ships properly screened by destroyers was decided limited, it was by no means negligible. This was shown on September 18, when a combination of circumstances enabled a German submarine to sink the *Courageous*, an old battleship which had been converted to an aircraft carrier. Even more striking was the feat of the submarine which on October 14 made its way into Scapa Flow and sank the battleship *Royal Oak* with a loss of 812 lives. The full significance of this feat was only made clear at a later date when it was revealed that it had led to the abandonment of Scapa Flow as the main naval base in favour of a less accessible anchorage. A further temporary loss was suffered early in December when a battleship of the *Queen Elizabeth* class, later identified as the *Barham*, was hit by a torpedo but managed to make port.

But Britain too had submarines, and they were anything but idle. In December two remarkable achievements were reported. The submarine *Salmon*, cruising in the North Sea, had a unique combination of disappointment and triumph. At one stage the liner *Bremen* seemed within her grasp as she made her cautious way from Murmansk

to her home port. But as the *Salmon* prepared to fire a shot across her bows, German aeroplanes appeared and forced the submarine to submerge. It would still have been possible to torpedo the *Bremen*, but in obedience to the laws of war the *Salmon* held her fire and let the liner escape. But to offset this, she shortly achieved the remarkable feat of sinking a German submarine; and next day she fell in with even more important prey, when she sighted the German home fleet on one of its rare excursions into the North Sea. The squadron consisted of a pocket battleship, two battle cruisers, two heavy cruisers and the light cruiser *Leipzig*. Taking careful bearings, the *Salmon* let go six torpedoes and then dived for her life. Her commander had time, however, to see that a hit had been scored on the *Leipzig*; and a moment later two explosions indicated that one of the heavy cruisers, possibly the *Blücher*, had also been hit. And a few days later a small British submarine, the *Ursula*, carried out a daring operation at the mouth of the Elbe when it dived under a protecting screen of six destroyers, torpedoed a 6000-ton cruiser of the Koln class, and got away in safety.

It was however the use of aeroplanes against battleships that represented a new aspect of naval warfare, and one about whose effectiveness there had been much argument among the experts. The results after three months of warfare were still inconclusive. In the first raid of the war, launched by the Royal Air Force against the Kiel Canal, it was believed that serious damage had been done to a pocket battleship and hits scored on another warship. In December, when British raids against Nazi coastal bases were intensified, partly to counteract the raiding and mine-laying squadrons of German planes, the air search for the German fleet was also vigorously pursued. On December 3rd it was announced that a strong formation of British bombers had attacked a squadron of German warships in the vicinity of Heligoland and had obtained direct hits with heavy bombs. But German defences were stiffened, and a further raid on December 18th resulted in the sharpest air engagement so far. The Germans, indeed, claimed that 52 British planes took part and that 36 had been shot down—a casualty figure which exceeded the actual strength of the British squadron. Britain admitted the loss of 7 British planes

and claimed 12 German, and viewed this as a satisfactory performance of bombing planes against the new German Messerschmitt fighters which took part in the action in considerable force.

The Germans on their part, attempted several raids which, in spite of their claims, remained without success. Attacks on September 27 and October 9 were driven off by the fleet without loss, and the persistent German claim to have sunk the *Ark Royal* gradually subsided in the face of overwhelming evidence that the aircraft carrier remained intact. An attack on October 16 against ships lying in the Firth of Forth had little more success. No damage was done to the ships themselves, though the cruiser *Southampton* was struck a glancing blow; and such casualties as occurred on the cruiser *Edinburgh* and the destroyer *Mohawk* were the result of bomb splinters. Next day, in an attack on Scapa Flow, hits were scored on the old *Iron Duke* which was in use as a base ship but no casualties resulted. Since all these raids resulted in loss to the raiders, the meagre results must have appeared discouraging. By December the German airmen, after searching for the main British fleet in the Shetlands, had turned their attention to fishing boats and lightships in preference to less vulnerable and more dangerous prey.

But the most active feature of the war at sea was the submarine campaign against merchant shipping. The sinking of the passenger liner *Athenia* on the first day of the war was a clear indication that unrestricted submarine warfare was to be resumed at the point where it had ended in 1918. With hundreds of British ships plying their individual ways when war broke out, protection was difficult in the early days and losses were naturally serious. But the British were quick to apply the lessons learned in the previous war. The organization of a convoy system, the most effective answer to the submarine, was quickly undertaken and showed immediate results. According to Mr. Churchill's summary on December 6, the losses of British merchant ships in October were half what they were in September, and in November two-thirds what they were in October. Although Britain had 2000 ships always at sea, and between 100 and 150 moved in and

out of British harbours every day, 110,000 tons entered port for every 1000 tons sunk, and total losses were 340,000 tons. (By the end of the year this had reached 460,000.) But Britain started the war with 21,000,000 tons, and between seizures from the enemy, transfers from neutral flags, and new construction, she had made up five-sixths of her losses.

In the face of these defences Germany fell back on two devices—submarine attacks on neutrals, and the indiscriminate laying of mines. Neutral losses by submarine steadily increased as the war progressed; and neutral losses by mines were twice that of Britain. These mines, sown broadcast along the British coast, were in many cases equipped with magnetic devices which enabled them to explode without direct contact. Some of them were apparently laid by aeroplanes. To combat such attacks, Britain added an extensive mine-sweeping campaign to a relentless and ceaseless hunt for the submarines. Mr. Churchill estimated that two to four submarines had been destroyed every week. This, he said, was “a rate superior to what we believe to be the German power of replacing U-boats and of replacing competently trained U-boat captains and crews. . . . When I see statements that Germany, during 1940, will have as many as 400 U-boats in commission, and that they are producing these vessels by the chain-belt system, I wonder if they are producing U-boat captains and crews by a similar method.” His announcement that 144 U-boat prisoners were in England could be compared with the situation at the end of 1916, when 180 prisoners represented a loss by Germany of 46 submarines. On that basis, Germany by the end of the first week in December 1939 must have lost 36 U-boats, or over half her pre-war fleet. In addition to this search, Britain toward the end of December announced her intention of laying a protective mine barrage five hundred miles long and thirty to forty miles wide along her east coast.

But beyond submarines and mines and bombers, there was a further menace with which it was the navy's task to deal. That was the armed commerce raider. Memories of the havoc wrought by the *Emden* during the last war made Britain particularly alive to this

danger. It might come from armed German merchant ships such as the *Windhuk*, which slipped out of the port of Lobite in Portuguese West Africa on November 17. Or it might come from such German warships as could manage to evade the British patrols, and particularly from the three pocket battleships, whose combination of speed and striking power made them particularly suited for commerce raiding.

It soon became evident that at least two ships were at large and engaged in this very activity. On October 2 a British freighter, the *Clement*, was sunk by a raider off the Brazilian coast. On October 9 the *Deutschland*, which had already sunk the British freighter *Stonegate*, revealed her presence in the north Atlantic by seizing the American freighter *City of Flint*—thus starting an episode of mingled drama and comedy which ended when the vessel, trying to reach Germany from Murmansk via the Norwegian coast, was brought illegally into the port of Haugesund by her German prize crew, and consequently taken over by Norwegian authorities and released to her American owners. Six weeks later, off the south coast of Iceland, the *Deutschland* in company with a lighter German warship encountered the armed merchant vessel *Rawalpindi* which was sunk after a gallant but hopeless fight against superior odds. With the approach of a British cruiser the *Deutschland* disappeared into the northern mists; and if she conducted any further depredations, they were not revealed to the outside world.

It was now clear that a second raider was also active. The sinking of the *Clement* on October 2 started a trail which led across the south Atlantic to Mozambique, where the *African Shell* was captured on November 15 by a ship tentatively identified as the *Admiral Scheer*. Then the trail doubled back toward South America, where it came to an end on December 13.

On that date the raider, now for the first time identified as the *Admiral Graf Spee*, was steaming south along the Uruguayan coast when she sighted the French steamer *Formose* escorted by the British 10,000-ton cruiser *Exeter*. The German commander, Captain

Langsdorff, at once offered battle. But the odds in his favour were reduced when the two light cruisers *Ajax* and *Achilles* hurried up at the call of the *Exeter* and joined in the engagement.

Yet even so the German captain might have reason to feel that his ship was superior to the combined strength of his opponents. Their heaviest armaments were the six 8-inch guns of the *Exeter*. The two light cruisers carried only 6-inch guns. The *Graf Spee* had two gun turrets, each of which housed three 11-inch guns. Their range was 3000 yards greater than anything on the *Exeter* and 5000 yards greater than the guns of the *Ajax* and *Achilles*. They fired shells weighing 670 pounds as compared with the 253 pounds of the *Exeter's* heaviest projectiles. In both range and striking power the German ship was definitely superior.

What she lacked was speed. Her 26 knots was fast for a ship so heavily armed; but the British cruisers had a speed of 32 knots, which they used to brilliant advantage. The battle began at 6 A.M. "on a fine morning with plenty of sea room" (as the commander of the *Ajax* later described it); and when the British ships with their superior speed got between the *Graf Spee* and open sea, the German commander had no chance of avoiding battle even if he wished to do so.

In the first stages of the engagement it was the *Exeter* which bore the brunt. The lighter cruisers took some time to get within range, and this allowed the *Graf Spee* to concentrate on her most formidable opponent. In the next four hours her heavy shells scored between 40 and 50 hits on the *Exeter*, damaging her steering gear and knocking her heavier guns out of action. By 10 A.M., with only one of her 8-inch guns left, and that one having to be worked by hand, the *Exeter* was practically forced out of any effective part in the battle.

By this time, however, both the *Ajax* and the *Achilles* were in the fight and steadily closing in on the *Graf Spee*. The *Ajax* moved inside between the German ship and the coast, with the *Achilles* on the other side to seaward, and the 6-inch guns of the two cruisers hammered away with damaging broadsides in a running battle to southward. The

British cruisers made effective use of smoke screens to hide their movements and of their speed to manoeuvre about the *Graf Spee* and force her to divide her fire. By mid-afternoon the *Graf Spee* was in a serious condition, with her stern damaged and her control tower knocked out, and with so many injured among her crew that her fighting ability was seriously impaired. But though she tried to get away, the battered *Exeter* was still trailing her and cutting off her retreat to northward, and the two light cruisers now made use of a smoke screen to close in upon the *Graf Spee*, and to hammer away with broadsides at incredibly short range. The hits which they registered on her bow just above the water line did enormous damage and clinched the British victory. A hit on the *Ajax*, which left only two of her four turrets in commission, gave the *Graf Spee* a badly needed respite, and the coming of darkness allowed her to slip away and to make at full speed for the neutral safety of Montevideo. When at midnight she entered the harbor stern first, she was a thoroughly beaten ship.

The next phase was a diplomatic battle over how long she had the right to stay there. Germany claimed that she must be allowed time to be rendered seaworthy. Britain insisted that she must not be allowed to repair battle damage. After investigation, the Uruguayan authorities ordered Captain Langsdorff, in spite of his protests, to leave by 8 P.M. on Sunday, December 17. Clearly this would not allow the *Graf Spee* to regain her fighting trim; and there were reports that her recent adversaries, who were standing watch off the River Plate, had been strongly reinforced by still more powerful units. It seemed a choice between facing defeat against overwhelming odds or submitting to internment for the rest of the war. On the direct orders of the German government, Captain Langsdorff followed a third course. At 6:30 P.M. on the 17th he took his ship out of harbour, disembarked his crew, and scuttled the *Graf Spee* in the shallows about three miles off shore. Three days later Captain Langsdorff committed suicide in Buenos Aires, where he and most of his crew had found refuge.

This ignominious end of a once proud fighting ship emphasized the vital significance of the whole episode. It was further underlined by the revelation that the only reinforcement to the British squadron had been the heavy cruiser *Cumberland* which replaced the damaged *Exeter*. The *Graf Spee* would have had to face no stronger force than she had encountered in the first place. The fact was, however, that that force itself had been too much for her. Before the battle of the River Plate, it had been generally assumed that only the very newest battle cruisers could cope with the pocket battleships. Now it had been shown that far smaller but speedier ships, handled with a skill and daring which were beyond praise, could deal decisively with the pride of the Germany navy. The myth of the pocket battleship had been shattered in the very first test.

Economic Warfare and the Neutrals

None of these naval efforts, of course, represented ends in themselves. Behind the struggle on the sea lay the fierce effort of each side to preserve its own economic life and to ruin that of its antagonist. On this economic front was being fought a vital and possibly the decisive battle in which the ultimate strength of all the belligerents was engaged.

The first task of each nation was to assure to itself the supplies essential to its national life and its war capacity. This meant not only securing its primary needs in the way of imports; it meant also continued access to those export markets through which payment for imports could be made. Hitler, before the war, had described Germany as a nation which must export or die. For Britain, and to a much smaller extent for France, this need was also vital. In war as in peace, said Mr. Chamberlain on September 20, "we depend for our life upon the uninterrupted flow of trade, and it is our fundamental policy to preserve, as far as possible, the conditions of normal trading."

The inevitable corollary of this was an effort by every possible means to interrupt the trade of the enemy. Mr. Chamberlain described Britain's aim as so to disorganize Germany's economic

structure as to make it impossible for her to carry on the war. An identical aim was pursued by Germany toward England. The German weapons were the submarine and the commerce raider, together with diplomatic pressure on the neighboring neutrals backed ultimately by the threat of armed invasion. The Allied weapons were the maritime blockade of Germany and a diplomacy backed by economic power.

It is clear that for such an attack, and even more for essential defence, control of the sea was far more vital to the Allies than to Germany. Britain in particular was highly vulnerable to an effective blockade. She depended on imports for 75 per cent. of her food and for nearly all her industrial raw materials except coal and iron ore. France also, though practically self-sufficient in food, must draw her essential raw materials from abroad. With control of the sea, however, nearly all their needs could be filled by countries bordering the Atlantic. Germany under such circumstances would be debarred from direct contact with those lands; and for the one-third of her raw materials which she normally imported she must depend primarily on her neighbors on the continent.

In this economic warfare, therefore, the neutral nations occupied a position of vital importance. Even before the outbreak of armed hostilities they had been the main theatres of the undeclared war. That struggle now increased in intensity; and outside the actual lines of battle, the neutrals offered an avenue for an economic flanking attack through which a blow might be struck that would ultimately be decisive.

The western neutrals were consequently under strong diplomatic pressure from both sides at the very outset. Sweden was particularly important to Germany because of her iron ore, which supplied 41 per cent. of Germany's imports in that line. Holland and Belgium, though less significant as sources of supplies, were important as possible channels through which materials from abroad might filter into Germany. But German efforts appear to have met with comparatively little success. By November 14 her talks with Sweden had broken down, apparently because Germany demanded practically a monopoly

of Swedish trade. By December 27, in contrast, Britain was able to conclude an agreement which promised to swing Sweden into the Allied trade orbit. Agreements with Iceland and Belgium followed, and by the end of the year there were good prospects for satisfactory relations between the Allies and the neutrals of western Europe.

In eastern Europe the situation was somewhat more complex. Here was an area in which German trade had made a striking advance in the years preceding the war, and which could supply something like 20 per cent. of Germany's normal imports. But the basis of that trade indicated one vulnerable feature of German economy. That was the lack of liquid funds for free purchases abroad. Her official gold reserve of approximately 77 million marks was well under one per cent. of her note circulation. Her foreign investments, in contrast to 1914, were negligible. Available gold and foreign exchange from all sources might total as much as 2 billion marks, but even that would only pay for 1/3 of Germany's imports in 1938. In consequence, her foreign trade had been built up predominantly on a bilateral barter basis; and in view of the demands of war economy, it seemed doubtful whether Germany could keep up the export of goods needed to pay for the imports she so badly needed.

Here the Allies were in a much more flexible position. Before the war, little more than 1.5 per cent. of their trade was done with South-eastern Europe. But if it came to outbidding Germany in that area, the Allies had the great advantage of being able to pay cash. Britain's gold stocks amounted to £560 million and her foreign investments were estimated at £1172 million. France had gold reserves of \$1702 million and foreign holdings of somewhere between 90 and 180 billion francs.

This was the economic power which the Allies used to bring to terms those neutrals who were not exposed to the pressure of the blockade. "We have placed contracts", said the Minister of Economic Warfare in Britain, "of a kind at which sober business men would shudder in peacetime." Purchases were made from countries from which the Allies bought little or nothing in peacetime, but from which Germany might draw essential materials. Prices were paid higher

than would have been necessary had these same materials been bought elsewhere. Turkey, who refused to renew her trade agreement with the Reich when it expired at the end of August, was rewarded by a substantial loan and by Allied purchase of her entire output of chromium, figs and grapes. Yugoslavia's copper, which normally went to Germany, was diverted to the Allies who also bought up her entire export prune crop. Over Rumania an intense struggle was waged. In March Germany had made an agreement which placed at her disposal the bulk of Rumania's resources, and especially the oil of which she was so desperately in need. After the outbreak of war, negotiations were directed towards increasing Rumania's export of oil to the Reich and securing a more favourable rate of exchange. On December 20 it was announced that Rumania had agreed to raise her oil exports to the Reich to a minimum of 130,000 tons monthly from the 80,000 tons which had prevailed since the outbreak of war, and to speed up delivery of a further 260,000 tons which were due under a previous agreement. The rate of exchange of 40 lei to the mark, which Germany wanted raised to 60, was actually raised to 49. Two days later, however, under Allied pressure, this rate was reduced to 44.75 in respect to practically all important exports except soya beans. It was clear that even in this case Allied financial pressure was by no means negligible. The importance of their cash reserves was indicated by British trade figures for December, which showed imports of £86 million against exports of £42 million. Only a stout financial backlog made it possible that such an adverse balance of trade could be consciously accentuated by these methods of economic warfare.

In the case of those countries which lacked direct connections with Germany the process was less expensive. In South America, where the fulfilment by Germany of her barter agreements was no longer possible, the Allies had a chance to insist on favourable terms. The significance of this was illustrated by a circular addressed by the Argentine Exchange Control Bureau to importers and business men on November 20, pointing out that volume of sales to the Allies would depend on the amount bought from them by Argentina. In the case

of Spain, the interruption of the trade connection built up with Germany by the Franco government, and her desperate need for foreign exchange, brought her to terms on the sale of copper and iron ore to the Allies. But of all these developments, the most vitally significant was the change in the provisions of the Neutrality Law adopted by the United States.

The original law was adopted as a joint resolution in 1935 and embodied in a permanent measure in 1937. Its first motive was to prevent the United States becoming involved in war as a result of economic entanglements. For this purpose it forbade the sale of munitions or the granting of loans to belligerents. But it was natural that there should also be a desire to continue trade as extensively as possible short of the risk of war. And as the crisis in Europe developed, it became clear that the sentiment of the American people was growing in favor of the Allies and anxious not to hamper them in the struggle—a sentiment which was ardently shared by the Roosevelt administration.

When war broke out, therefore, the President first applied the existing law by proclamation on September 5, and then called a special session of Congress for September 21 to consider amendments to the act, and especially the repeal of the absolute embargo on arms. The new act, as passed on November 4, made a fundamental difference to the Allied prospect of obtaining American supplies. Instead of prohibition, the principle of "cash and carry" was adopted with respect to sales to belligerents. No arms could be carried to them in American ships, and all titles to goods exported to belligerents must be transferred before such goods left American shores. The ban on loans to belligerents was retained; but it was now possible for the Allies, by a careful use of their cash resources, to enlist on their side the productive capacity of American industry. And although American ships were forbidden to enter the war zone, and so were not available to the Allies, there was at least the compensation that this very provision was likely to prevent any major American grievances from developing against the Allied blockade.

The effectiveness of the blockade was one of the most striking lessons from the last war. As soon as the new struggle broke out, plans were put into effect to revive and strengthen the methods that had then been developed. A Ministry of Economic Warfare was instituted in Britain under Mr. Ronald Cross. The list of absolute contraband issued by the Ministry included not only arms and munitions but fuel, transport machines and animals, articles of communication, and "coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt". Conditional contraband, which might be seized if intended for the German government or its armed forces, comprised "all kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing, and articles and materials used in their production". On September 8 five control ports, from Kirkwall to Haifa, were instituted at which ships must call for examination, and further examination ports were later added. On December 1 this was reinforced by the navicert system—examination in neutral ports of outgoing cargoes, and the issuance of certificates to those free of contraband which would facilitate their passage through the control.

The effect was extremely wide. Even the Danubian countries felt it in a practical way. The normal route of trade from Hungary and Rumania was by way of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to North German ports. Now Germany was forced to try to develop the difficult upstream traffic on the Danube; and when ice closed the river at the beginning of December, she was left dependent on rail transportation, which seemed wholly inadequate for her import needs from southeastern Europe. Similarly, a large proportion of Swedish iron ore was normally exported through the Norwegian port of Narvik on the North Sea. A portion went in summertime through Lulea on the Baltic; but this too was closed to sea traffic during the winter months. Moreover, Britain's power to enforce the blockade, with its scope for damaging and costly delays, gave her a powerful weapon against any desire on the part of the neutrals to act as middlemen on behalf of Germany. From the beginning, neutrals were practically rationed to their normal import quotas, and an acquiescence in this was a feature of the Swedish treaty, which was undoubtedly a model for others.

The effectiveness is revealed by the figures. During the first month of the war, Britain captured 150,000 tons more German merchandise than she lost through submarine attacks. At the end of the year the Allies estimated that they had seized approximately one million tons, amounting to 10 per cent. of Germany's whole annual imports. And in addition between 400 and 500 ships of the German fleet were immobilized in ports all over the world; for though an occasional one might slip through—as witness the saga of the *Bremen* which made home from New York by way of Murmansk—the more usual tale was that of the *Cap Norte*, captured on the high seas, or the *Columbus*, scuttled to avoid capture, or the *Tacoma*, interned in Montevideo. German imports from the outside world were being reduced to a trickle—and Germany, which had already reduced imports close to the minimum, had little in the way of a trade cushion to minimize the effects.

After imports, exports. Having cut down on the former, the Allies proceeded to try to strangle the latter, to prevent Germany from paying for such imports as she did get through. On November 21 it was announced that, in reprisal for Germany's illegal and indiscriminate laying of mines, the Allies intended to seize all German exports wherever found. Vigorous protests from most neutral nations followed but failed to change the decision. On November 27 King George signed the necessary order-in-council, and on December 4 the measure was put into effect.

There was, however, one important neutral untouched by all these measures—a power whose new relations with Germany made her the big question mark in the diplomatic and economic, perhaps even in the military picture. That nation was the Soviet Union.

The Advance of Russia

From the date of the non-aggression pact, Germany sought to give the world the impression that her new relations with Russia were so close as to amount almost to a military alliance. Each new development was represented as a step closer to complete co-operation. The treaty of September 29, with its promise of joint efforts toward

peace and joint consultation if these should fail, was presented as foreshadowing Russia's entry into the war. And the clauses which promised an exchange of Russian raw materials in return for German industrial goods on a scale which would bring the exchange of goods to the maximum level attained in the past, seemed to indicate a complete reversal of previous economic relations.

The actual developments, however, were not entirely in harmony with these conceptions. The failure of Hitler's peace offer, though it brought a fresh diatribe from Mr. Molotoff against the Allies, left Russia asserting a firm desire to maintain her neutrality. The exchange of goods, in spite of a promise on October 9 that it would begin immediately, failed to develop in any noticeable degree. As for Russia's arms, it was soon clear that she had other uses for them than putting them directly at the service of the Reich.


The truth was, Russia meant to take advantage of the unique position in which the war had placed her. Never since the Revolution had she been so free from the fear of imminent attack. The conclusion of an armistice with Japan on September 16 strengthened that freedom. But there was still the fear that ultimately an attack would be launched against her by the capitalist Powers. Her determination was to take advantage of the present respite to strengthen her position against that day, and particularly to consolidate her flanks while Germany was keeping the centre occupied.

Her efforts on the southern flank were anything but successful. Here she had to deal with Turkey, with whom negotiations were opened on September 22. Although no precise details were revealed, it appeared that Russia's objectives were a closing of the Straits against outside Powers, and the creation of a Balkan bloc which would involve adjustments at the expense of Rumania. In any case, the Turks refused to accept the Russian demands. Although negotiations ended on October 17 with mutual protests of continued friendship, the most that was secured was the exemption of Russia from the operation of the Anglo-Turkish alliance signed two days later. And the threat of Russian penetration had roused both Italy and the

Balkan nations to explore on their own part the possibility of a defensive pact. Although for the moment the problem of Rumania balked any agreement, it was clear that any direct threat by Russia would meet with serious resistance.

On the northern front, in contrast, the Russian advance was spectacular. Ministers of the Baltic states were summoned to Moscow to negotiate. They came, they listened, they agreed. A treaty with Esthonia on September 29, providing for mutual assistance, gave to the Soviet rights of military garrison and naval and air bases on Esthonian soil. This was the model for treaties concluded with Latvia on October 5 and Lithuania on October 10, the latter of which gave back to Lithuania the long-desired district of Vilna. These treaties made Russian influence supreme in a sphere which had always been regarded as one of German influence; and to clinch the matter, the Reich on October 7 invited all citizens of German stock in these countries to return to Germany, with the announced intention of settling them in the newly annexed districts of Poland. It was clear that Stalin intended to have no problem of aggrieved German minorities on his hands.

Next on the list was Finland; and here the speedy and unopposed advance of Russia ran into difficulties. Negotiations began on October 9 in an atmosphere which showed that the Finnish government was at least contemplating the possibility of resistance. On the two following days the inhabitants of the more exposed towns were advised to evacuate them as a precautionary measure. On the 14th Finland announced that any sort of alliance was out of the question. The negotiations, more than once interrupted, were definitely broken off on November 13. It was revealed that the Russian demands had been chiefly concerned with the security of Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland. To this end they had asked for certain islands in the gulf, and a naval base at Hangoe at its entrance; the cession of territory on the Karelian isthmus which would move the Finnish frontier well out of artillery range of Leningrad; and an adjustment of the boundary in the Petsamo region. Russia on her part was ready to cede 2134 square



THE BALTIC, DECEMBER 1939

miles along the centre of the frontier. The Finns wanted a further discussion of the cession of Hogland island, and were adamant in their refusal to lease or sell the port of Hangoe, which they asserted would be inconsistent with their policy of neutrality.

It looked for the moment as though Russia would be content to temporize in the belief that the Finns would ultimately come to terms. But in the last week of November this attitude changed abruptly. A campaign of abuse was suddenly launched against the Finnish government. On November 26 the Soviet protested against an alleged border shooting incident. On the 28th Russia denounced her pact of non-aggression with Finland. A Finnish offer to negotiate was ignored, and on the 30th Soviet troops invaded Finland.

The result was an outburst of world indignation. Already there had been direct expressions of sympathy, both from President Roosevelt, and from the Scandinavian sovereigns who had met in conference on October 18. Sweden on December 3 acted as agent in presenting to Moscow a new Finnish offer; but Russia had set up a Finnish government of her own at Terijoki two days previously, and ignored the overture. But on December 2 Finland took a further step to rally support by appealing to the League under Articles 11 and 15.

The League acted with somewhat unusual promptness. When an initial appeal was met by Russia's assertion that she was not at war with Finland, the Council was called for December 9 and the Assembly for December 11. When Russia ignored a further appeal to accept League mediation, these bodies adopted a resolution condemning her as an aggressor and stating that she had thus placed herself outside the League of Nations, and further appealed to members to lend Finland all assistance within their power.

It was soon clear that, although a certain amount of aid in the way of volunteers and supplies would be forthcoming, no country was as yet prepared to take direct military action on Finland's behalf. But while waiting for help from others, the Finns proved extremely adept at helping themselves.

The Russian invasion struck at five main points. In the north the port of Petsamo was seized and an expedition attempted to push southward. At the same time a second expedition struck for the head of the Gulf of Bothnia by way of Salla, and a third attempted to cut across the narrow "waist" of Finland about Suomussalmi. The chief objective of these forces, which were comparatively small in numbers, was the railway running around the head of the Gulf of Bothnia and connecting Finland with Sweden.

But the main effort was in the south. On the Karelian isthmus the Finnish fortified positions—the Mannerheim Line—opposed a formidable obstacle to a direct assault. The Russians for the moment contented themselves with a holding attack in this region, and sought to outflank the Finnish defences by launching their main drive in two columns around the north of Lake Ladoga.

All these columns had a certain initial success, which included the capture of Petsamo and an advance beyond Salla to the Kemi River. By the end of the year, however, not one of the five separate drives had achieved its essential objective. The troops used in the first stages were in many cases of inferior quality. There was an incredible lack of co-ordination between the different commands. In the matter of communications and supplies, the Russians depended on the single and none too adequate route of the Murmansk railway. The Finns, who had the advantage of fighting on interior lines, had also a network of railways on which they could rely for both supplies and reinforcements, and showed a quality of staff work incomparably better than that of the Russians. They were able to check the flanking drive to the north of Lake Ladoga, and then to rush forces northward to inflict further checks upon the Russians at Salla and Suomussalmi. By the end of December the lumbering Russian machine seemed temporarily stalled; and the military as well as the moral prestige of the Soviet Union threatened to suffer severely unless these setbacks were quickly and effectively redressed.

3

JANUARY TO MARCH 1940

THE PROGRESS OF HOSTILITIES

THE opening of the year saw the armies of the chief belligerents watching each other from their fortified positions on the western front with a wariness that offered no immediate prospect of a major attack by either side. The Allies for the moment seemed to have accepted Mr. Churchill's view, expressed on November 12, that "if we come through the winter without any large or important event occurring we shall in fact have gained the first campaign of the war." On the German side there were sounds of vague ferocity menacing the Allies with almost instant destruction. Hitler in his New Year's proclamation, and again in his speech of January 30, hinted that the war was about to start in earnest. Goering announced that at Hitler's signal the German air force would "strike at Britain with such an onslaught as has never been known in the history of the world". But for all these bold words, activity on the western front was confined to scattered raids, in which the Allies appeared merely to be seeking information, and the Germans trying to gain command of outlying positions which might be useful to them later.

The one serious threat of possible action came on January 14 with a new war scare in the Netherlands. Certain press reports alleged that this was based on the fact that the pilot of a German aeroplane, who made a forced landing on Belgian soil, happened to have the plans for the German attack in his pocket. The circumstance was rendered all the more curious by the fact that the Dutch government, on January 6, had announced a determination to resist all attack "with the most severe power of our weapons", and the Belgian government had shown itself prepared to support Holland against aggression. But whatever the reason, the alarm was strong enough for Belgium to mobilize 600,000 men, and for Holland and Britain to cancel all army leaves. On January 24 Mr. Chamberlain renewed Britain's pledge of immediate aid to Belgium in case of a German attack. Though by that time the crisis had blown over, the Low Countries, and Switzerland as well, remained on the alert as periodic reports reached them of German troop concentrations near their borders. Germany's small neighbors were clearly none too confident of Germany's good faith.

Conditions during this period, however, were hardly ideal for a military offensive. The weather—reports on which were among the many things suppressed by the censors, on the ground that they might aid enemy aviators—showed what it could do by putting on a *blitzkrieg* of its own. The coldest winter for nearly half a century settled down over Europe. Storms stalled trains, disrupted traffic, and created a temporary coal shortage for both industries and private citizens. In February, one quarter of the population of Berlin was reported to be living in unheated houses. These difficulties on the home front were undoubtedly reflected in the continued military stalemate.

This was not true, however, either of the sea or of the air. Merchant ships continued to ply the seas with essential supplies. Navies kept a ceaseless watch over the vital trade routes. And over and under the sea the war went on—the war which sought to tighten

the blockade against the enemy and to break the stranglehold which the enemy was striving to impose.

The War at Sea

In this struggle the Allies more than held their own. By the end of March, unofficial estimates placed the total British and French loss at 211 ships of 810,000 tons. Shipping losses of all nations, belligerent and neutral, averaged 7300 tons a day as compared with 20,000 tons during the period of unrestricted warfare in 1917. What was still more encouraging was the evidence that the sinkings were on the decline, largely due to the successful operation of the convoy system. Losses of Allied and neutral shipping amounted to some 90,000 tons in March as against over 200,000 tons in February. Even in the week ending February 20, which saw the loss of 20 ships, only five British were among them. Between February 26 and March 3, Britain lost only two small ships totalling 1886 tons. And on March 30 Mr. Churchill announced that during the past fortnight only one British ship had been sunk as a result of enemy action.

In this situation the full fury of Germany was turned against neutral shipping. The complete disregard of international law which the Nazis had exhibited in the sinking of belligerent vessels without warning, and in the indiscriminate laying of mines, was even more glaringly in evidence in their deliberate attacks upon neutral merchantmen. During the month of February, in which 25 British ships were reported lost, neutral nations lost 39. By February 14, Sweden had lost since the outbreak of war 32 cargo steamers, with 228 seamen dead and 15 missing. According to the Swedish foreign minister, 7 of these ships were certainly sunk by German U-boats, 3 of them while on the way to neutral ports; and of the whole 32, only 7 had Britain as their destination. By February 21, Norway had lost 49 ships and 327 sailors. A total of nearly 200 neutral ships had been destroyed by the end of March. Only in an Allied convoy, where its chances of being sunk were one in eight hundred, was a neutral ship reasonably safe upon the seas.

But if Allied shipping was hampered and neutral shipping endangered, German shipping was being swept from the seas. By the end of March 38 ships totalling nearly 200,000 tons had gone down, most of them scuttled by their crews to avoid capture. When the 100,000 tons of German shipping taken by the Allies were added, they totalled nearly 8 per cent. of Germany's merchant marine. The remainder was tied up in neutral or home ports or confined, as far as navigation was concerned, to the waters of the Baltic and of the northern neutral states.

The principal route left open to German shipping was along the Norwegian coast. Germany had worked out a way for ships to slip down from Murmansk to their home ports, keeping within neutral territorial waters all the way. In the latter part of February, Allied warships were reported to be cruising in the Arctic in the region of Murmansk and Petsamo. Protests by Norway to Britain toward the end of March revealed that British destroyers were keeping a strict watch for German ore ships which sometimes carried them within the three-mile limit. A new daring in the methods of operation by British submarines led on March 22 to the torpedoing of a German ore freighter in the heavily mined area of the Kattegat, and next day another freighter was sunk in the same area. It was made clear that in both cases, in contrast to Nazi methods, the British submarine commanders made provision for the safety of the German crews, and accomplished the destruction of the ships without loss of life.

By this time the blockade was reaching still farther afield. Reports that goods were being shipped to Germany through Vladivostok, and that Germany had made overtures to both Russia and Japan for submarine bases in the Pacific, were followed by news of Allied naval activity in the Far East. By the end of March at least two Russian ships—one of which had been seized as early as January 13—had been taken with their cargoes of metals into Hong Kong by British warships. A Soviet protest led to nothing more than the handing over of these ships to the French for "administrative reasons". It was

becoming clear that, where the Allies suspected that a cargo was destined for Germany, they were growing steadily less inclined to give neutrals the benefit of the doubt.

It would be too much to expect that such constant and far-reaching activity could be carried on entirely without loss. Yet the price which the Allied navies were forced to pay during this period was comparatively small, and far inferior to that exacted during the earlier months of the war. No capital ship was sunk, though the *Nelson* was damaged by a mine, and one cruiser was slightly damaged during the air raid on Scapa Flow. On January 16 it was revealed that three British submarines had been lost while "engaged in a particularly hazardous service"—presumably an attempt to reach the German naval base in Heligoland Bight. Two destroyers, the *Grenville* and the *Exmouth*, were lost by the British during January; another, the *Daring*, was torpedoed in February; and in March the French destroyer *La Railleuse* was the victim of an explosion in the port of Casablanca. Against these minor losses, Britain had five capital ships nearing completion, two of which were expected to be in service by spring. France had one battleship which would probably be ready in the course of the year, and another, the *Jean Bart*—the second of four under construction—reached the launching stage early in March.

The German losses were less easy to estimate; for the Nazi fleet was remarkable chiefly for its inactivity. Most remarkable was the lack of any action on the part of the pocket battleships. In theory Germany should still have two of these after the loss of the *Graf Spee*. But one of these, the *Admiral Scheer*, had not been heard of since the war began. As for the *Deutschland*, the latest news available was the curious announcement on January 25 that she had returned to her base and was being renamed the *Luetzow* in order to preserve her old name for a more powerful ship. Since one of the German cruisers under construction had already been named the *Luetzow*, the procedure seemed distinctly odd. But, under whatever name, nothing

more was heard from her; and there seemed to be some ground for suspicion that both pocket battleships had been put out of action in the course of the various British attacks by air and submarine.

In the matter of undersea warfare, Germany's position was equally hard to calculate. In spite of German claims of mass production, it was highly doubtful whether more than four U-boats a week were being completed, and a lower figure would probably be nearer the truth. This would do little more than keep pace with the Allied rate of destruction, conservatively calculated at between two and three a week. Reports on the nature of the new German submarines were equally at variance; but the suggestion that Germany was going in for larger units capable of ranging farther afield had yet to be borne out by definite evidence.

The Altmark Rescue

But the most enlivening episode in the war at sea was one which had less effect on German naval strength than on whatever was left of German prestige. The case of the *Altmark* was a triumphant sequel to the destruction of the *Graf Spee*. This ship, which had on board the crews of seven British ships destroyed by the pocket battleship, had been the object of a far-flung search by the British navy ever since the battle of the River Plate. For two months the prison ship evaded the hunters. Then on February 16 she was spotted by British reconnaissance planes as she slipped down the Norwegian coast south of Bergen on the last lap to Hamburg and safety.

Three British destroyers raced toward their quarry. But the attempt of the *Intrepid* to seize the *Altmark* was frustrated by a Norwegian gunboat whose commander demanded that the British respect Norwegian territorial waters. During the argument the *Altmark* slipped into the shelter of a near-by fjord; and eventually the British ships retired beyond the three-mile limit and wirelessly the Admiralty for orders.

The Admiralty replied with a command to go in and rescue the prisoners. It was after dark when the senior destroyer *Cossack* went in and her commander asked the Norwegians to have the *Altmark* taken to Bergen under joint guard and there searched for British

prisoners. When this was refused, as was also the request that the Norwegian commander should lead a search party on the spot, the *Cossack* went ahead. The *Altmark*, breaking free from the icepack in which she had been jammed, attempted to ram the *Cossack*, but the destroyer grappled with her and a boarding party leaped to the deck of the German ship. There was firing on both sides; a number of German sailors who escaped over the side opened fire from the shore, and the return British fire inflicted several casualties. Locked in shell rooms, store rooms and an empty oil tank were 299 British seamen, many in serious physical condition from the hardships of their imprisonment. With these on board the *Cossack* left the grounded *Altmark* to her crew and headed with the rescued men for home.

A sheaf of diplomatic protests followed. Germany protested to Norway for permitting a violation of her neutrality. Britain, alleging that the *Altmark* was an armed ship and that Norwegian authorities had boarded and searched her at Bergen, protested at Norway's failure to discover and release the prisoners. Norway, denying that the ship had stopped at Bergen and claiming to be ignorant that there were prisoners aboard or that the *Altmark* was armed, protested at the action of the *Cossack* and demanded the return of the rescued seamen—a stand which was probably taken less from any expectation that it would be met than from a desire to conciliate Germany. The apoplectic rage of Nazi spokesmen offered a somewhat comic spectacle of Germany expressing horror at a violation of international law. The contrast between the more normal German attitude and this sudden concern for legality was pointedly summed up by Mr. Chamberlain on February 24:

“So little do the Nazis regard interests that neutral ships are no longer free from their attacks even when they are sailing only from one neutral point to another. Merchant vessels may be sunk, cargoes may be destroyed, the crews may be turned to drift, to burn, or to perish from exposure, and the neutral country must not complain. But if we, the British, in order to save 300 men, illegally made prisoners, from the brutality of a concentration camp, if we commit a mere technical breach of neutrality, which takes no neutral life and

touches no neutral property, why then the Nazis exhaust themselves in exclamations of hysterical indignation."

With her duty done by formal and vigorous protests, accompanied by an offer of arbitration, Norway on her part was content to accept a compromise which left the matter very much where it stood.

The War in the Air

While the struggle was thus being waged on and under the sea, the war in the air continued to make its chief contribution to this particular aspect of the conflict. Extensive reconnaissance flights over land, in which Allied planes ranged as far east as Poland, were conducted by both sides; but except for an occasional clash of patrols, there was no fighting, and no bombing of either military or civilian objectives. But warships and merchantmen were both exposed to the hazards of air warfare as well as to the dangers from submarines and mines.

Here, as in the case of submarine warfare, the chief risks were run by unprotected neutrals. German air attacks on British convoys, though apparently growing in frequency during March, were almost uniformly unsuccessful. Bombing and machine-gunning of trawlers and lightships were hardly profitable enough to balance the indignation aroused by such ruthless brutality. Occasionally an isolated British ship might suffer—the passenger liner *Domala*, for instance, victim on March 2 of a machine-gun attack from the air which took at least 108 lives, chiefly British Indians who were being repatriated after internment in Germany. But it was the neutrals who offered the easiest prey, particularly since they were generally unarmed and fully illuminated. Nine Dutch ships were bombed and machine-gunned on March 4 alone; three more were attacked on the following day. Scandinavian shipping was no more respected by aeroplanes than by U-boats. Not even the Italians escaped. On March 7, during a particularly critical stage in relations between Britain and Italy, the Italian freighter *Emilia Lauro* was the victim of a savage German air attack which killed one and wounded three—an action which, as the Italian skipper plaintively remarked, "came as a surprise from our friends".

Scapa and Sylt

This activity was directed chiefly against merchant vessels, with some incidental attention to the warships engaged on convoy duty. The chief effort by German fliers against the British fleet during this period came in the raid on Scapa Flow on March 16. Although Mr. Churchill had announced nearly three weeks previously that Scapa Flow had not been used as the main naval base since the sinking of the *Royal Oak*, it was clearly being used as an important anchorage and seems on this occasion to have held a number of capital ships as well as lesser craft. At dusk on the evening of March 16, fourteen Heinkels swooped down in a raid which lasted an hour and a half. Something like a hundred bombs were dropped, causing seven casualties to naval personnel and inflicting minor damage on one warship described as "not a capital ship". The most notable feature of the raid, however, was that for the first time the Germans attacked land objectives as well as the ships in the harbour. Apparently with the object of striking at hangars and landing fields and preventing the British fighters from taking off, the Germans dropped both explosive and incendiary bombs on the surrounding countryside, killing one civilian and wounding seven.

This action at once called forth British reprisals. British air activity to this point had been directed to the forestalling of Nazi raiders, both by coastal patrols and by raids on naval air bases, and to attacks on German patrol ships off the German coast. On the day of the Scapa Flow raid, British fliers located and bombed several German patrol vessels off Heligoland. But on March 19 a new intensity of action developed when Britain launched the biggest air raid in history against the German air bases on the island of Sylt. Beginning shortly after dark and continued by successive waves of bombers, the raid lasted for nearly seven hours, while its progress, radioed by the fliers to the Admiralty and passed on to the Prime Minister, was related stage by stage by Mr. Chamberlain to the House of Commons.

As in the case of the raid on Scapa Flow, the British and German accounts of the raid on Sylt showed a wide divergence. The British fliers believed that they had wrecked a number of German hangars, hit oil tanks and an ammunition dump, and severely damaged the causeway known as the Hindenburg Dam which was the island's only rail connection with the mainland. The German account admitted only minor damage, and the Nazis tried to prove their claim by a carefully conducted tour with several selected journalists. In any case, it seemed probable that both raids were to a considerable extent experimental, and doubtful whether the experiments were conclusive for either side.

Neither side, it was clear, was yet ready to risk an air attack in full force. If it remained true that the bomber could get through, it seemed that it did so with considerable risk that it would never get back. If the defence did not, in the air, enjoy the preponderance of strength over the attack that it claimed on land, it was still strong enough to give pause to the attacker. Even the raids on shipping were hit-and-run affairs by small squadrons or even lone fliers, and hardly 3 per cent. of the ships sunk were destroyed by air attack. Nor did the attacking squadrons, as a rule, stay to do battle once the defending planes were up. Losses in actual combat, both in these raids and on the western front, were negligible. The Allies claimed to have downed 133 planes (the Germans admitted a loss of 85) and to have damaged 26 others so severely that they were unlikely to have reached home. The Germans claimed 357 Allied planes—a figure which the Allies said was more than double their actual losses. But even admitting the full claims of both sides, the comment of the *Spectator* on February 23 would remain true: "The scale of air-warfare up to date, and the potentialities of air-warfare in the future, will be put in their right proportions if it is realized that in all the fighting—North Sea, Heligoland Bight, western front—neither side has lost in machines the equivalent of a week's, or half a week's, production."

Thus in both sea and air, no less than on land, the armed forces hesitated to come to grips with each other. Instead, they tried through

the blockade and the attacks on shipping to strangle the economic life of their opponents. And while each was conducting this offensive, each was also striving to strengthen and consolidate its home front against the increased effort which the war could be expected to demand.

THE HOME FRONTS

The announcement of the British War Cabinet, on September 9, that plans were being laid on the assumption that the war would last three years or more, might be sobering but could hardly have been unexpected. In contrast to 1914, with its expectations of an early and an easy victory, there were now few illusions about the seriousness of the struggle upon which the nations had entered. Facing such a prospect, both sides seemed determined to avoid as far as possible the costly muddles of the last war in the civil no less than in the military field. In 1914 there had been a rooted reluctance to disturb the normal course of civil life even for the sake of greater military efficiency. In 1939 it was evident from the start that the whole of the nation's activities must be directed to the single purpose of attaining the maximum efficiency in war.

For the democracies this meant a regulation and a co-ordination of economic effort far more stringent than they had ever known hitherto, directed by a concentration of authority far more powerful than any that had existed in peacetime. Britain and France preferred to avoid the word "dictatorship" as well as the thing for which it stood. But for the efficient direction of the national energies to a supreme end, some form of central authority equipped with adequate powers was absolutely essential. A recognition of this fact was the foundation for the wartime government of both countries.

Behind this development, however, stood a fact that was still more fundamental. That was the maintenance in both countries of the system of parliamentary government. The sweeping authority

enjoyed by British and French ministers rested solidly upon the sober decision of a majority of the selected representatives of the nation. The British Parliament, on August 24, passed the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill which gave the government the right to impose extensive regulations by Order-in-Council. The French government, which had already been given the right to govern by temporary decrees, had that right confirmed for the duration of the war by a vote of the Chamber on November 30 and of the Senate on December 1. But neither measure was in any way an abdication of the ultimate authority of parliament. The Cabinet existed, and ministers exercised their powers, subject in the last resort to the continued approval of the elected legislatures; and either parliament could withdraw those powers or overthrow the ministry whenever such action seemed desirable in the national interest.

This was shown by the constant yet reasoned criticism which the governments of both countries had to meet and satisfy. In the early days of the war, it was the British House of Commons which secured a drastic modification of the regulations under the War Measures Act in the interests of greater personal liberty. In France, similar criticism brought an end to some of the worst absurdities of the censorship, including a practical suppression of political criticism of the government; in England it had a like result in the reorganization of the ill-named Ministry of Information. But such achievements strengthened the effectiveness of democratic government instead of weakening it. As Mr. Churchill said in his broadcast of January 27:

"In our country public men are proud to be the servants of the people. They would be ashamed to be their masters. Ministers of the Crown feel themselves strengthened by having at their side the House of Commons and the House of Lords sitting with great regularity and seeking out continual opportunities of stimulating their activities. Of course, it is quite true that there is often severe criticism of the government in both Houses. We do not resent the well-meant criticism of any man who wishes to win the war. We do not shrink even from fair criticism, and that is the most dangerous of all."

Britain's War Cabinet

It had been realized in Britain during the last war that a Cabinet of some twenty-odd members was too large a body for the efficient direction of affairs. When Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 1916, he created a small inner group of five whose sole function was the management of the war. This was the precedent which guided the formation of an inner War Cabinet at the outbreak of the present war. It was presided over by the Prime Minister, and included Sir John Simon (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary), Lord Chatfield (Co-ordination of Defence), Mr. Hore-Belisha (War), Sir Kingsley Wood (Air), and Sir Samuel Hoare (Lord Privy Seal). Two other members brought to this body their experience gained during the Great War. Mr. Winston Churchill, returning to his old post at the Admiralty, was included in the War Cabinet; and Lord Hankey, who had a long record as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and who had served as Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, was brought in as Minister without Portfolio. In addition, Mr. Anthony Eden, who was appointed Dominions Secretary, was to have access to the War Cabinet in connection with matters touching his office.

Certain differences were noted between this body and the War Cabinet of 1916. In the first place, it was not a coalition of all parties. The Liberal and Labour parties had been approached, but after consideration had decided to hold aloof, ready to support the government's war effort but remaining free to criticize when criticism seemed warranted. In the second place, it consisted largely of Ministers in charge of departments. The members of the earlier War Cabinet had been relieved of all administrative duties in order that they might devote their full energies to the broader problems of the war. In the present case, members retained their executive offices, and it was felt that this might be a mistake. It was also suggested in some quarters that—for reasons not unconnected with Mr. Churchill's inclusion—the War Cabinet was heavily weighted on the side of the fighting services, and that the balance could with profit be redressed on the civilian side.

Barely four months had passed before one major change in the personnel of the War Cabinet took place. On January 5 it was announced that Mr. Hore-Belisha had resigned his office of Secretary of State for War. The news took the public generally by complete surprise. Mr. Hore-Belisha had gained a reputation as an energetic reformer, particularly during his tenure of the War Office. His drastic shake-up of the higher command, his measures to democratize the army and to speed up promotions, his attempts to improve the lot of the common soldier, had attracted favourable comment. The mystery was scarcely lessened by the official explanations in Parliament. The nearest thing to a hint in Mr. Hore-Belisha's somewhat cryptic statement was his remark: "It did not occur to me to consider that we were making the army too democratic to fight for democracy." The Prime Minister confined himself largely to denying some of the explanations which had been rumoured abroad. There had been, he said, no differences in policy between Mr. Hore-Belisha and either the Cabinet or the Army Council. There had been no pressure for his removal by the "brass hats" and no threats of resignation among the higher command. "I will only say that I became aware of difficulties—perhaps I might describe them as arising out of the very great qualities of my Right Honourable friend—which in my view made it desirable that a change should occur some time." All that could be assumed from this statement was that in the case of Mr. Oliver Stanley, who succeeded Mr. Hore-Belisha at the War Office, these particular difficulties were unlikely to arise.

This change, though accepted without too serious criticism, did little to quell the rising impatience which became manifest in a number of quarters during the succeeding months. A feeling was openly expressed, not merely that certain officials were somewhat less than ideal in their posts, but that there was need for a more effective co-ordination of effort than was provided by the War Cabinet on its existing basis. At the beginning of April, tentative steps were taken to conciliate this sentiment. In addition to certain ministerial changes, including the replacing of Sir Kingsley Wood at the Air Ministry by Sir Samuel Hoare, and the resignation of Lord Chatfield

from the Cabinet, the structure of the central governing body was itself reorganized. Mr. Churchill became head of a committee composed of the heads of the fighting services; Sir John Simon was henceforth to preside over a committee on economic policy; and Sir Kingsley Wood, now Lord Privy Seal, was put in charge of a committee on home policy. In this way the direction of active hostilities, of economic matters, and of social and domestic problems was placed in the hands of a coherent authority, with the War Cabinet exercising the supreme function of a co-ordinating body. It was by no means all that the critics had asked for, but it represented a distinct advance toward unity of direction.

War Government in France

In France too the outbreak of war led to a reorganization of the government. M. Daladier sought to broaden the basis of his ministry by including two Socialist leaders, but they failed to get permission from their party on terms acceptable to M. Daladier. The ministry which he announced on September 13 was therefore very similar in complexion to the one which preceded it. The most notable change was the transfer to the Ministry of Justice of M. Bonnet, who during his tenure of the Foreign Office had been prominently—and somewhat unfavourably—associated with the policy of appeasement. Nor was this a reduced body on the model of the British War Cabinet, although in one sense a significant concentration of power was effected when M. Daladier took the portfolios of War and Foreign Affairs, in addition to the Premiership, into his own hands.

The French Parliament traditionally governs the executive with a jealous hand; and a ministry furnished with decree powers and with so much authority concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister was bound to endure more than the usual careful scrutiny of all its acts. The Socialists particularly might have been expected to show some concern over the attitude of the government toward the more radical elements of the Left. At the outset of the war the government used all the resources of its authority to launch a drive against the Communists. The party was proscribed and its leaders arrested; its

attempt to reorganize as a Workers and Peasants Party was declared illegal; Communist municipal councils were suppressed, and 60 out of the 73 Communist deputies in the Chamber were deprived of their seats. But in fact even the Socialists had been forthright in their condemnation of Moscow since the German-Soviet pact. Parliament itself voted for the expulsion of the Communist deputies; and when in February M. Daladier defended his policies before the Chamber in secret session, he secured the almost unprecedented triumph of a unanimous vote of confidence.

This success, however, proved temporary. A certain restiveness over the conduct of the war became evident in March, and was accentuated by the conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia. On March 15, after two days of secret debate, a motion of confidence was carried in the Senate with no opposing votes, but, significantly, with a number of abstentions. On March 19 there was a lengthy secret session of the Chamber of Deputies. At its conclusion a motion expressing admiration for Finland and confidence in the Government to carry the war to victory was passed by 239 to 1. But the figures showed that 300 deputies, chiefly Socialists, had abstained from voting, and indicated a growing precariousness in the government's position. The result was the resignation of the Daladier government on March 20.

His successor was Paul Reynaud, Minister of Finance. M. Reynaud was known as a man of energy and decision, a moderate who was a staunch supporter of democratic methods and of "sound" finance. His reputation had been heightened by his work in the Daladier cabinet, where his policies stabilized France's financial position and brought a return of confidence which checked the flight of capital abroad. His cabinet, in which M. Daladier remained as War Minister and M. Reynaud himself assumed the direction of foreign policy, was marked by two special features. It created a central group of nine ministers to act as a War Cabinet, and it broadened the base of the government by including three Socialists in the ministry. In addition a War Committee, consisting of the defence ministers and the heads of the fighting services, and an

Interministerial Economic Committee, whose function was to co-ordinate economic activity, were created in the interests of more effective central direction.

The new ministry met with a somewhat dubious reception. Its first vote of confidence was carried by 268 to 156, but the abstention of 111 members left it with a clear majority of only a single vote. There were several reasons for this. The Cabinet of nine, which M. Reynaud described as "enough for deliberation and not too many for action", was felt by many people to be still too large. The inclusion of Socialist ministers was looked on askance by the conservatives; and the Radical Socialists, the party of M. Daladier, exhibited certain signs of discontent. Though the new cabinet showed some signs of growing strength in the days that followed, its ultimate future at the beginning of April was still in doubt.

The Ascendancy of Goering

In the Germany of Adolf Hitler there was of course no problem of concentrating authority for war purposes. That had been achieved with the accession of Hitler to power. But even here the need was felt for a body which could oversee the co-ordination of the measures necessary for the effective prosecution of the war. The German equivalent of the British War Cabinet was thus the Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich, which Hitler set up by decree on August 30.

The head of this body was Field-Marshal Goering, now definitely established as second in importance only to Hitler himself. During the Nazi years of power he had been entrusted with a succession of critical tasks, so that his authority already extended into the political, military and economic fields. He was president of the Reichstag, creator and head of the German air force, and director of the Four Year Plan which governed Germany's economic activity. And in his speech to the Reichstag on September 1, Hitler named Goering as his immediate successor should anything befall him during the war.

Next in line, and also a member of the Defence Council, Hitler named Rudolf Hess. His outstanding merit was his utter devotion

to Hitler personally. In return, Hitler probably relied on Hess more than on any of his other associates. He had made Hess his deputy leader of the Nazi party, and depended on him for much of the detailed work involved in such things as the drafting of decrees. From Hess, Hitler could count on unswerving obedience.

The other four members of the Council were Wilhelm Frick (Minister of the Interior), Dr. Walther Funk (Minister of Economics and head of the Reichsbank), General Wilhelm Keitel (Hitler's personal Chief of Staff), and Dr. Heinrich Lammers, chief of the Reich Chancellery and secretary to the Council. These men were naturally members by virtue of the offices they occupied, and their inclusion was less remarkable than the omission of certain other leaders. Herr von Ribbentrop's absence might be accounted for by the fact that he was Foreign Minister, whereas the Council would be dealing chiefly with domestic matters. But the exclusion of Dr. Goebbels, minister of Propaganda, and Heinrich Himmler, head of the Secret Police, was laid by most observers to the personal hostility of Goering. His feud with Goebbels had long been notorious; and his dislike of Himmler, though possibly more recent, was none the less bitter for that. It was apparently shared by high Army circles who had been revolted by the brutality of Himmler's police methods. It says much for Himmler's power that a short time later Goering was obliged to concede him the right to sit as deputy for Dr. Frick whenever the latter should be absent.

By the turn of the year it was felt that still closer co-ordination was needed. The Defence Council could harmonize policy, but something in the way of a General Staff for the national economy would bring about a greater harmony in that essential field. The result was the creation on January 4 of a General Council for War Economy. Again Goering was its head, and associated with him were officials from the chief ministries dealing with economic and social matters, as well as from the Army and the organization of the Four Year Plan. The new appointment made Goering supreme over the whole national economy, and placed directly in his hands a control over detailed functions such as Hitler himself had never sought to exercise.

Wartime Economics

"Finance", said Sir John Simon in introducing Britain's war budget, "is the fourth arm of defence, no less important than the other three, and if finance fails then the prop that sustains the whole of our war effort will collapse." But finance in this war meant something far wider than simply balancing government receipts against government spending. With all the belligerents, even during the quiet stage of the war, spending amounts equivalent to roughly half their national income, the sources of loans and taxes had to be considered; and that meant ultimately a profound concern with the sources of national income itself.

One result was a complete change of attitude toward the question of individual spending. In time of peace it was natural to encourage the average citizen to buy as many things as possible. The more he bought, the greater would be the encouragement to productive efforts; and that way, it was felt, lay the road to national prosperity. But in time of war the full productive energies of the nation were needed for the carrying on of the war. The more the average citizen demanded for himself, the less would be available for war purposes. On the other hand, the closer his demands could be reduced to bare essentials, the greater would be the amount available to the state.

One way of curtailing individual consumption was by rationing. This was introduced in Germany for a number of essentials on August 27, and further adjusted in September. The Allies were slower to adopt compulsory restrictions. But on January 8 Britain introduced ration cards for butter, sugar, bacon and ham, and meat was added in March. Sir John Simon explained these steps as deliberately intended to reduce the consumption of goods; and the steps which were taken in February to control supplies of cotton and wool were directed to the same end. The French restrictions, introduced on March 1, took the form not of ration cards but of the prohibition of certain foods on certain days—no beef on Monday, for instance, and no pastry on Tuesday. Spirits were forbidden three days a week, but wine was left to the Gallic consumer's discretion.

A second method was to raise prices—or, alternatively, to reduce wages. All the belligerent governments recognized the difficulties of

the latter course; but all attempted to prevent any serious rise in wages while allowing prices to take an upward trend. In the case of certain essentials which were still unrationed it was realized that this must be limited; and in February the British government introduced a plan of food subsidies to cost £58,000,000 a year and to apply to wheat and milk, as well as to the rationed foods of meat and bacon whose prices were rising higher than was desirable. But the rise in most articles was left unchecked; and in the belligerent countries—and indeed in the European neutral nations as well—the cost of living rose during this period between twenty and thirty per cent.

Along with these developments went an effort, not merely to increase national agricultural and industrial output, but also—and particularly in the case of Britain—to give a special stimulus to export industries. British purchases abroad, always heavy, increased substantially as a result of wartime demands. Imports of £105,000,000 in January were over two and one-half times exports, and exceeded imports for January 1939 by nearly £30,000,000. February imports were down to under £96,000,000, but exports were also down to under £40,000,000. This involved not only a problem of trade balance, but also one of foreign exchange. Some relief might be expected from such plans as that to expand domestic agriculture by two million acres; and the exchange problem could be rendered less acute by buying within the empire, where extensive purchases of such products as wool and copper and timber had already been arranged. But it was apparent that a serious effort must still be undertaken if the balance was to be redressed.

Among business circles in Britain there arose in consequence a demand for the creation of a Ministry of Economics whose task would be the co-ordination and direction of all the economic activities of the nation—the task which was in effect being performed by Goering's Economic Council in Germany. This proposal was rejected by Mr. Chamberlain, who feared that "this high-powered Minister with a high-powered staff might do more harm than good," and who wondered "what the Prime Minister would have left to do by the time this gentleman had given his orders to all departments." But on

February 1 he announced the creation of an Export Council under Sir Andrew Rae Duncan, whose task would be to encourage Britain's export trade and to narrow the gap between exports and imports by increasing the former some fifty per cent.

The Problem of Finance

These, then, were a few of the developments which lay behind the efforts of the belligerent governments to lay the necessary foundations for meeting the running costs of the war—costs which, in Britain, were mounting to six and a half million pounds a day. France was spending somewhat less, Germany considerably more. Not all of this could be covered by current taxation, although serious efforts were made to meet as large a proportion as possible. Britons paid income taxes ranging from 37 per cent. to 80 per cent. The French income tax—4 per cent. to 15 per cent.—looked low in comparison, but was supplemented by increases in indirect taxes and by drastic levies on business profits. Germany increased an already heavy income tax by 50 per cent. and indirect taxes on various articles of consumption by 20 per cent. Even Britain could hardly hope, however, to raise by taxation more than 40 per cent. of a war expenditure which might ultimately run as high as three billion pounds a year. Germany would be doing well if she approached that proportion; while France, who would be spending seven and a half billion dollars in 1940, would probably have to secure fully three-fourths of that sum from loans and credits.

This situation necessitated a careful husbanding of the nation's credit resources. A certain use could be made of existing capital investments, particularly for the securing of credits abroad. All belligerents had imposed rigid exchange restrictions. Germany, of course, had long ago called for the surrender to the State of all foreign holdings. In February, Britain called in a list of sixty selected American securities. But the chief resource must be borrowings from available funds within the countries. The successful floating of a British loan of £300,000,000 at an interest rate of 3 per cent. showed an intention to keep the cost of borrowing as low as possible; and this

was accompanied by measures to prevent a rise in the return on private investments, and by the fixing of a minimum price for government securities. France also endeavoured to preserve for the government a favourable credit position; and Germany showed signs of broadening the already extensive control which she exercised over the investing policy of individuals and corporations.

The fact was, of course, that outside these countries—the financial strongholds of Europe—comparatively few credit resources were available. Britain hoped to make use of the credit power of Canada and the other Dominions, and commercial credits might be secured from various neutrals. But these, except the United States, had limited funds which they were likely to lend to the belligerents; and loans from the United States were debarred by the Neutrality Act. As Mr. Robert Hudson, Secretary for Overseas Trade, summed up the twin problems of supplies and finance:

“We are not free to concentrate all our strength on making munitions, because we must devote some part of our industrial resources, an increasing part, to the making of goods which will pay for the material out of which these munitions can in turn be made. We cannot borrow abroad to do this as we did between 1914 and 1918. We must pay as we go. This is a cash-and-carry war.”

Difficulties in the budget, however, would not by themselves bring the collapse of any of the belligerents. So long as their people continued to produce, and so long as they would consent to hand over enough of their production to the state for war purposes, their economic difficulties would not be insuperable. The restrictions and the rationing which had been imposed were in most cases in the nature of precautions rather than the result of immediate needs, and the absolute necessities of life were still available in all the belligerent countries. Germany had undoubtedly pushed her citizens closer to a minimum standard than had either Britain or France. At the beginning of the year a more lenient policy was adopted with respect to wages and overtime—an indication that the pressure on the workers was felt to have gone too far. And when on February 15 Goering announced an increase in the price of butter and milk, he felt

it desirable to couple with this an assertion that Germany had plenty of food available and a plea to housewives to hold firm.

In the field of trade, Germany's imports from the accessible neutrals appeared to be up to or even above the pre-war levels, and a certain amount of supplies from other lands trickled through by way of Germany's neighbours. A less promising sign was the decrease of exports, even to Continental Europe. To make up deficiencies in both these fields, Germany's best hope lay in developing her connection with Russia. It was true that little profit had so far been drawn from that connection. But a new trade treaty on February 12 (they were becoming almost monthly events) aimed at raising trade between the two countries from the existing 200 million marks to "a level exceeding that of any year since the world war"—that is, above the billion marks reached in 1931. And if such hopes were seriously entertained, they no doubt received considerable impetus from the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish war.

RUSSIA AND FINLAND

The severity of the winter which settled down over Europe, whatever its effect on operations in the west, did nothing to diminish the intensity of the war which raged between Russia and Finland. On battlefronts which extended into the Arctic Circle, and in temperatures which dropped at times to fifty below zero, the struggle went on; and as it continued the exuberant fantasy of earlier reports on Finnish successes began to give way to more sober estimates of the grave prospects ahead.

When the year opened, the Finns were still conducting a remarkably successful resistance to the continued Russian pressure which was general on all fronts. The northern drive by way of Salla to the railhead at Kemijaervi had met with an initial check on December 19, and a further attempt was brought to a standstill by the middle of January. The effort to cut across the narrow waist of Finland, in order to reach the Gulf of Bothnia and so cut Finnish rail connections with Sweden, led at the turn of the year to the battle of Suomussalmi, in which the Finns first defeated the 163rd Russian division, and then

a week later turned on the relieving 44th division and punished it severely. Attacks on the Mannerheim Line were successfully repulsed; a new thrust south of Suomussalmi at Kuhmo was frustrated; and the serious offensive north of Lake Ladoga, which continued throughout January, had still at the end of the month met with no decisive success.

At the beginning of February, however, the Russian tactics changed. Already there had been a shake-up in the Russian command, and the second-rate troops who had been engaged in the earlier operations were replaced by divisions of a higher quality, possibly drawn from the forces in Siberia. This reorganization was now followed by a new plan of campaign. Hitherto the chief efforts had been directed by mechanized forces against the unfortified eastern frontier of Finland. The difficulties of the terrain, the inadequacy of the Russian communications, and the skill of the Finns in taking full advantage of these factors, had helped to account for the Russian lack of success. Now the earlier methods were abandoned. The efforts in the north were reduced to mere auxiliary operations; and on February 1 the full weight of the main Russian drive was launched in a frontal attack against the Mannerheim Line.

The Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line was a first-rate example of modern fortification. It followed the principle adopted by the Germans in the west and by the French in their newer construction behind the Maginot Line—the principle of defence in depth. It took full advantage of the natural features of the terrain on which it was built. The sixty-mile width of the Karelian isthmus is interspersed with lakes which are obstacles to a mass assault along the whole length of that line. Infiltration tactics are practically imposed on the attacker by the very nature of the ground. These are just the tactics which the fortifications were designed to meet. They were not constructed in a solid line, but in a series of isolated positions. The strong points were the citadel of Muolaa in the centre, the defences of Taipale on Lake Ladoga, and the forts of Koivisto on the Gulf of Finland. Between

these and behind them, in three main zones, lay a series of fortified positions covering the main lines of approach and designed to bring a withering cross-fire to bear on the advancing troops. A progressive stiffening of the defence was calculated to wear down the attackers to a point where a well-timed counter-attack would complete their destruction.

It appears that a preliminary breach had been made in the latter part of January where the chief weight of the Russian attack was now concentrated, along the Viipuri-Leningrad road before Summa, in the right centre of the line between Muolaa and Koivisto. Behind the attack was a concentration of artillery reminiscent of the battles of the Somme and Verdun during the Great War. Standing almost hub to hub, the Russian guns hammered ceaselessly at the fortifications, pouring out an estimated 300,000 shells a day. The ultimate effect was to uproot the gun emplacements and throw their fire out of line, thus enabling the infantry covered by tanks to advance on each successive position. After a fortnight's battle, Summa was captured and the first line of defence had been pierced.

The Finns had won their earlier victories by allowing the Russian forces to advance and then isolating them by attacking their communications. This called for a flexibility of manoeuvre which was not possible in defending fortified positions. The equivalent of these tactics on the Mannerheim Line would have been a counter-attack before the salient which the Russians drove at Summa had actually broken through. But strong Russian attacks at the eastern end of the line and to the north of Lake Ladoga kept substantial Finnish forces engaged and prevented the Finns from reinforcing the defenders of Summa. They had no fresh reserves available for counter-attacks, in spite of calling up men of 45 and 46. With the break-through, the Russians were able to widen their front and to turn their attention to the forts at Koivisto which threatened their flank.

On February 26 the Finns finally admitted the loss of Koivisto. The key city of Viipuri was now under close range bombardment. Russian troops entered its suburbs in the early days of March; other

Russian forces embarked on a flanking movement across Viipuri Bay. Despite the sweep of artillery and machine-gun fire which met them as they advanced in the open across the ice, they mastered the islands in the bay and gained a foothold on the mainland. By March 11, Viipuri was outflanked and its days were clearly numbered.

But four days previously, on March 7, the world was startled to learn that peace negotiations were already in progress between Russia and Finland.

The Russian Peace Offer

The steps which led to this development had been a carefully guarded secret; and the various statements available at the time of writing had only lifted a very small portion of the veil. But it seems clear that, even after war broke out, both sides continued to keep in mind the possibility of a settlement. On December 15 the Finnish Foreign Minister broadcast a personal message to Premier Molotoff offering to negotiate an honourable peace. A similar offer was made by President Kallio at a meeting of the War Diet on February 1. In the meantime, the Russians had apparently informed Sweden, on January 29, of their willingness to receive suggestions from the Finns, providing Russia's original claims were satisfied and further guarantees were provided. But the Finnish reply, and the basis implied in President Kallio's speech, failed to meet these conditions. Moscow relapsed into the attitude that the puppet régime at Terijoki, and not the "Finnish bandits" at Helsinki, constituted the legal government of Finland; and new Finnish overtures through Sweden on February 12 met with no response.

In the latter part of February, however, this attitude changed. New dangers of a clash with Japan over the Mongolian boundary, negotiations on which had broken down, and a certain nervousness about internal conditions, may have had something to do with this. In any case, the Soviet Ambassador in London approached the British Government on February 22 with a set of proposals which Britain was requested to pass on to Finland.

The Russian proposals were stiffer than the original demands which had led to the war with Finland. They included all the territory covering Lake Ladoga and the whole of the Karelian isthmus, as well as concessions in the Petsamo region and a long lease on the naval base at Hangoe. The British government studied them for five days and then decided that they were too outrageous to pass on. So, having failed to secure British good offices, the Soviet government turned again to Sweden.

The Position of Sweden

The Swedes had good reason to seize the opportunity for peace more eagerly than the British. Their position was one of growing discomfort. The war between Germany and the Allies made their neutrality precarious enough. Germany's interest in maintaining access to Swedish supplies, particularly iron ore, accentuated her political pressure, directed especially toward securing the suppression in the Swedish press of any comments in the least unfavourable to Germany. In view of the suffering of Swedish commerce and shipping from Germany's ruthless methods of sea warfare, such comments were naturally of some frequency. And, equally naturally, the Allies, while sympathizing with Sweden's difficulties, were bound to make every effort to prevent her technical maintenance of neutrality from being used in actual fact in a manner favourable to Germany.

The outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war enormously complicated the situation. It placed Scandinavia, and Sweden particularly, between three fires. There was a widespread feeling that Finland was an essential outpost whose fall would make Sweden the next victim of Russian aggression; and a very considerable "activist" sentiment developed in the country, demanding not merely voluntary aid to the Finns, but direct military intervention on their behalf. And even if the Allies had not yet actually brought pressure to the same end, such manifestations as Mr. Churchill's speech of January 20, calling on the neutrals to back the Allies against Germany, were clear enough signs that it might ultimately develop.

Against this stood the far more imminent danger of direct German action if Sweden should make a false move. Not that Germany was necessarily hostile to the Finns, in spite of her connection with Russia. She yielded to Russian pressure in holding up Italian planes which were sent to Finland by way of Germany early in the war. But she showed no enthusiasm for the Russian venture. She denied flatly the rumour that she had given either military or technical aid against the Finns. And it was significant that she apparently raised no objections to Swedish help to the Finns or to the transit of supplies and volunteers from Allied countries across Scandinavian soil.

Direct military intervention by the Allies, however, would be a decidedly different matter. Germany had a lively suspicion that the object of such intervention would be not merely to rescue Finland but to strike a blow at Germany. In Britain and France there was considerable support for a policy of using intervention in Finland in order to create a northern front against Germany and to deprive her of access to the Swedish iron mines. This policy was vigorously advocated by Mr. Hore-Belisha in a speech to his constituents on February 23. Germany on her part made it clear to Sweden and Norway that the presence of Allied troops on their soil would be the signal for a German invasion.

The Allies and Finland

By February the Allies were definitely contemplating an expedition to Finland. The first Finnish requests, which were frequent from November 30 on, were for military supplies. These the Allies answered to the best of their ability, and an impressive list of supplies, including artillery and aeroplanes as well as a wide variety of smaller munitions, was later revealed by the British and French governments. But it was not until mid-January that Baron Mannerheim said that he would be glad to have 30,000 trained soldiers by the middle of May.

On February 5 the Supreme War Council met and decided to send an expedition. It was realized, however, that this would bring a German attack on Sweden and that part of the force would be needed

to help the Swedes. Thus, although the size of the expedition was set at 100,000, only 30,000 of these would actually go to Finland. It was suggested to the Finns in the second half of February that they should make a public appeal for an expedition not later than March 5, which would allow the Allies to approach Norway and Sweden on the question of passage.

By this time, with the Russians battering at the Mannerheim Line, the Finnish situation had become much more desperate. On or about February 13 they approached the Scandinavian countries with an official request for military help, stating that the alternative was for them to ask Allied intervention, and allowing it to be understood that the Allies had given a concrete promise of military aid. On February 16 it was announced that Sweden had refused the Finnish request. The news led to an outburst of "activist" protests so serious that three days later King Gustav convened the Crown Council in order to make a public statement supporting the action of his ministers. On February 25 a meeting of the foreign ministers of Norway, Sweden and Denmark resulted in an announcement that they were unanimously determined to maintain their neutrality, and that they would "gladly welcome any endeavour to initiate negotiations between the belligerents".

Meanwhile the Finns had apparently begun to press for more immediate Allied help. A statement by M. Daladier on March 12 revealed that an appeal was made at the beginning of the second half of February, and that on February 26 the Finns were informed that the necessary transports had been collected and that the French had 50,000 troops ready to sail. It was implied unofficially that Britain had taken similar steps.

While waiting for a formal request from Finland, the Allies sought to clear the way in Scandinavia. On March 2, according to a statement by the Norwegian foreign minister, the Allies asked Norway and Sweden for permission to transport troops across their territory. Sweden refused on March 3, Norway on March 4. By this time preliminary peace talks were under way in Stockholm, and the Finns themselves were hesitating. They asked the Allies to be allowed to

postpone their decision on a formal request for aid, and at the same time inquired whether they could count on 50,000 men within a month. The Allies, according to Mr. Chamberlain, replied that their earlier offer represented the largest force which it would be physically possible to transport. This was, apparently, the meaning of "all available resources" which, as Mr. Chamberlain said in the Commons on March 11, the Allies had promised to Finland on request. But the request never came, for the Finns were now negotiating the final terms in Moscow. A formal request by the Allies on March 12 for passage through Scandinavia came to nothing, for a few hours later the Finnish representatives signed the peace treaty with Russia.

The Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty

The terms which the treaty imposed on Finland were far more severe than those which she had rejected in November. In the north she secured the return of Petsamo, which the Russians had occupied at the beginning of the war; but the restrictions of the 1920 peace treaty on naval forces in that region were renewed, and territory on the Rybachi peninsula was to be ceded. On the eastern frontier, instead of securing a slice of Russian Karelia as in the earlier proposals, the Finns ceded a strip in the Salla region, including the town of Kuolajaervi. In addition, there were important transit concessions in both these areas. There was to be free transit between Russia and Norway across the Petsamo region, and between Russia and Sweden by the shortest railway route. For this latter purpose the Finns promised that the line running inland from the Gulf of Bothnia as far as Kemijaervi would within the year be extended to reach the frontier and to connect with a Russian line from Kandalaksha. This would complete a rapid transit route from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia to the White Sea which might be of first-rate importance for the development of the Murmansk region.

But it was in the south that Finland suffered her really important losses. The earlier negotiations had broken down over Finnish reluctance to cede the strategic islands in the Gulf of Finland and to

sell or lease the naval base of Hangoe. Now they had to give way on both points. All the islands in Viipuri bay and a number in the Gulf of Finland were handed over. Hangoe was leased to Russia for 30 years at an annual rental of 8 million Finnish marks, and the peninsula and the islands adjoining it passed under Russian administration for the period of the lease.

The terms affecting the Karelian isthmus were the most drastic of all. Russia's original demands had been merely for a minor boundary adjustment which would place the frontier out of artillery range of Leningrad. Now the whole isthmus, including Viipuri, was ceded, together with a strip to the north of Lake Ladoga which placed the lake wholly within Russian territory. Economically this was the severest loss suffered by the Finns. Viipuri or Viborg, Finland's third largest city, was the seaport of an area which contained a large proportion of Finland's industry. Now half that area, with important sawmills and pulp factories and a population of nearly 400,000 was handed over to Russia, and the remaining area was deprived of direct access to its natural outlet.

But although this economic loss was a severe blow to Finland, it was the strategic aspect of the treaty that was the most important, particularly from Russia's point of view. Her aims in the original negotiations had been to secure command of the Gulf of Finland, to assure the security of Leningrad, and to remove the possibility of a threat to Murmansk from the Rybachi peninsula. These were now attained in full measure; and in addition, the chance that Finland might again offer serious military resistance was rendered almost negligible. Russia could now dominate Petsamo. The cession of Kuolajaervi narrowed the distance to the Gulf of Bothnia, and the projected railway would provide a line of communication enabling a Russian advance to cut off Finland from Sweden. Hangoe and the adjacent islands made Russia supreme in the Gulf of Finland. Most important of all, the cessions around Lake Ladoga meant the loss of Finland's chief defensive positions. A new fortified line might be built farther back; but the Russian attack would no longer be divided

by Lake Ladoga, and the cession of Viipuri and the strip north of Lake Ladoga involved the disruption of the rail connections on which Finland had relied for the defence of her eastern frontier.

The prospect that Russia might thus hold Finland at her mercy was one of grave concern to Sweden. An assurance by Russia that she had no more territorial aspirations in Scandinavia was accepted with some reserve, which was not diminished by the report that, in the commission which met to settle the details of the new boundary, the Russian delegates had produced a map which extended their claims at several points. And when the proposal for a mutual defence pact between Sweden, Norway and Finland was vetoed by Russia, as contravening the clause in the treaty which forbade hostile alliances, it seemed clear that Russia was determined to hold Finland within her own political orbit.

Thus the peace, while it allayed Sweden's immediate apprehensions, by no means removed them entirely. In certain quarters there was a tendency to blame the Swedes for their course, and particularly for their blocking of Allied intervention. But their problem was a desperately difficult one, and their sympathy with the Finns had been testified in a most tangible fashion. It was estimated that nine thousand Swedish volunteers had been sent to Finland—undoubtedly far more than had come from all other countries put together. Five thousand more had offered their services. Money and supplies to the amount of \$125,000,000 had been sent. It was anything but a small effort for a nation of six million people. The balance of the whole question was well summed up by Baron Mannerheim in his valedictory to the weary Finnish troops:

"Without the ready help in arms and equipment which Sweden and the Western Powers have given us, our struggle up to this date would have been inconceivable . . .

"We are proudly conscious of the historic duty, which we shall continue to fulfil—the defence of that western civilization which has been our heritage for centuries; but we also know that we have paid to the very last penny any debt we may have owed to the West."

THE NEAR EAST AND THE BALKANS

The end of the Finnish war removed for the moment any immediate prospect of creating a northern front against Germany. This was a prospect which had been openly canvassed by a number of commentators in both Britain and France, who felt that the existence of the Siegfried Line made it necessary to find some other and more promising point at which Germany could be attacked. But a northern front was not the only possibility; and while some eyes were turned toward Scandinavia and Finland, others were casting speculative glances toward the Balkans and the Near East.

This speculation was heightened by the revelation that very considerable Allied military preparations were under way at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The landing at Suez on February 12 of an Anzac contingent estimated at 30,000 men called attention to the very considerable forces that were being collected in that region. British troops in Egypt and Palestine and French troops in Syria were reliably calculated to have reached a total of well over half a million men. Turkey had some 350,000 men under arms; and in the latter part of March the holding of a conference at Aleppo between the Allied and Turkish military staffs suggested that these forces were preparing to act in concert if the occasion should arise.

This opened up several possibilities. One upon which discussion frequently turned was an attack on the Russian oilfields at Baku. If Russia planned to provide Germany with any considerable amount of the oil she so desperately needed, it was from Baku that it must come. Here were the oldest and richest producing fields in Russia, accounting for twenty-three million tons, or three-fourths of Russia's total production. Their seizure would be a severe blow to the Soviet economy as well as to any German hope of substantial oil deliveries.

An attack on Baku itself would have to be conducted through the difficult mountainous terrain of the southern Caucasus. A serious lack of communications would aggravate the difficulty; for although Turkey was reported to have completed a new railway line toward Erzerum, part of it was still narrow gauge, and Turkey's own railway system had suffered considerable damage as a result of the earthquake



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in northern Anatolia early in the year. If, however, the main objective was to cut off supplies from Germany, something might be done by seizing Batum. This port, the Black Sea terminus of the pipeline from Baku, was only twenty miles from the Turkish frontier, and would be vulnerable to attack or blockade by sea. An incentive toward some such action was offered by the report, in February, that Russian tankers were beginning to carry oil from Batum to the Rumanian port of Constanza, there to be stored for trans-shipment to Germany. It was even alleged that the Allies, at the Aleppo conference, had paved the way by securing Turkey's consent to the passage of Allied warships through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea—a report, however, which the Allies at once denied.

On the other hand, the possibility was suggested that Russia herself might launch an attack, not so much on Turkey as on Persia or Iraq. The goal would be the Mosul oil fields or Allied communications with India by way of the Persian Gulf. Some attempt was made to read an aggressive significance into the mysterious Russian naval manoeuvres in the Black Sea, which took place in the latter part of February. But although a certain nervousness was reported among the nations of the Middle East, no tangible evidence appeared that Russia was nursing any immediate aggressive designs in that direction.

A third possibility of action lay in the Balkans. If one or more of the Balkan states should ultimately throw in its lot with the Allies, it would open up the possibility of creating an eastern front against Germany. If one of these states should be attacked by either Germany or Russia, a similar prospect would be presented. And in view of the tense diplomatic struggle which was being waged in this area, it was far from impossible that something of the sort might take place.

At the same time, it was unlikely that Germany would attack in the Balkans until all other forms of pressure had been exhausted. What Germany wanted for the moment was not actual possession of the lands in that region so much as assurance that the products of those lands would be fully available. A military invasion was only too

likely to interfere with production and to frustrate, temporarily at least, the purpose which it was intended to serve. So long as the Balkan countries would continue to trade with her, Germany's wisest course was to support their neutrality while trying by every means of peaceful pressure to bind their economies to the service of the Reich.

Rumania and Germany

The chief focus of such pressure—and not only from the German side, but from that of the Allies as well—was Rumania. Rumanian products were of prime importance for Germany, and first in importance was Rumanian oil. By the agreement of December, Germany was supposed to be assured of a minimum of 130,000 tons a month. In actual fact, however, January deliveries amounted to no more than 26,000 tons. A wide variety of obstacles stood in the way. Transportation in itself presented a formidable problem. The frozen Danube prevented transport by water, and the Allies were preparing for the spring by chartering all available barges to keep them out of the hands of Germany. The functioning of rail transportation through Galicia, now in the possession of Russia, was so unsatisfactory that, toward the end of January, Germany secured permission to put her own technicians and railway guards in charge in an attempt to remedy the situation. Allied competition in buying shot the price up from \$17 to \$44 a ton. German pressure for increased shipments was answered by Allied counter-pressure. Eighty per cent. of Rumania's oil industry was foreign-owned; and when, on January 17, a petroleum commission was set up to regulate the industry, Rumania was warned by the Allies against forcing French and British companies to deliver oil for Germany. In February, by clamping down on Rumania's trade and cutting off shipments of metals and rubber, the Allies wrung from King Carol's government a promise that German demands for an increased quota would not be accepted and a banning of the shipment of aviation gasoline to the Reich. For the winter months, at least, Nazi hopes for substantial oil deliveries from Rumania seem to have been disappointed.

There were further measures which interfered with deliveries of other products as well. Heavy export taxes were imposed on cereals and vegetable oils on February 12. On February 22 an export ban was imposed on a long list of goods suitable for the manufacture of munitions. On February 26, freight rates on exports were increased, in some cases as much as 40 per cent. In addition, Rumania by the beginning of March had 1,600,000 men under arms—a circumstance which hampered Rumanian agriculture and reduced the amount of farm produce likely to be available to Germany. A German attempt to get a reduction of this force by offering to guarantee Rumania's frontiers was accompanied by demands for a practical monopoly of Rumanian trade and for the inclusion of Nazi sympathizers in the ministry—demands which were firmly rejected. In the latter part of March a German mission arrived to negotiate for new trade concessions, particularly on agricultural products and oil quotas; but at the end of the month it did not appear to have achieved any striking degree of success.

Turkey and the Balkan Entente

Behind this successful balancing of Rumania between the belligerents was the effort by the whole group of Balkan states to remain aloof from the conflict. This attitude was undoubtedly strengthened by the stand of Turkey. It was true that Turkey herself was avowedly favourable to the Allies. The terms of her alliance, her close economic connections with Britain and France, and such episodes as her seizure of the Krupp works at Istanbul and her expulsion of over a hundred German technicians, were clear expressions of her sympathies. As the Turkish Foreign Minister put it at the beginning of February: "Turkey is not neutral, but only non-belligerent for the moment." But her influence over the Balkan countries was directed less toward drawing them in on the side of the Allies than to keeping them out of the control of Germany. And her influence was not diminished by her firm stand on behalf of Balkan independence. As a Turkish journal put it on February 20: "If Germany attacks the Balkans she

will find us facing her on the side of the Allies. Our country will not await her turn with folded arms while the Balkans are crushed. That is one mistake we shall not make."

There were some signs at the beginning of the year of a Turkish tendency to encourage the formation of a stronger Balkan bloc as an effective barrier to German or Russian penetration, and for a time it seemed that the Balkan states would fall in with the idea. But any common front would involve a settlement of the existing difficulties between these states themselves, and this proved a stumbling block. Here again Rumania was the focus. She had secured territory from both Hungary and Bulgaria at the end of the last war, and was unready to relinquish any of it in order to win the friendship of these two neighbours. Bulgaria apparently had no intention of creating serious difficulties, and even Hungary offered no immediate threat; but neither country was prepared to renounce its territorial ambitions, which could only be satisfied at Rumania's expense. There was some prospect that an effort might be made to find a solution when the conference of the Balkan Entente—to which neither Hungary nor Bulgaria belonged—met at Belgrade on February 2. But a three-day conference ended in nothing more significant than a mild communiqué expressing a common interest in the maintenance of neutrality and peace.

It was clear from this that the other members of the Entente were not prepared to bring effective pressure on Rumania in the interests of a wider solidarity. It was still more significant that no steps appeared to have been taken to reach an agreement on mutual support against aggression. Indeed, the foreign minister of Yugoslavia, at the close of the conference, asserted with considerable optimism that "the Balkans are not threatened from any side." But at least it was true that the feeling of imminent danger which had been abroad at the beginning of the year had given way to a greater degree of confidence in the security of the Balkans. This meant that unity was not for the moment so vital that the different states were impelled to make important concessions or to take on new commitments for the

sake of mutual support. And the reason for this feeling was less a faith in Germany's ultimate intentions than a sense of greater ease concerning the attitudes of Italy and Russia.

The Policy of Italy

The attitude of encouragement toward the idea of a Balkan bloc, which Italy at one stage seemed to have adopted, diminished in strength as the year advanced. It had been motivated in the first place by a fear of Russian penetration in the Balkans, perhaps indeed of an actual Russian attack in that region. But this declined as Russia became absorbed in Finland, and with its decline the desire for Balkan solidarity also dwindled. After all, there was at least a chance that the influence of Turkey over such a grouping might become strong enough to draw it within the Allied orbit, and this would be of no advantage whatever to Italy. Her purposes would best be served if the Balkan states could be kept suspicious of all the belligerents, and Russia as well. Then in their desire to maintain their neutrality they might be inclined to look to Italy for support, and to accept a benevolent political guidance from her in return for the prospect of her protection.

This meant that Italy, like the other Great Powers, had a very definite interest in the position of Rumania. If Russia had any intention of expanding in the Balkans, Rumania must form the first line of defence. And if Italy held by her assertions of a firm intention to oppose the advance of Bolshevism, she would in that case be obliged to come to Rumania's aid. It was, indeed, asserted in the Rumanian Senate that Mussolini had promised to come to that country's rescue in case of attack, no matter by whom.

There was reason to doubt, however, whether Italy would give such a promise entirely without reservations. Though she might recognize the crucial position of Rumania, she had a far livelier traditional interest in Hungary; and Hungary, though maintaining a moderate attitude, had by no means abandoned her desire for a return of territory from Rumania. Hungary too was in a somewhat exposed

position. She too had Russia for a neighbour; and, perhaps still more important, she stood squarely in the path of any projected German expansion down the Danube.

There was thus good reason for Hungary to strengthen her ties with Italy, and for Italy to support Hungary as the bastion of a neutral Balkan area. Early in January the two foreign ministers, Count Ciano and Count Czaky, met at a conference in Italy. The announcement that they had established "a perfect identity of views" was interpreted to mean almost everything up to a definite military alliance. It was denied in Rome that any new formal agreement had been negotiated; but it seemed probable that the two statesmen had agreed on common resistance to Russia, and that Ciano, while possibly renewing his promise of Italy's support to Hungary's territorial claims, had used his influence to persuade her not to press those claims for the moment.

The lack of any precise agreement was suggested by the circumstances surrounding Premier Teleki's visit to Rome in the last week of March. Rumours that the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at Brennero was to be the prelude to an Italo-Russian rapprochement had clearly made Hungary nervous about her position. Apparently Count Teleki was reassured on this particular point by the information that Italy contemplated no fundamental change in her attitude toward Moscow. At the same time, however, he was made to realize that Hungary's own ambitions must not be allowed to complicate an extremely delicate situation. "Hungary", he said in an interview, "fully aware of the difficult moment, has adopted an attitude that harmonizes with superior European necessities. My country is patient. It has a thousand years of history, and it therefore can wait." It was a clear indication that Hungary's particular claims were to be postponed until the outcome of the European struggle appeared more certain than it was at the moment.

What was not so clear was the bearing of all this on Germany's influence in the Danube basin. Although Italy naturally desired a predominant position, there were few signs that she was prepared to offer any strong opposition to German penetration of Hungary and

the Balkans. Her attitude was that Italy was not a neutral, but a non-belligerent whose ties with Germany remained as firm as ever. The conclusion of a commercial agreement on February 24, after a month of negotiation, was made the occasion for a reaffirmation of the political collaboration between Germany and Italy; and the controlled press continued to manifest a sustained hostility toward Britain and France.

This was an attitude which might have grave implications. Italy was in a position to make serious trouble for the Allies, if it suited her purpose. She could undertake to stir up trouble in France's African colonies, as well as in Egypt and Arabia. She could do much to make the Allied position in the Mediterranean uncomfortable and even uncertain. And if the Allies should become seriously involved in the Balkans or the Near East, then Italy, planted across their sea communications, would almost be able to hold them to ransom.

The Coal Dispute

It was perhaps with a view to clarifying Italy's attitude by a warning example of the consequences of any real hostility that Britain, at the end of February, clamped down on deliveries of German coal. The occasion was the break-down of Anglo-Italian trade negotiations. Britain, it was understood, had offered to supply Italy with certain industrial raw materials in return for arms and munitions. Italy balked at supplying weapons to Germany's enemy and offered to pay in such products as fruit and textiles. (It was noted, however, that deliveries of Italian arms to France continued without interruption; and on March 6 a new trade agreement was concluded between the two countries.) By the middle of February negotiations with England had broken down; after some further skirmishing, it was announced that all shipments of coal from Germany to Italy would be seized after midnight on March 1.

The order hit Italy in a particularly sensitive spot. She imported about twelve million tons of coal a year, of which seven million came from Greater Germany. Normally, ten million tons came by sea; and though some of this might be transported overland, it was estimated

that the overworked German railways could not possibly deliver more than five million tons. If Italy was to get the fuel so vital to her industries, she must make terms with the Allies.

Britain had already shown her desire to deal gently with Italy by allowing German coal to go through even after the December ban on German exports. Apparently Italy was uncertain whether the new measure would really be enforced, and decided to test it by defying the British order. Thirteen Italian colliers put out from German ports at the beginning of March, and were promptly seized by the British fleet. With a coal shortage already in existence and prices rapidly on the rise, Italy, in spite of wrathful protests, decided to seek an agreement. Britain on her part was ready for a compromise, particularly in view of Ribbentrop's prospective visit to Rome. On March 9 it was decided to renew trade negotiations, with Britain dropping her insistence on actual armaments but securing a promise of such equipment as trucks and aeroplane engines, and Italy promising to import no more German coal by sea. To emphasize the lesson, the British note of March 20 in reply to the earlier Italian protests pointed out that Italian as well as other neutral ships had suffered from Germany's complete disregard of the laws of war, and asserted a continued intention to use every legal weapon against the Reich.

This settlement came just at the moment when Germany was embarking on new efforts to draw her Axis partner into more effective co-operation. Her anxiety over the possible complications which might result from the Finnish war had now abated with the prospect of peace between Russia and Finland. Her desire to improve and consolidate her position in southeastern Europe could now be pursued with more vigour and freedom. The chance that the defeat of Finland might be regarded as a setback for the Allies which would hurt their prestige in the Balkan states was an additional reason for taking advantage of this particular moment. And Italy, whose co-operation was essential in such an enterprise, might be moved by her resentment over the coal dispute with Britain to lend a helping hand to Germany.

Hitler and Mussolini

On March 10 the German Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, arrived in Rome on a diplomatic mission of exploration. Besides his conversations with the King and Mussolini, he paid a visit to the Vatican in the desire to soothe the strained relations between the Papacy and the Reich. There his reception was coldly correct. The Pope had for some time been gravely exercised by the ruthless brutality of Germany's treatment of the conquered Poles, and he made it clear, as he had done in his five-point peace programme presented at Christmas, that reparation of such injustices was in his view an essential condition of peace.

It seemed clear that Von Ribbentrop had failed in any efforts he may have made to enlist the support of the Pontiff on behalf of a peace crusade. His conversations with the Italian leaders, though possibly more cordial, did not appear to have achieved any more tangible result. An agreement on deliveries of German coal suggested that Von Ribbentrop's influence had been used to support the commercial negotiations which Dr. Clodius was at the moment conducting in Rome. But although the final communiqué said that the talks had taken place "in the spirit and framework of the pact of alliance and the accords existing between Italy and Germany", it did not appear that any positive steps had been agreed upon. It was regarded as significant that no sooner had Von Ribbentrop crossed the Alps than it was officially announced that Italy's new fortifications covered the German as well as the French border—an announcement which was greeted with enthusiastic applause in the Italian Chamber.

In this situation, Hitler decided to take matters in hand himself. In a surprise announcement on March 17 it was revealed that the two dictators had arranged to meet next day at the Italian frontier.

The Brennero meeting of March 18 was officially described as a "cordial colloquy". Beyond that, no positive information was vouchsafed. But although any conclusions were therefore somewhat speculative, it was still possible to divine from these various diplomatic activities the outline of the policy which Germany had in mind.

The first element in that policy was the desire to keep the area of hostilities from extending to eastern Europe. Whatever Germany's military plans might be, she seemed bent on confining the war to the west and preventing the creation of a new front on which the Allies might attack. This involved the maintenance of Balkan neutrality—a buffer area which would guard Germany's back door. For full security it was desirable that the predominant political influence in the Balkans should be that of Germany and her friends. This would pave the way for an increase of economic influence which would bring the Balkan states effectively under German domination and allow the full exploitation of their agricultural and other resources. The creation of a strong economic bloc in that region, firmly bound to Germany in its commercial relations, would go a long way toward frustrating the Allied blockade; and if the resulting stalemate did not convince the Allies of the hopelessness of continuing the struggle, it might pave the way for a smashing and possibly decisive blow by Germany in the west.

Such a plan, however, called for the co-operation of both Russia and Italy with Germany. The competition of these three powers for influence in the Balkans, and the fears which this had aroused, had made it possible for Turkey and the Allies to keep alive their influence there. A common front, on the other hand, could bring such pressure to bear on the Balkan states that they would have no choice but to accept its domination and to adapt their policies to serve Germany's war necessities.

This was the critical point in the whole plan, and to all appearances it was a stumbling block not easily surmounted. Italian hostility to Bolshevism, which grew rapidly after the German-Soviet treaty in August, had burst into flame with the outbreak of the Finnish war. The possibility of a Russian advance in the Balkans made Italy look on Russia as her most immediate enemy. Germany appeared to hope that the end of the Finnish war would diminish the hostility, and that the assurance that Russia was prepared to guarantee the Rumanian and Turkish frontiers would quiet Italy's alarm.

But Italy appeared sceptical; and Ciano's reported assertion to Ribbentrop that Italy had no intention of changing her policy applied to her attitude to Russia as well as to her maintenance of neutrality.

Russia and the Axis

Russia on her part seemed equally cool toward the idea of closer co-operation. Although Berlin persistently reported that Premier Molotoff was about to visit the German capital, no sign of such a move appeared. Instead, the conclusion of peace with Finland seemed to be taken as an opportunity to return to an attitude of watchful and defensive neutrality.

The Finnish war, indeed, had already had a significant effect on the relations of Russia with Turkey and the Balkans. The initial setbacks to the Russian troops had encouraged these countries, and particularly Rumania, to take a bolder attitude toward the prospect of Russian attacks. They had indeed roused in Turkey indications of a growing hostility which, coupled with the military preparations of the Allies, had wakened some concern in Russia over the security of her frontier in the Caucasus. This feeling reached its climax in the latter part of February, when a withdrawal of Russian experts from Turkey was followed by reports of clashes on the frontier and by Turkey's declaration of a state of emergency. But this was smoothed over when Russia gave assurances that no attack was contemplated, and both countries agreed to retire their troops from the frontier in order that further clashes might be avoided. By the middle of March, this same conciliatory attitude was shown in a willingness to give Rumania assurances against attack; and if Rumania still did not feel confidence enough in Russia's promises to reduce her military precautions, at least they helped to diminish the likelihood of any immediate hostilities.

Russia's attitude was summed up by Premier Molotoff in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on March 29. Reiterating his promise not to recover Bessarabia from Rumania by force, and recalling the existence of non-aggression pacts with Turkey and Iran, he expressed suspicion

of Allied preparations in the Near East and warned them that they were playing with fire. His tone throughout was distinctly hostile to the Allies—a hostility increased by the French action in demanding the recall of the Russian ambassador after his most undiplomatic telegram on the conclusion of the Finnish peace. It was made abundantly clear by these passages, as well as by Molotoff's references to America, that Russia continued to feel no friendship whatever toward the western Powers.

The Allies, however, felt that a certain comfort might be drawn from the lack of any striking cordiality in Molotoff's references to the Axis. To judge from his speech, Italy's reluctance to enter upon friendly relations with Russia was apparently reciprocated by Moscow. There was a glance at Italy's attitude toward the Finnish war, and a resentful reference to her shipment of aeroplanes to the Finns. As far as Germany was concerned, Molotoff's language could be regarded as sympathetic. He contrasted the friendly relations between Moscow and Berlin with "the hostile policy of the imperialists toward a socialist state", and forecast further developments in the economic relations of the two countries. But these references, though no doubt cordial, hardly rose to a pitch of enthusiasm; and accompanying them was a clear indication that Russia had no intention of turning these friendly relations into a military alliance. "The Soviet Union", said Molotoff, "neither was nor will be a tool of the policy of others. We stand for neutrality and will not participate in the war between the Great Powers."

Thus, though the Allies had no hopes for the moment from Italy and Russia, there was at least the prospect that neither of these two neutrals would be in a hurry to throw its weight on the side of Germany. There was still a chance for Britain and France to bring pressure on them by appeals, if not to their higher emotions, at least to their cupidity or their fears. And while trying by diplomatic means to diminish the hostility which these Powers continued to exhibit, the Allies could count as an asset the continued friendliness of the United States.

THE AMERICAS AND THE WAR

The American republics, looking across the ocean at the plight of the neutral countries of Europe, had some reason to feel grateful for their geographic remoteness from the scene of conflict. It was a conflict whose course was bound to have an important effect upon their interests, and whose outcome might be of vital significance for their ultimate destiny. But at least they were exposed to no such immediate pressure as were the smaller European states. No major belligerent gazed with a calculating eye across their frontiers. The prospect of a spread of the war did not threaten to engulf them at any moment in hostilities from which they desired to remain aloof. Some of them might ultimately be led to participate as they did in the Great War; but the decision would be taken of their own free will in the light of circumstances, not forced upon them by a pressure against which resistance was in vain.

The Position of Canada

This contrast was illuminated by the position of Canada on the American continent. The proclamation on September 10, by the authority of the Parliament of Canada, of a state of war with Germany, placed the Dominion unreservedly in the ranks of the belligerents. Yet no other American nation—in spite of the alarmist remarks of Colonel Lindbergh—felt that by this step the threat of war had been brought closer to its doors. On the continent of Europe, if Holland were invaded, Belgium could hardly hope to stand aloof; if Rumania should enter the war, the neutral position of all the other Balkan states would thereby be endangered. And the risk that these states might become involved was heightened by the fact that they occupied a strategic position which might be of first-rate importance to one or other of the warring nations. But Canada was unlikely to be the focus of such strategic considerations; nor, so long as the western front held, was her participation in the war likely to provoke an invasion which would threaten the security of any other American state.

This did not mean that her strategic value, apart from other factors, was by any means negligible. Quite apart from the possible importance of her outlook on the Pacific, she possessed in Halifax a naval base that was the key to the north Atlantic. From this port, supplemented by bases in the British West Indies, naval squadrons could operate in the work of convoy and in the search for enemy submarines and commerce raiders. In theory this would bring the possibility of warlike operations uncomfortably close to the American hemisphere. But in practice it did little more than provide certain valuable facilities for that control of the sea which the British and French navies were bound in any case to seek to impose in whatever area belligerent commerce or warships might be found.

The activities of Canada herself could therefore be viewed by her neighbors on the continent without serious perturbation. Neither her raising of military forces nor her creation of war industries threatened them with embarrassment. No doubt the plans to use Canada's industrial resources for the extensive manufacture of munitions might ultimately reduce somewhat the dependence of the Allies on the United States. But in the meantime the air training scheme, intended to produce 15,000 trained pilots annually, was likely to draw heavily on the United States for equipment; and the use of Canada's financial resources in the Allied cause was hardly likely to cause any serious resentment on the part of those countries from which Allied purchases would be made.

Effects on Latin America

It was the question of the probable effect of the war on their economic interests which was, at the outset, the most immediate concern of the various American republics. Expert observers warned that the boom times of the last war were hardly likely to be repeated, and that it was not wholly desirable that they should be. But it was clear that, for good or ill, serious changes were certain to take place in the commerce of the American nations. The normal channels of foreign trade were inevitably disrupted, and it was a question what gains could be anticipated to balance the inevitable loss.

In the case of Latin America there was one special matter for concern at the outbreak of war. That was the existence of barter trade agreements with various European countries, and particularly with Germany. Under these, many of the countries of Central and South America had built up commercial credits in Berlin which they could cash only by taking German goods. In the period after Munich the uncertainties of the situation led these countries to try to liquidate their balances by increasing their imports from Germany. How successful they had been by the outbreak of war is not entirely clear. Uruguay denied rumours that she had heavy frozen credits and asserted that her accounts with Germany were balanced to date. Mexico, on the other hand, still had credits outstanding as a result of sales of oil to Germany and Italy. One observer estimated that as much as \$75,000,000 was tied up; but on the whole, most countries seem to have reduced their balances to comparatively small amounts.

It was clearly going to be difficult, however, for Germany to keep up these barter arrangements, in view of the blockade and the Allied seizure of exports. In the case of such countries as Chile and Argentina, trade with Germany, and particularly imports, showed a sharp drop. There were indications that some exports were still going by a round-about way. It was suspected that the increased exports of Brazilian cotton to Italy were not intended for Italy alone. Brazil lost her best European market for coffee when Germany was cut off, but increased her sales to Germany's neighbours. But with signs that the Allies intended to exercise a stricter supervision over neutral purchases, Latin America had to face the prospect of a considerable readjustment in trade relations.

This was accentuated by the policy of the Allies. Their efforts to conserve foreign exchange led to a curtailment of purchases in many cases. Britain's imports from Chile, for instance, dropped in the last three months of 1939 to six per cent. of what they had been in the same period of the previous year. But there were signs that this was only a preliminary to a readjustment of arrangements which would link imports more closely with exports. Argentina's close connection with Britain, who continued to be her best customer, placed her

practically on the footing of a Dominion as far as trade was concerned. But even with the best prospects in this direction, most Latin American countries would have to look to the United States to make up the sales which they were losing in Europe.

War Trade and the United States

The trade connection between the Allies and the United States was even in peacetime of paramount importance. Britain and Canada were by far the most important customers of the United States. Between them they bought, in 1939, American goods of a total value of a billion dollars—a figure amounting to one-third of all United States exports, and considerably in excess of the purchases of the whole of Latin America. Sales to Germany in the same year amounted to only \$47,000,000. France, with purchases of \$182,000,000, bought more than Germany, Russia and Italy combined.

This disparity was accentuated by the war, which brought a sharp increase in total Allied purchases. December figures showed that, while exports to Britain were up a modest three million dollars over the same month of the previous year, exports to France had tripled, and Canada's purchases had increased by \$15,000,000—a rise of over forty per cent. In contrast, in the five months from September to January inclusive, the whole of Greater Germany including Poland bought under a million dollars' worth of goods, compared with \$66,000,000 worth in the same period a year before. An increase in neutral purchases by 47 per cent.—and, in the case of Scandinavia, by 70 per cent.—suggested that Germany might be getting more than these figures showed; but this was a matter to which the Allies were expected to attend at an early date.

Whatever the net loss of American trade to central Europe, it was more than balanced by increased sales to the Allies and Latin America. January exports were the highest in ten years, up 75 per cent. over January 1939. Not all sections of American production, however, shared this rise. War materials benefitted at the expense of some of the more staple export industries. British purchases of wheat

in the Dominions and the Argentine reduced American wheat exports. American tobacco suffered as a result of British purchases in Turkey. Automobile exports were off 10 per cent. Cotton, on the other hand, benefitted from increased British and Canadian purchases which in February 1940 tripled exports as compared with 1939; and metals, machinery, chemicals, and especially aircraft, seemed headed for a wartime boom.

In the matter of war supplies, however, there were signs of a good deal of wariness on the part of both buyers and sellers. The agreement by Britain and France to co-ordinate their purchasing policies meant that their purchasing missions in the United States avoided competing with each other and were able to pursue a policy of close bargaining for the supplies they wanted. American manufacturers on their part showed a great deal of caution about accepting orders in excess of their existing capacity unless they could be assured of a price high enough to cover any necessary expansion of their plants and equipment.

This was illustrated particularly by the situation in respect to aeroplanes. The Allies, and France particularly, were counting on substantial deliveries from the United States, and held out the prospect of orders totalling a billion dollars. Naturally they wanted the latest types of planes, and they wanted them produced as rapidly as possible. Orders of this size would call for the expansion of existing plants; and manufacturers demanded assurances that these construction costs would be covered, and that an agreement on this point would not be nullified by Treasury regulations on taxation. At the same time, both public opinion and military circles became somewhat perturbed at the thought that the sale of the newest planes might make certain military secrets available to foreign powers. All through March intensive negotiations went on, with a Congressional committee inquiring into the military angle of the situation. But by the end of the month these various difficulties appeared to have been cleared up, and there was every prospect that large scale deliveries would be available to the Allies during the coming year.

Neutral Rights

These economic developments indicated some of the advantages of a benevolent neutrality. On the other side, the immediate disadvantages were comparatively small. The European neutrals had the constant concern that rights of various sorts would be violated—their waters infringed by belligerent warships, their territory flown over by belligerent planes. The American republics had few worries on that score. Even the question of the rights of neutral commerce, which had bulked large in previous wars, was reduced in importance when United States ships were forbidden to enter the war zone. And though some difficulties did occasionally arise as a result of the blockade and other incidents in sea warfare, they were comparatively minor in importance and in effect.

One controversy, indeed, arose directly from an attempt to create a situation which would prevent such controversies from arising. On the outbreak of war, a Pan-American conference was called to consider the adoption of common policies toward the problems which the war was likely to present. The most novel idea produced by the conference, which met at Panama from September 23 to October 3, was to create a "zone of American security" of an average width of 300 miles around the continent, and to treat this as territorial waters within which belligerent activities would be barred. Although this did not include Canadian waters, it took in the British possessions in the Caribbean, and raised the question of their use as naval bases and of the immunity of belligerent commerce within this area. The effectiveness of the proposal would depend entirely on the willingness of the warring powers to accept and abide by it, for no American state really contemplated effective naval measures of enforcement. An American admiral put his finger on the vital spot. "It is a nice idea," he commented, "but what are we going to do if somebody sticks his nose inside the zone?"

In December somebody did. The battle of the River Plate between the British cruisers and the *Graf Spee* brought the question into the foreground, complicated by Uruguay's claim that part of the

engagement had actually taken place within the three-mile limit. On December 23 a protest was presented to the belligerents on this and other episodes, including attacks on belligerent shipping. Britain's reply on January 15 implied a willingness to accept the Declaration of Panama if its impartial enforcement could be assured, but asserted that, while this was lacking, "the legitimate activities of His Majesty's ships can in no way imperil but must rather contribute to the security of the American continent." Germany on February 14 rejected the whole idea, asserting that it favoured England and France and pointing out that Canada was a belligerent state directly bordering on the zone. Although on February 3 new proposals for the control of belligerent shipping were drawn up by the Inter-American Neutrality Committee, it was clear that so broad an innovation in international law had little immediate chance of practical acceptance.

On more established questions there were also occasional skirmishes. An American note protesting the seizure of German exports was published on December 8, but in practice the measure created few serious grievances; and Britain in her reply on February 22 defended its legality under the right of reprisal, and pointed to Germany's violations of law and treaties by her methods in mine and submarine warfare. But certain other aspects of the blockade created considerable though passing annoyance in America. The detention of American ships at control ports, particularly Gibraltar, was felt to involve unwarrantable discrimination. An aide-memoire on January 22 pointed out that although Italian ships were released after an average delay of four days, American ships were held for an average of 12.4. A still sharper protest was sent concerning Britain's seizure of mail destined for Germany from American ships—a practice which was even extended to the Transatlantic *Clipper* during a landing at Bermuda on January 18. The dispute over the legality of this practice centred on the Hague Convention of 1907. The United States claimed that Article I, which asserted the inviolability of all postal correspondence, was decisive. But Britain and France, pointing to Article II which said that this inviolability did not exempt a neutral ship

from the laws of maritime war, claimed that this justified them in intercepting the currency and other valuables which the seized mail contained to the value of \$8,000,000. In this as in other questions, the discussions ended without agreement.

The Mission of Sumner Welles

But while these matters showed that friction between America and the Allies might occasionally arise, they were unlikely to cause any serious breach. The Roosevelt administration was far too concerned with the broader issues of the conflict. The President was fully aware of its significance for America and of the dangers inherent in a possible defeat of the Allies. He was eager to use his influence wherever possible to further any opportunity for the restoration of peace. But, as he showed in his speech on March 16, he realized that a moral basis was necessary if peace was to be real and lasting; and during this period there seemed to be little prospect that Germany would accept any settlement that would even approximate to this condition.

It was apparently with the intention of discovering whether any prospect whatever existed that President Roosevelt announced, on February 9, the appointment of Mr. Sumner Welles to conduct a fact-finding tour of the belligerent capitals. "This visit", said the White House statement, "is solely for the purpose of advising the President and the Secretary of State as to present conditions in Europe. Mr. Welles will, of course, be authorized to make no proposals or commitments in the name of the Government of the United States."

This explanation seemed altogether too simple to satisfy the speculative tendency of a great many observers. But in their search for the deeper and subtler purposes behind the mission, they got no help from Mr. Welles. The Under-secretary of State pursued his appointed way, tall and tight-lipped, from one capital to another. In the course of four weeks he saw the chief officials in Rome and Berlin, conversed with the leaders of the various parties in Paris and London, and met with representatives of the Polish government-in-exile. At the end of his tour, the only enlightenment he would offer was the

statement: "I wish to state categorically that I have not received any peace plan or proposals from any belligerent or from any other government; that I have not conveyed any such proposals to any belligerent nor to any other government; nor am I bringing back to the President any such proposals."

What seemed clear, however, was that statesmen had insisted in their talks with Mr. Welles that any peace must virtually be a peace with victory. Britain and France both insisted that the Nazi shadow must be lifted from Europe. On the German side there were still more striking statements, if the semi-official accounts from Berlin could be accepted. Von Ribbentrop stressed Germany's determination to break the power of the British "plutocracy". He interpreted this to mean the end of British control of the seas, the surrender of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, and the exclusion of British influence from the Continent in order that Germany's domination over her "living space" might be assured. Hitler elaborated these demands and added the return of colonies to Germany and the recognition of Germany's right to establish her own Monroe Doctrine in central and eastern Europe. On which the *New York Times* commented: "The Monroe Doctrine, presumably, gives us the right to occupy Argentina and Brazil, to shoot their leading civilians, close their universities, conscript their labour, uproot thousands of women and children from their homes, and impose our ideas upon Latin America at the point of a bayonet."

How little comfort Mr. Welles brought back from his explorations was revealed by the President's statement on his envoy's return. "He has not received, nor has he brought back to me any peace proposals from any source", said Mr. Roosevelt, adding that his information would be valuable "even though there may be scant immediate prospect for the establishment of any just, stable and lasting peace in Europe." At the same time, a curious episode suggested that Mr. Welles had left behind him a certain amount of discontent in at least one European country. Barely had he arrived home when the Nazis published what purported to be a series of documents from the Polish archives intended to prove that American diplomatic envoys had

helped, by encouraging Poland and the Allies, to fan the quarrels which ultimately led to war. Whatever the historical worth of the publication might turn out to be, it was hard to see what propaganda value they could possibly have at the moment to the Nazi cause, or in what way that cause would be served by so curious a manifestation of resentment toward America.

The Tightening Ring

The beginning of April thus saw a hardening determination on both sides, and a tightening of preparations for a new and more strenuous phase of the struggle. New Nazi threats of devastating action were climaxed by Goering's assertion that Hitler had prepared a decisive blow in the west. The Allies on their part refused to yield to the clamour that rose from some quarters that they should commit themselves to taking the offensive, but made it clear that they were determined to press the struggle to a decision. Their economic solidarity had been further increased by a new trade treaty between Britain and France on February 16. Their political and military union was strengthened at the meeting of the Supreme War Council on March 28, where it was agreed that no peace should be sought except by mutual agreement, and that community of action would continue for as long after the peace as was necessary for security and the reconstruction of Europe. And in his speech on April 3, Premier Reynaud spoke of his new war cabinet in a phrase which seemed to forecast more vigorous measures: "We have forged this weapon, now we are going to use it."

At least one form of its use was clearly indicated—the tightening of the economic pressure on Germany. The Allies were no longer content to see the maintenance of legal neutrality by the small nations work out in practice to the advantage of the enemy. They were themselves using legal means to diminish that advantage. A more extensive purchasing policy was envisaged to keep neutral products out of German hands. New trade treaties provided that the countries concerned should voluntarily ration their imports to prevent them from acting as channels of supply to the Reich. But it was made

clear that if the neutrals did not do this voluntarily, it would be imposed upon them by the Allied blockade; and it was also forecast that means would be found, one way or another, to deal with such important matters as the shipment of Swedish iron ore to Germany. With the blockade closing down on the Baltic and the Adriatic and the Pacific, the Allies were clearly getting ready to apply a new intensity of pressure. It remained to be seen whether this, which could add nothing to the happiness of the neutrals, would also lead to the extension of hostilities at their expense as Germany sought to break the closing ring.

4

APRIL TO 15 JUNE 1940

A NEW KIND OF WAR

THE probability that the coming of spring would see a major offensive was brought still nearer by the new blockade measures adopted by the Allies. Behind these steps there were at least two motives discernible. The first, of course, was to deprive Germany of the means of carrying on the war. But the second was based on a hope that the danger of being quietly strangled would force Germany to abandon her defensive tactics. It was felt in many quarters that the launching of an attack by Germany which would force her to come outside her prepared position would be a real advantage to the Allies. It would force her to put forth more strenuous efforts which would rapidly use up her reserves of material; and at the same time it was hoped that the Nazi forces, by battering against the Allied positions, would so exhaust themselves that the Allies at the appropriate moment could launch the counter-attack which would bring victory at a minimum of cost.

This theory of a defensive war, a war of limited liability, depended for its success on an accurate calculation of the power of

the defensive. But when Germany took the initiative and followed a successful stab at Scandinavia with a crashing blow through the Netherlands, it was quickly seen that calculations based on past experience must now be thrown to the winds. The "real" war, when it burst, was an entirely new kind of war. The basic elements might still be those of text-books, but its development of tactics based on new weapons and a new use of those weapons made it quite without precedent.

For this kind of war the Allies discovered that they were still unprepared. They had to define its nature and discover an answer to the new method of attack in the midst of their desperate efforts to meet that attack with sufficient success to avert complete annihilation. And in the meantime it was the Nazis with their new technique who held the initiative. They were able to choose their own ground and their own time, and to impose upon the hard-pressed enemy the conditions of battle best suited to their own purposes. In two months of fighting the measure of success which they achieved was in itself a proof of how very different this war was from the struggle which had raged over much of the same territory twenty-five years before.

That difference was inherent, not only in military methods, but in the broad implications of the struggle. It was no longer only the belligerents, or even the small buffer states, who were affected by the issue. Even those nations which stood outside, without any immediate fear of attack, awoke with a shock to a realization that this was something more than an ordinary war for limited objectives. It was a struggle between two utterly diverse conceptions of life; and while the world was certain to be changed by the fact of war itself, the nature of the change which would follow on a Nazi victory was beginning to be clear. It would be the end of a type of society which the western world had spent centuries in evolving, and the creation of an entirely new order which would impose its stamp, not merely on the conquered nations, but on the world at large. And as the world confronted this prospect it became conscious that it faced a threat

of imminent world revolution—but a threat which came no longer from Moscow, but from Rome and Berlin.

THE INVASION OF SCANDINAVIA

The decision reached by the Allies, at the end of March, to clamp down more effectively on the blockade of Germany, was viewed with especial apprehension in Scandinavia. There were of course many leaks which the Allies intended to stop—the oil and metals which Germany was drawing from the Balkans, the foodstuffs she was receiving from the Danubian states, the wide range of products from overseas which reached her by way of the Low Countries. But important as these were, there was reason to believe that the most immediate concern of the Allies was with the iron ore which Germany was getting from Sweden and transporting by way of Norwegian territorial waters.

For these two nations the problems of neutrality had been growing steadily more difficult since the war began. At the slightest indication that they were not completely subservient to Germany, the Nazi press and government burst out in menacing abuse. At the same time, Germany in her air and submarine warfare made no effort to distinguish their shipping from that of the belligerents. Up to April 6, 52 Norwegian, 33 Swedish, and 28 Danish ships had been sunk, with a loss of nearly a thousand lives. When the protests of these neutrals to Germany were answered merely by new recriminations, the Allies naturally began to feel that such neutrality left something to be desired.

The Finnish war had for a time added a new complication to this situation. With the end of hostilities, the Scandinavian states were released from the dangers inherent in the Allied plans for intervention on behalf of the Finns. But the general problem remained, accentuated by a growing Allied impatience at Germany's continued access to Scandinavian supplies; and this was expressed in Churchill's broadcast of March 30, which pointed out that the neutrals were being

forced to supply a Power whose victory would mean their enslavement. Any doubt about what this attitude meant for Scandinavia was removed by Chamberlain's statement on April 2, which attacked the "double standard of neutrality" and strongly hinted that the current efforts to block the Scandinavian route were only a preliminary to more effective operations. And two days later, speaking to the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, the Prime Minister said: "Although we shall never seek to inflict injury or loss on neutrals, and although we are anxious to keep all the rules, it cannot be expected that we shall allow Germany indefinitely to profit by our scrupulousness to draw aid and comfort from neutrals."

This view was given official expression in the Allied notes presented to Norway and Sweden on April 5. These notes, according to the statement by M. Koht on April 8, asserted that the developments of the past three months had shown the refusal of Germany to permit a free conduct of foreign policy by the Scandinavian states. The result was that Germany, by her access to important raw materials, benefited from advantages in those countries to the disadvantage and danger of the Allied Powers. This was something which the Allies could no longer tolerate. They were fighting as much on behalf of the small nations as for their own cause, and could not allow themselves to be hampered by the advantages which such a situation gave to Germany. They must therefore reserve the right to take steps which would stop any practices which aided Germany or harmed the Allied cause.

The steps which they had in mind were particularly concerned with the iron ore route. German ships had found it possible to travel from Narvik down the Norwegian coast without leaving territorial waters until they reached the Skaggerak and the shelter of German minefields. "There has been", said Churchill on April 11, "no greater impediment to the blockade of Germany than this Norwegian corridor. It was so in the last war, and it has been so in this war." During the last war the Allies had induced Norway to lay minefields in these waters; and when the present war broke out, they

sought permission from Norway to lay a minefield of their own. But Norway steadily resisted this demand; and her virtual rejection of the Allied case as stated in the notes of April 5 showed that no effective action could be expected from her. On April 8 the Allies passed from words to deeds. On the morning of that day the Allies announced that they had resolved "to deny the continued use by the enemy of stretches of territorial waters of particular value to him", and that in consequence they had laid minefields at three points in Norwegian waters.

The Norwegian government at once protested and demanded the removal of the mines. It seemed quite possible that a grave situation would result between Norway and the Allies. But before this could develop, the whole picture was changed by the action of Germany.

The German Preparations

From the outset of the war, Germany had striven to keep the Scandinavian states firmly within her own orbit. For both economic and strategic reasons it was of the utmost importance to her to preserve access to those countries, and to prevent her adversaries from securing either a diplomatic ascendancy or a military foothold in the peninsula. This concern had been increased by the Finnish war and the possibility of Allied intervention. There were no illusions about the use that would be made of such intervention to create a new front against Germany; and even before the Allies came to a decision to lend armed aid to Finland, Germany had begun her preparations to forestall any such move in the north.

When it came to protecting their own interests at the expense of the neutrals, the Nazis by their very nature enjoyed a freedom of action which was denied to the Allies. The latter had based their moral cause on the maintenance of international legality and the preservation of the rights of all nations, both great and small. This position effectively debarred them from any serious infringement of the established sovereignty of the neutral countries. They might invoke the doctrine of reprisal to justify certain extraordinary acts

such as the seizure of German exports or the laying of the minefields off Norway. They might risk a technical violation of theoretical rights in an extreme case such as that of the *Altmark*. But only dire necessity would move them to sacrifice their moral advantage for the sake of military expediency. Germany, however, had no such advantage to lose. In Nazi doctrine the welfare of the Reich was the sole moral standard to be considered; and while Germany might seek to use the moral concepts of the democracies against them when it served her purpose, she had no intention of being hampered by them herself.

Early in the year, therefore, Germany decided to seize command of Scandinavia, both to protect her own position and to extend the sea front against England. By February the preliminaries were in full swing, with ships being collected for transport and troops being trained along the Baltic in landing operations. The announced intention of the Allies to stiffen the blockade stimulated these measures and evoked notes of sinister warning in the German press. Already, on March 16, the *Voelkischer Beobachter* had pointed out: "The examples of Poland and Finland show with overwhelming emphasis what happens to small peoples when they defy the laws of their living space . . . The generous attitude of Germany stands in startling contrast to the dirty egoism with which England and France seek to force little peoples into the service of their war strategy". At the end of the month, commenting on Churchill's speech, a Berlin paper inquired: "What is the loss of a few neutral lives compared with the cynical attempt to starve a whole nation's women and children? Germany will not forget it if anyone . . . shares in this mass murder by depriving the German people of the legal means of defence". And on April 5, after a conference with Goebbels, German editors began forecasting a new phase of the war and the approach of the fateful hour of the neutrals.

This demonstration synchronized with the actual launching of the expedition against Norway. Although the laying of the Allied minefields at first gave the German attack the appearance of a

counter-stroke, the coincidence was purely fortuitous, since the German ships had in some cases set out for their destinations at least three days before. Indications that something was afoot were apparent on April 8 when a German transport crammed with troops, the *Rio de Janeiro*, was sunk by a British submarine off Lillesand, and a German flotilla was reported to be steaming north through the Great Belt. But while the public was still speculating on the meaning of these events, Germany struck. At dawn on April 9, over a thousand-mile stretch, her forces closed in on Norway and Denmark.

The Occupation of Denmark

When German troops crossed the Danish frontier at Flensburg, they traversed what was almost the last unfortified boundary left in Europe. Even more than her Scandinavian neighbours, Denmark felt herself compelled by her size and her strategic position to rely upon international good faith rather than on armed strength as her sole possible defence. A nation of less than four million, whose only land frontier bordered the German Reich, she had long recognized that she could offer no effective resistance to invasion; and even her recent appropriations for air defence were rather a gesture signifying her desire to retain her independence than a real guarantee against conquest. As her Premier said in his New Year's broadcast: "To the Danish people only one road is open. We must continue along the road of neutrality and trust in the reliability of the promises and agreements that apply to us".

Chief among these agreements was the non-aggression pact with Germany. In April 1939, as a result of President Roosevelt's message asking pledges of peace, Hitler had called on Germany's small neighbours to say whether they felt themselves to be threatened, and offered to conclude treaties which would supposedly remove any fear which they might admit. Neither Sweden nor Norway had accepted the offer, having had examples of how dangerous it was for a small country to accept any German pledge. Denmark, however, felt that she could not afford any risk of offending her overbearing neighbour;

and on May 31 she signed with Germany a treaty in which both promised that they would "in no circumstances resort to war or to any other form of violence against each other."

This was slender enough assurance, in view of Germany's record; yet it was the only real assurance that Denmark possessed. She had no alliances and no guarantees from any other nation. With the other western neutrals she had for years placed her hopes in the League of Nations and the prospect of general disarmament; and when these collapsed, nothing remained but the hope that, in any new conflict, she would offer neither offence nor temptation to either party which might endanger her neutrality. She was linked in loose economic and political co-operation with the Oslo group of states, which consisted of Scandinavia and the Low Countries; but these states had shunned all idea of military alliance by mutual consent. When, in March, Finland secured from Sweden and Norway a promise that a mutual assistance pact would follow on her peace with Russia, Denmark was left outside the project as likely to be more of a liability than an asset; and the project itself collapsed when Russia interposed a decisive veto. As a result, all the Scandinavian states stood single and isolated before the new German thrust.

The force which Denmark could oppose to such a thrust was negligible. In theory she could muster something like 150,000 men on a war footing; but most of these were scantily trained, and the available peace-time force was no more than 11,000. It is therefore hardly surprising that the invader met no real resistance. The forces which struck at half a dozen points by sea and land were estimated at the time to number some 40,000 to 50,000. Only the Royal Guard at Copenhagen offered a brief resistance which was promptly overcome. By mid-afternoon the country was under effective German control.

This control, according to the German government, was not that of a conqueror but of a protector. In a note to the governments of the invaded countries, the Reich asserted that the Allied blockade measures constituted "a destructive blow at the conception of neutrality". The Reich was in possession of proof that England and

France were planning an invasion of the northern countries, and it was clear that these countries could not offer effective opposition. Germany had therefore intervened "to protect peace in the north against every English-French attack and definitely to render it secure". In view of this unexampled altruism, Germany expected the countries in question to understand her motives and to offer no opposition. "All resistance", they were warned, "would have to be and would be broken by every available means by the German armed forces deployed here, and therefore lead only to utterly useless bloodshed."

Faced with this prospect, Denmark had no choice but to yield. After conferring with his Cabinet, King Christian issued a proclamation countersigned by the Prime Minister accepting the situation under protest. The population was asked to avoid resistance in order to save the country from the disasters of war. At a special session of Parliament during the afternoon, the Prime Minister made a statement in the course of which he said: "Germany has assured us that she has no intention of violating Denmark's independence and territorial integrity . . . Our people will doubtless realize the necessity for the Government's attitude . . . It is only Denmark and nothing but Denmark that matters now".

But if the Danish kingdom thus proved an easy prey, Norway proved to be a very different matter.

The Invasion of Norway

The German naval forces which moved in simultaneously on six Norwegian ports did so with the knowledge that the success of their enterprise did not rest upon them alone. Reinforcements awaited them in several places in the holds of German ships which, sailing to Norway ostensibly in ballast, in reality had hidden under hatches the troops and mechanized equipment intended for the invasion. The element of surprise, accentuated by these tactics, was a big initial advantage in allowing a handful of men to take over essential positions while Norwegians looked on bewildered. And as a final touch, there were the allies who awaited the Nazis inside Norway and

who, at the allotted time, carried out their essential tasks and made victory secure.

The Norwegian Foreign Minister later discounted this internal aid, and asserted on May 6 that he had still to discover an authentic case of treachery. "It may be hard for some to believe it," he said, "but we were taken by surprise. They came upon us in the night while we slept." There is little doubt that much of the talk about fifth columns and Trojan horses was exaggerated, and that in many cases surprise was achieved not through Norwegian defection but as a result of false orders sent by the Nazis themselves. Yet internal co-operation, from whatever sources, remained a vital feature of the whole scheme. The very confidence with which German warships sailed up the narrow twisting fjords, heedless of protecting mine barriers or of the danger from shore batteries, showed their complete assurance that the way had already been effectively prepared.

At Narvik, for instance, the Nazis were aided both by the activities of the German consul and by the action of the Norwegian military commander. The former held the threads of the preparations, including the presence of freighters with their hidden cargoes of troops. The latter refrained from taking up the dispositions and issuing the orders which might have made resistance possible. Two Norwegian warships, surprised in Narvik harbour, opened fire on the German ships when they hove in sight through a heavy snow-storm; but they were almost immediately torpedoed, and the town itself was occupied in half an hour without a shot being fired from the shore. At Trondheim, according to a Norwegian statement, the German warships surrounded themselves with a flotilla of small Norwegian craft which deterred the forts at Agdenes from opening fire. Here again the town was occupied without resistance; but the fort of Hegre to the east offered an opposition which continued throughout the subsequent campaign. Bergen and Stavanger and Kristiansand were similarly taken after comparatively little resistance.

It was at Oslo, however, that the key to the whole operation lay. Here also a combination of surprise and false orders reduced resistance to a minimum. There was brief fighting at the airport, and the forts

at Oskarborg put up a short resistance. But even the loss of two warships in their passage through the narrows failed to check the German expedition, which effectively occupied the capital during the morning of April 9.

The Norwegian authorities had learned at midnight that German ships had entered the fjord, and the ministry had assembled at the Foreign Office. At 5 A.M., with hostilities already in progress, the German Minister arrived to present the note which informed Norway that she was being taken under the benevolent protection of the Reich and demanded the complete surrender of the country to German control. With some reluctance the German envoy allowed Foreign Minister Koht to consult his colleagues before returning an answer. That answer was an immediate rejection which involved the certainty of hostilities. The government at once moved to Hamar and assembled the Storting to inform that body of the latest events and to receive its approval. By evening, with a German attack on Hamar already imminent, the government made a further move to Elverum.

All possibility of settlement, however, was not yet completely at an end. At Elverum a request was received from the German minister, Dr. Brauer, for an audience with King Haakon. Dr. Brauer was a man in whom Professor Koht had considerable confidence, and it seemed possible that new and more acceptable proposals might be forthcoming. The Storting therefore agreed to associate three of its own members with Professor Koht, and Dr. Brauer was informed that he would be received on the following day.

There was a certain difficulty about the reception, since the Germans most tactlessly assaulted Elverum before it could take place. It was only their repulse at the hands of the Norwegians that enabled the German minister to secure the interview which he had requested. It proved, however, to be futile. Dr. Brauer informed the King, and later the delegation, that the changed situation necessitated new demands. Chief among these was the resignation of the present ministry and the setting up of a new government under Major Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Nazi party in Norway. Although

M. Koht appeared ready to consider a change of government which would make possible collaboration with Germany, this submission to a discredited puppet was too much to ask. The King insisted that he could not appoint a government which did not enjoy the confidence of the people, and a Quisling regime would be on a footing with the Kuusinen government which Russia had set up after her invasion of Finland. He consented to reserve his reply until he had consulted his legal government, but they agreed with his decision, which was communicated to Dr. Brauer on the evening of April 10. To the German Minister's inquiry whether this meant that Norwegian resistance would continue, the reply was: "Yes, as long as possible".

There were, in fact, very serious limits on the length of time that Norway could be expected to hold out effectively by herself. Even under favourable conditions she could hardly count on raising more than 100,000 troops from a population of barely three million. Taken by surprise as she was, it seemed unlikely that more than half that number was available. The Germans by April 11 had perhaps 50,000 men in Norway, well equipped with lighter weapons though not yet fully provided with tanks and heavy artillery. The immediate task of the Norwegians was to hold up these more modern forces as much as possible, and particularly to prevent the main body at Oslo from linking up effectively with the far lighter garrisons which had occupied the other Norwegian ports.

This meant, in effect, preventing an advance to the north or east of Oslo fjord. A German move westward could do little more than strengthen control of a brief coastal strip. A move to the east, however, would open communications with the Swedish frontier; and a successful advance to the north would soon place the invaders in a position to cut the country in two and consolidate their grip on the whole of southern Norway.

The immediate Norwegian effort, therefore, was to hold a ring against the Germans striking in these two directions. The drive to the north followed the Glommen valley, leading to the railway junctions

of Hamar and Elverum and guarded on the east by the fortress of Kongsvinger. Southeast of Oslo the Germans landed troops on the east side of the fjord and fought their way inland. These were apparently small forces, but they had little more before them than improvised Norwegian detachments. By April 15 the Germans claimed to have reached the Swedish frontier and to be in command of the defences on both sides of Oslo fjord; and by the 18th, Norwegian resistance in this particular area appeared to be at an end.

Meanwhile the Germans seem to have become concerned about regularizing their instruments of authority in Norway. The complete ineffectiveness of Major Quisling even as a puppet was revealed when he was replaced on April 15 by a former provincial governor and Minister of Justice, Ingolf Christensen. This still indicated a hope that the Reich would be able to keep up the fiction of an independent government exercising effective authority and accepting German protection, but the hope was rapidly dwindling. On April 19 it received a further blow when Hitler ordered the expulsion of the Norwegian Minister from Berlin. And on April 24 Germany announced its unrestricted sovereignty over the occupied districts of Norway and appointed a commissioner responsible to Hitler alone.

The area over which he ruled, however, was distinctly limited. Nazi garrisons had had little success in extending their control around the western ports. North of Oslo the Germans were pressing up the mountain valleys with advance units but their control beyond Hamar was still precarious. The Norwegians were still putting up a stiff resistance, and aid had begun to reach them from the Allies. The future course of events would now depend on the success of the British navy in cutting the German communications with Norway and in opening the way for the landing of an effective Allied force.

The Naval Operations

The eve of the Norwegian campaign found the main body of the home fleet back in Scapa Flow. Since the loss of the *Royal Oak* the defences of that anchorage had been strengthened, and the fleet had been operating from that base for the past five or six weeks.

Periodically during that period the Germans has launched air raids against Scapa, and two took place in the week preceding the invasion, in addition to a raid which failed to reach the Orkneys. But in the last of these visits, on the evening of April 8, the fleet was no longer there.

The reason was the presence of German naval units at sea. On Sunday, April 7, British reconnaissance planes sighted a German squadron, including battle cruisers, moving northward off Heligoland. As soon as this was reported, the fleet put to sea in search of the enemy. There was every prospect that the German ships, even if they were not overtaken, would be herded into a trap; for there was off northern Norway at that moment a strong British force preparing to carry out their task of laying the new minefields next day at dawn.

That the Germans escaped was due to a combination of good luck and bad weather. How narrow was their margin was shown by the fate of the British destroyer *Glowworm*. This ship lost a man overboard on Sunday, April 7, and was delayed for some time in picking him up. Next day she was heading north to join the rest of the force when she came upon two German destroyers. Barely had she engaged them when another and larger ship loomed up to northward—the new German cruiser *Admiral Hipper*. Before the *Glowworm* could realize and report that she had run into the main German fleet, she was sent to the bottom with the loss of the bulk of her crew.

Again next day the British squadron brushed the fringe of the enemy force. At daybreak on Tuesday, April 9, the hour allotted for the German expedition to strike, the battle cruiser *Renown* sighted through the snowstorm then raging off Narvik the German battleship *Scharnhorst* accompanied by the *Admiral Hipper*. At 18,000 yards the *Renown* secured two hits, one of which put the *Scharnhorst's* fire control out of action; but the *Scharnhorst*, aided by the storm and by a smokescreen laid down by her accompanying cruiser, succeeded in escaping from sight, even though the *Renown* was pressing at twenty-four knots into the heavy seas and had actually outdistanced her destroyers. In the course of the action she was hit by a shell which pierced her about the water line but failed to explode and caused no casualties aboard.

Yet in spite of these instances of good fortune the Germans paid a substantial price in naval losses for the success of their enterprise. The final toll could not be assessed with complete accuracy. The Norwegian claim to have sunk the battleship *Gneisenau* in Oslo fjord was treated by observers with some caution. A British submarine disputed with Norwegian coastal batteries the claim to have sunk the cruiser *Karlsruhe*. The cruiser which British airmen believed they had sunk in Bergen harbour was, according to an eyewitness, the *Koln*, which had already been damaged by a torpedo. The Germans admitted the loss of the *Bluecher* and the *Karlsruhe*, and it seemed established that the *Emden* had been sunk by a Norwegian minelayer and the *Admiral Scheer* put out of action by a British submarine. A British naval authority put the Nazi naval losses at the end of the first week at 50 per cent. of their strength in capital ships, 33 per cent. of their heavy cruisers, 83 per cent. of their light cruisers, and 45 per cent. of their destroyers. Even allowing a reasonable margin of error, it was certain that the German navy had been ruined as an effective striking force.

The significance of this, however, might easily be overrated. Germany's surface fleet, even at full strength, was never in a position to challenge the British navy. At best it was a raiding force; and even in this form of activity its success had been so small as to be almost negligible. If, however, it could be used to assure a German conquest of Norway, with its prospect of air and submarine bases within easier striking distance of Britain, the loss of a third or even half its strength might seem not too great a price to pay. Once established in these positions, Hitler could rely on his air and submarine strength rather than on surface warships to protect his communications and to avert any efforts of British sea power to dislodge him.

In both these respects the German calculations proved to have considerable foundation. Allied blows at the enemy communications in the Skaggerak were swift and vigorous, and in their initial stages were so effective that the Germans in Norway were to a large extent

dependent on air transport for reinforcements. But the nature of Allied operations was severely limited by circumstances. As Churchill explained later, German air strength meant that a continuous surface patrol in that area would have meant losses amounting to a naval disaster. Reliance was therefore placed on a submarine blockade supplemented by mines. British submarines were told to sink all German ships as opportunity served. Mines were laid, not only in the Skaggerak and Kattegat, but along the Baltic coastline of Germany. These varied activities resulted in a loss to Germany within three weeks of at least twenty-eight transport and supply ships and serious damage to a dozen more. But even at the price of these losses, German ships continued to get through, and the comparative safety of their communications, shaken by the initial assault, was gradually re-established.

The possibility of immediately dislodging the Germans by direct assault was also one which involved grave hazards. Although the German garrisons at the ports outside Oslo were seldom at the outset larger than two thousand troops, their head start gave them a real advantage. Invading ships would have to face, not only air attack in narrow waters where there was little room to manoeuvre, but the added danger from shore batteries and from enemy naval craft lying in ambush in the deeply indented fjords. An attack on Oslo, once the Nazis gained command of the forts, would have been suicidal. An attack on Trondheim was contemplated, and a force which included Canadian troops was made ready for an expedition timed for April 25. But the early success in landing troops at Andalsnes and Trondheim decided the military experts to concentrate on these points in preference to a direct attack on Trondheim with its risk of serious loss.

In the case of Narvik the situation turned out differently, largely due to the initiative of the commander of the British destroyer flotilla in that region. On April 9 this flotilla of five ships, under the command of Captain Warburton-Lee, was on patrol in West Fjord between the Lofoten Islands and the mainland. Reconnoitering, the

commander learned that Narvik was already strongly held, and that six of the latest and largest Nazi destroyers—a force which would have nearly double the fire power of the British squadron—lay in harbour. On learning of this situation, the Admiralty, although particularly anxious to destroy the store ships which accompanied the German expedition, hesitated to order an attack. But when they told Captain Warburton-Lee that he must be the sole judge, and that the Admiralty would support him in whatever course he chose, they must have had very little doubt what the sequel would be.

In the early hours of April 10 the flotilla started up the fjord. They fully expected to find the channel mined and the port defended by shore batteries. It was snowing so heavily that, as one officer reported, "We never saw either side of the fjord at all, except early, when we nearly hit it once." Their entry apparently took the German forces completely by surprise, and they were able to sink the supply ships in the harbour before they were forced to retire by the fire of their heavier enemy. The destroyer *Hunter* was sunk; the *Hardy* was hit so badly that she was beached and abandoned (her survivors made their way to shore and were rescued four days later); the *Hotspur* was crippled but able to make her way out with the remaining two ships. As they retired they crowned their exploit by sinking a German ammunition carrier. They left behind them one German destroyer sunk and three in flames.

This feat paved the way for the elimination of the German naval force three days later. On April 13 nine British destroyers, accompanied by the battleship *Warspite* whose task was to silence the shore batteries, steamed into Narvik where seven German destroyers now lay. Three of these were destroyed in the course of an engagement which lasted two and a half hours. The remainder fled up the narrow ten-mile inlet of Rombaks fjord to the east of Narvik where they were pursued by the British destroyers. One of the German ships, already badly damaged, was set afire; the remaining three were beached and scuttled by their crews who escaped inland. Three of the British destroyers were damaged during the action; but the Ger-

man force was wiped out, and with it disappeared all hope of reinforcing the German garrison from the sea.

But Narvik itself was not yet in Allied hands; and even if it had been, its remoteness and lack of land communications would have made it almost useless as a base for military operations against the main German forces. The naval patrol off the west coast prevented any substantial reinforcements reaching the garrisons at Bergen and Trondheim. But to dislodge them involved military operations; and it now remained for the navy to make possible the effective landing of a substantial and well-equipped force if the invaders were to be driven from Norway.

The Allied Expedition

Such an expedition was necessitated by the very nature of the situation. In theory the Allies had no more direct obligations to Denmark and Norway than they had to Finland. The nearest thing to a pledge was Chamberlain's reference to Sweden and Norway in the course of the Finnish debate on March 19: "Nothing will or can save them but the determination to defend themselves and to join with others who are ready to aid them in their defence." But in their own interests the Allies could not stand idly by while Germany overran Scandinavia. It was at once announced that the Allies had decided forthwith to extend their full aid to Norway and to fight the war in full association with them. This pledge was repeated by Chamberlain on April 9. On April 11 Churchill said of the Norwegians: "We shall aid them to the best of our ability. We shall conduct the war in common with them, and we shall make peace only when their rights and freedom are restored." And on April 13 King George sent a personal message to King Haakon assuring him that the Allies were bringing all the help in their power to Norway.

As the first painful days dragged on, that help seemed slow in coming. The Germans had asserted that in their occupation of Norway and Denmark they were merely forestalling an imminent Allied invasion. By April 27, with Ribbentrop's theatrical but unconvincing production of "documentary proofs", the legend had grown to the

point where the Nazis were asserting that an Allied expedition had actually put to sea, only to turn back on news of the German move. To such fantasies the lack of immediate Allied military action was only too convincing an answer, and one which lent colour to the theory that Britain and France had in fact been caught napping by the German stroke. Churchill lent some support to this when on April 11, after admitting that they had known for months of German preparations, he insisted that the Allies had no way of knowing what these preparations were actually intended for. That was surely under-rating the perspicuity of himself and his colleagues. The real nature of the Allied miscalculations was perhaps best expressed in a note by the military correspondent of the *Times*:

"When the campaign in Finland came to an end, the main body of the force assembled to go to the aid of that country was transferred elsewhere, together with its anti-aircraft artillery. The 49th (West Riding) division and certain other troops were, however, kept standing by, with the object of disembarking in the principal Norwegian ports in the event of a German invasion from the south. The capture of these ports by the Germans was not envisaged, and it was considered that the comparatively small detachments allotted for the purpose would suffice to hold them until further forces could be disembarked under their cover. . . . The German invasion was not, therefore, wholly a surprise in itself; but its scope and success made the original plan to meet it of no avail."

The Allies, in consequence, now found themselves faced with an operation which is traditionally one of serious difficulty—the landing of troops on a hostile coast in the face of enemy resistance. The uncomfortable memories of Gallipoli which began to stir at this prospect were in no way quieted by a contemplation of the Norwegian terrain. This mountainous coast, guarded by numerous islands and pierced by deep and tangled inlets, offered a formidable problem. Their advantages to the defence had been fully realized by the British strategists, as revealed by the passage quoted above. Now they must find a way to overcome that defence conducted by the enemy who had forestalled them.

The key to the whole operation was obviously the port of Trondheim. Oslo, for the moment, was out of the question; and a port such as Bergen, hemmed in by mountains that almost isolated it from the interior, would offer comparatively minor advantages from the strategic point of view. From Trondheim, on the other hand, access would be possible—though by no means easy—to the main system of communications of southern Norway. An army which secured a substantial foothold in this region could hope to establish a line which would cut the south from the north and offer a base from which the Allied forces could sweep down the central plateau on the German positions along the coast.

The first effort, however, was not a frontal assault, but a move to take the Trondheim position from the rear. On the 14th and 17th naval detachments were landed at Namsos and Andalsnes respectively; on the 16th and 18th they were followed by the first detachments of troops. Their immediate objective was to secure command of the railway and so prevent a junction between the forces at Trondheim and the main German body, at the same time securing communications which would allow them to get quickly in touch with the Norwegian forces and to seize advance positions in the hope of holding them against the Germans until the main Allied bodies arrived.

By this date it was a race against time, and a race which had possibly been lost already. It was true that the Germans, in spite of a week of fighting, had not yet established communications between their main body and the garrisons on the coast. This was a remarkable tribute to the quality of Norwegian resistance, but the defenders were being hard pressed by the German forces pressing north from Oslo and east from Trondheim. On April 16 the Norwegian minister in London appealed for speedy action by the Allies and stressed the urgent need for help against the Germans in southern Norway.

The fact was that the German strength was now growing with a speed which made their early success only too probable. The process of re-establishing control of the Skaggerak had gone far enough to make their communications reasonably secure. They were now

receiving, not merely reinforcements, but the mechanized equipment which enabled advance forces to make rapid dashes to seize important positions, and the Norwegians could see the prospect that the tactics which had been so successful in Poland would be repeated at their expense.

Against this the first British forces could offer little in the way of heavy equipment. Light detachments were rushed inland to join the Norwegians and help them stem the German advance from Hamar to Lillehammer, but their inferiority in numbers and equipment made it impossible to consolidate their positions. At the same time the German naval units in Trondheim fjord were able to direct a heavy fire against the Allied forces driving south from Namsos and forced them to fall back to Steinkjer. And the prospect that these disadvantages would soon be overcome was seriously menaced by German superiority in the air.

The outset of the campaign saw air power pitted against sea power more directly than it had ever been before. The heavy air attacks on the British naval forces off Bergen on April 9 represented the first real battle between ships and aircraft in substantial numbers and in the open sea. So far as this put to the test the relative strength of bomber and battleship, the verdict went decisively to the latter.

From this aspect, the most significant bomb dropped during the war was the 1000-lb. bomb which scored a direct hit on the *Rodney*. The heavy deck armour of the battleship completely withstood the shock, and the only damage from the explosion was the wounding of three officers and seven men. Two other cruisers were hit but only slightly damaged by splinters, and remained at their stations with the fleet.

The smaller and more lightly armoured units could not hope to escape so easily. Against direct hits which were only too likely to be fatal their chief protection was their speed. In this same engagement five attacks were pressed home against the destroyer *Aurora* in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, but all failed in their objectives. The destroyer *Ghurka*, on the other hand, was heavily hit and had to be abandoned. It was against units of this class that the German fliers

scored their rare successes during the subsequent campaign. The nearest they came to a more substantial bag was in inflicting some damage to a cruiser during the bombardment of Stavanger on April 17, but the ship was able to continue back to port. German pilots seem to have been prone to overestimate the size of the ships they were attacking, and their claims ultimately included the sinking of a *Queen Elizabeth* class battleship, a *York* class cruiser, and an aircraft carrier. But the Admiralty denied that any capital ship was lost during the campaign; and in view of the fantastic quality of previous German claims of this character their latest exuberance made little impression on detached observers.

Air power, therefore, proved incapable of disputing effectively the command of the sea. The navy could keep open the sea communications which were essential to the Allied expedition. But its power stopped at the ports; and it was at the ports, the junction point between sea and land operations, that the German air force struck with its maximum of effectiveness.

These ports were far from adequate even under the best conditions. A successful attack on Trondheim would have secured a substantial harbour with modern docking facilities. The decision of the Allies to confine their initial efforts to Namsos and Andalsnes left them dependent on mere fishing villages whose few docks were of rough stone or even wood, completely lacking in mechanical cranes and other necessary unloading facilities. Their vulnerability to air attack was accentuated by the failure to send anti-aircraft equipment with the first Allied detachments. It was at these points that the Germans struck with full fury. On April 19 they launched against Namsos an attack which lasted for seven hours, and these attacks continued during the next three days. "I have seen Chapei, Madrid, Abo and Rovaniemi", wrote a French correspondent, "after attacks from the air. I know what bombing is, but the completeness of the destruction of Namsos exceeded anything I have ever seen." The attacks on Andalsnes, if less spectacular, were almost equally effective. By the time anti-aircraft equipment was available, the two ports were in ruins.

The Allied troops which had advanced into the interior were exposed to equally terrible assaults. They met the co-ordinated attacks of troops, tanks and dive bombers; and at Steinkjer they faced in addition the fire of the German ships from Trondheim fjord. This last factor, together with the landing of German naval forces which threatened to cut off the first detachments advancing south toward Levanger, practically stalled the northern arm of the Allied pincers movement against Trondheim. It was left to the southern detachments to seize first the vital railway junctions of Dombaas and Stoeren, and then to press south as rapidly as possible to prevent a German advance up the main valleys toward Trondheim.

These Allied forces were ill-equipped for such a task. They lacked mechanized equipment and heavy artillery. They were without an adequate supply of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. They could at best hope to act as a delaying force against the superior enemy until they were backed by reinforcements not only of numbers but of material. And the possibility of their receiving reinforcements depended again on the situation in the air.

This meant the establishment of Allied air bases in Norway. There were from the beginning attempts to nullify German air power by striking at the principal bases. Stavanger was under almost constant bombardment, and there were frequent raids on such fields as Fornebu, near Oslo, and Aalborg in the north of Denmark. But in spite of extensive damage to these fields, the Nazi planes continued to operate; and it became apparent that, if bombers could not control the sea lanes, neither could they halt the air activity of the enemy. Nor was it possible for fighters to operate effectively from bases in Britain three hundred miles distant. The twin-engined fighters which were used gave a good account of themselves when they encountered the enemy. But they could not stay in the air for long, and they were probably slower than such new German bombers as the Junkers Ju. 88. They could operate a limited patrol or attack a definite objective. But for defence, the need was fighter aeroplanes which could stay in the air longer and could take off at once when the enemy

bombers came over. But such a force could not operate without bases, and the Germans had seized all the important bases in Norway. Some attempt was made by the Allies to use frozen lakes, but these proved unsatisfactory; and a base that was improvised in the Dombaas area was discovered and bombed until it was almost useless. To the end, the Nazis in Norway remained supreme in the air.

This fact spelled the doom of the Allied expedition. German superiority in both man-power and fire-power steadily increased, and with it the speed of the German advance. By April 25 they had pushed up the Osterdal—the eastern one of the two main valleys—to Tynset and were within striking distance of Roeros; and in the Gudbrandsdal, the parallel valley to the west, the Allies were forced back from Otta to Dombaas. Here they succeeded in checking the enemy; but the Germans in the Osterdal launched two mechanized columns across mountain trails toward a point on the railway between Dombaas and Stoeren. It was a move which threatened to effect connections between the attacking force and the Germans in Trondheim and to cut the Allied forces in two. Only immediate reinforcements could save the Allied expedition, now outnumbered almost ten to one. But the High Command had reached the conclusion that reinforcements were impossible, in view of the German ascendancy in the air; and although General de Wiart was reported on April 29 to have asserted that “the British troops have everything they need”, the decision had in fact been taken to withdraw the troops in order to save them from destruction. On the night of May 1-2 the withdrawal was effected from Andalsnes and on the following night from Namsos. Except for such scattered Norwegian resistance as remained, the whole of southern Norway was left in the hands of the Nazis. In a final rain of bombs on the retreating expedition the Germans sank three destroyers—one British, one French and one Polish—but according to the Admiralty announcement the troop transports were untouched.

The Allied announcement of the withdrawal implied, however, that the struggle had not been completely abandoned, and that efforts

would still be made elsewhere in Norway. This clearly meant that they would be concentrated on Narvik. Here the naval battle on April 13 had resulted in the loss of German control of the port but not of the town itself. It was not until two days later that the Allies began landing troops, and the delay gave the Germans time, not merely to consolidate their positions, but to seize Rombak Heights to the east from the small Norwegian forces planted there, and to extend their control along the railway leading to the Swedish border. When therefore Allied military forces arrived, they found the position too strong for a frontal assault. Instead they landed troops on both sides of the fjord outside the town, and began the slow process of encircling the Nazi garrison.

It proved to be anything but an easy task. The German garrison had no immediate prospect of relief, for all attempts to send reinforcements by sea were intercepted, and German efforts to advance from Namsos by land were delayed by Norwegian and Allied forces operating from Mo and Bodo. But the German possession of Rombak Heights made possible the occasional landing of transport planes, and further reinforcements came by parachute. Supplies, including anti-aircraft artillery, were also dropped by parachute; and German bombing, together with German possession of the coastal forts, involved a slow process of reduction before Allied naval forces could enter the harbour with safety. The loss of the small cruiser *Gurlew*, equipped for anti-aircraft work, showed how risky it was for ships to operate in these narrow and difficult waters.

None the less, the Allied forces, steadily augmented until they reached an estimated 15,000, gradually closed in. On May 28 an assault was launched which lasted twenty-four hours; and by the following day the Allies could announce that the town of Narvik was at last in their possession.

But that was by no means the end of the story. The bulk of the German forces had left the town before it fell and had fallen back along the railway on their positions around Bjoernfjell. It was clear that they were still not ready to surrender this means of access to the Swedish iron mines without a struggle which, given the suitability

of the country, might conceivably be prolonged indefinitely. With the whole issue of the conflict—an issue which included the destiny of Norway herself—at stake on the Western front, the Allies decided to avoid further dissipation of their strength and to evacuate the whole of Norway. “The hard necessity of war”, said King Haakon in his proclamation on June 10, “has forced the Allied governments to gather all their strength for the struggle on other fronts and they need all their men and material on these fronts.” He therefore advised his people that it was useless to continue their resistance, while assuring them that their King and government would continue the fight outside the country, and expressing confidence that “the Norwegian people, together with other peoples which now are suffering under German domination, will once more regain their rights and liberty.” As a final tragic touch to the evacuation, the Admiralty was obliged to announce the loss of a tanker, a supply ship, two destroyers and the aircraft carrier *Glorious*—sunk, according to the German accounts, by the battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*.

Germany's Acquisitions

These operations, bitterly contested as they were, engaged only a small part of the forces of the adversaries on either side. Neither regarded Norway as a stake which would justify the risk of major losses. Hitler might risk warships which were of little use elsewhere, but the Admiralty on its part refused to take any really serious chances with the British navy. The Allied expedition to southern Norway of 12,000 men amounted to less than a single division; and though the Germans sent eight or ten divisions, that was still a small proportion of the two hundred divisions which the Reich was estimated to have under arms. Important as the possession of Norway was from a number of aspects, neither side was willing to play so high as to weaken seriously its position in case of a move by the enemy in the Balkans or the Mediterranean or the Netherlands.

Yet there were definite economic and strategic consequences which represented a real gain to Germany and a distinct loss to the Allies. The immediate loot seized by the Nazis was in itself substantial.

Half the gold reserves of the central banks in Oslo and Copenhagen, amounting to some \$75,000,000, together with an unknown quantity of foreign holdings, fell into German hands. In the free port of Copenhagen, warehouses were crammed to bursting with imported goods, from foodstuffs to motor tires. Oil and petroleum totalling between 300,000 and 500,000 tons were found in Denmark alone. These were windfalls which the closely rationed economy of the Reich had every reason to welcome.

The natural assets of Norway and Denmark were of still greater importance. Denmark was a rich farming and dairying country in which one-third of the population lived exclusively by agriculture. A nation such as Germany, which had been doing without butter in order to get guns, might welcome the acquisition of the greatest butter exporter in the world, and one of the greatest bacon producers as well. Both Denmark and Norway were great exporters of fish, and Norway's forest and mineral products were both important for war purposes. An added feature of these acquisitions was that they deprived the Allies, particularly Britain, of supplies which they had hitherto enjoyed. Britain took half Denmark's exports and over one-quarter of Norway's. She was now cut off from her chief supplier of butter, bacon, and eggs. Through the conquest of Norway she lost the bulk of her normal supply of timber and over ninety per cent. of her wood-pulp—materials important in the manufacture of aircraft and the provision of cellulose for explosives, as well as vital for newsprint. From Norway also came ferro-alloys and acetelyne products which were important for steel-making and ship-building. Such products, which Germany now had at her disposal, would have to be replaced for the Allies by supplies from less convenient sources.

There were, it is true, other considerations which somewhat modified the balance. For one thing, Denmark had a favourable trade balance with Britain, while she bought from Germany more than she sold to that country. This meant that Denmark got cash from Britain and paid it out to Germany, thus providing a certain

amount of foreign exchange which would no longer be available to the Reich. Also, although the new conquests might ease the food situation in the Reich, their advantage might in some respects be temporary. Neither country was self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Norway in particular, with only three per cent. of its land arable, was dependent on imported cereals; and Denmark was a specialized producer for a world market and dependent in a number of respects on outside supplies. This was particularly true in the case of fertilizers and fodder, both of which came from overseas; and these, and particularly such concentrated fodder as oil cake, were just the things in which Germany herself was lacking. This meant that, although Denmark was a short-run food supply, the possibility loomed that the lack of fodder would lead by winter to a considerable slaughter of stock; and in the meantime the problem of Norway's food supply was on Germany's hands. But these were difficulties which might easily be overrated. Germany had shown in the case of her other conquests that she could deal with this sort of situation by reducing the standard of living of her subject peoples; and the immediate institution of a rigid rationing in Denmark showed a determination to conserve these new assets by similar means.

One important asset, however, largely escaped her control. That was the shipping of Scandinavia. This was particularly important in the case of Norway, whose four and a half million tons of shipping gave her the fourth largest merchant fleet in the world, slightly in excess of that of Germany. A considerable part of this, including about fifty per cent. of Norway's 272 tankers, was already under charter to the British government. Only a small proportion of this fleet was in Norwegian ports at the time of the invasion, and the ships at sea were ordered by wireless to make for neutral or Allied ports. Under subsequent arrangements a Norwegian committee sitting in London took over unified control of this fleet and acted in co-operation with the Anglo-French shipping control which was set up early in the war. Danish shipping, however, was a more complicated problem. The Norwegian government could act with

the Allies; but the Danish government was under German protection and could not adopt a course hostile to the Reich. This meant that Danish shipping, from the Allied point of view, was technically of an enemy character. At the same time, the Allies had no desire to treat Denmark as a hostile power, and every reason to acquire rather than to destroy Danish ships. Instead of seizing or sinking them, the Allies offered to lease them on condition that they were transferred to the British or French flag and that none of the proceeds got back to Germany. These conditions, however, proved difficult of acceptance, and throughout April and May the bulk of Denmark's 700 ships, two-thirds of them in Allied or neutral ports, remained idle. A Danish shipping committee, organized by the Danish minister to the United States, negotiated with the Allies; and on May 23 an agreement was reached allowing the ships to leave neutral ports for any destination except Germany and the countries under her control. But this turned out to be only a temporary concession, and the ultimate fate of ships which continued to fly the Danish flag seemed likely to be seizure by the Allies.

From the strategic aspect the conquest of southern Norway in particular meant a definite gain to Germany. Norwegian ports were admirably suited to submarine activity. Norwegian air bases halved the former air distance to northern Britain, and particularly to the naval base at Scapa Flow. Germany was, potentially at least, in a far more favourable position to strike at the main British sea routes, including the routes north and west of the British Isles, and to force the blockading squadrons which had patrolled the area between Scotland and Norway to extend their activities to a much wider range. One indication of the significance of the new situation was given on April 17 with the announcement that Britain was laying a minefield along her west coast, principally to protect the Clyde estuary. The threat was still potential rather than actual, for the success of the U-boats against merchant shipping continued to decline, and Norwegian air bases were apparently not yet being used for long-distance raids. But Germany none the less had greatly extended the range of her striking power on Britain's eastern flank.

In a negative sense too there were real advantages to Germany. Even if she did not use these new positions as bases for aggressive action, the occupation removed her fear that they might be seized and used against her by the enemy. The control of Denmark and Norway was a protection for Germany's northern front whose importance was vastly increased because it meant control of the Baltic as well. And that had a further and positive advantage in that it almost automatically meant control of Sweden.

The invasion of Norway had naturally alarmed Sweden for her own safety. Ironically enough, it was only Russia's veto of the proposed Scandinavian defence pact which saved Sweden from being obligated to enter the war on behalf of Norway. But there was always the prospect that, if the German forces fared badly, the Nazis would demand passage through Sweden for men and supplies. Any such idea was rejected by Sweden in advance, and she firmly asserted her intention to defend her neutrality against any violation. She backed this up by attacking German aeroplanes which flew over her territory and by protesting energetically to the Reich against such actions. An exchange of letters between King Gustav and Hitler apparently led to assurances from the German side; but the decisive fact was the successful consolidation of German control in Norway. This meant, in effect, that Sweden fell inescapably into the German orbit both politically and economically; and the initiation of trade negotiations with Germany at the end of April indicated Sweden's realization that, with Germany controlling the Baltic gateway, Sweden's access to the outside world was henceforth dependent on German goodwill.

It meant also that Sweden's resources were more completely than ever at the disposal of Germany, and particularly that Germany was now assured of a continued supply of Swedish iron ore. This was of the first importance, for out of Germany's iron ore imports of 24,000,000 tons in 1938, nearly 11,000,000 tons came from Sweden, and its high grade made it indispensable to the German armament industry. Normally the bulk of this went by way of Narvik, and that port was for the moment no longer usable. But German imports

by that route had shown a great decline since the beginning of the year; and with the opening of the Baltic route it was estimated that Lulea and other Swedish ports, though more limited than Narvik in their capacity, could take care of the bulk of the necessary exports. On the other hand, the Allies were now largely debarred from access to Swedish ore. Britain, in February, had actually taken more ore from Narvik than had Germany. The two million tons which she normally imported from Norway and Sweden represented only one-third of her imports, but its high quality made it of great importance, and the British steel industry was likely to face some difficulty before it succeeded in arranging a substitute source of supply.

The Fall of Chamberlain

The collapse of the Norwegian campaign brought to a head in Britain a political crisis which had long been developing. In the first stages of the Nazi invasion the public had been encouraged to believe that Hitler had made a reckless move whose consequences would soon recoil upon him. As time went on and retribution was still delayed, an increasing restiveness became apparent; and with the revelation of the complete inability of the Allies to deliver a decisive counterstroke, the feeling of deception found vent in an outburst of wrath against the Government, and particularly against the Prime Minister.

But it was not only the Norwegian failure that was responsible. As Attlee said in the subsequent debate: "There is widespread anxiety among the people of this country, and they are not satisfied that the war is being waged with sufficient energy, capacity, drive and resolution, not in Norway alone. The Norwegian campaign is the culmination of other discontents". This was borne out by the difference in the general attitude toward Chamberlain and toward Churchill. The latter was responsible for the Admiralty, whose policy came in for considerable criticism on the ground of lack of boldness—criticism which was led by Admiral Keyes, who resented the rejection of his offer to lead an attack on Trondheim. Churchill

had talked optimistically about Hitler's action as being "as great a strategic and political error as that committed by Napoleon when he invaded Spain". He had promised that the Allied armies would "cleanse the soil of the Vikings from the filthy pollution of Nazi tyranny". But Churchill, whatever his mistakes, had little share in the responsibility for the major deficiencies which had condemned the campaign to failure. Ever since Hitler had started rearming he had been hammering at the Government in an effort to persuade them of the need to prepare for the coming struggle. And he now pointed to a record in which he had no part when he said: "The reason for this serious disadvantage of our not having the initiative is one which cannot speedily be removed. It was our failure in the last five years to maintain or regain parity with Germany in the air. That is an old story and it is a long story".

For such a situation, on the other hand, Chamberlain could not escape at least a share of the responsibility. And in the light of the Norwegian failure, the whole policy of the Chamberlain government began to assume a different perspective in the eyes even of his supporters. The record of futile attempts to appease the dictators, the stubborn exclusion from his counsel of men who advocated a more spirited course, the lack of vigour even after the war started and the shallow optimism of such assertions as that "Hitler had missed the bus"—these now recoiled against him. Any chance he might have had of retrieving his position was wrecked by his defiant unrepentance. His implied apology in his speech on May 7 was less for the failure of the expedition than for having sent an expedition at all. He refused to contemplate any serious changes of personnel or any creation of a really effective war cabinet. He reiterated his conviction that "the balance of the advantage up to the present lies with the Allied forces". It was clear that no new spirit of vigour or imagination could be expected under his leadership.

The result was a revolt within the Conservative party itself against the continuance of this stubborn inadequacy. This was the vital fact about the vote in the House of Commons on May 8. The

Government was on the surface sustained by a vote of 281 against 200. But the Conservative party in the House numbered 365, and only 252 voted for the Government. Among the 65 unpaired Conservative members who did not vote there may have been some actual absentees, but the bulk of them deliberately abstained as an expression of disapproval. The 33 Conservatives who voted against the Government included such prominent figures as Duff Cooper, L. S. Amery, Leslie Hore-Belisha and Lord Winterton—all former Conservative ministers. Every Conservative member of the fighting services who was present in the House voted against the ministry.

In spite of Chamberlain's majority, therefore, the vote was a clear condemnation of his leadership. He still attempted to redress the situation by broadening the basis of the ministry. But the Labour leaders refused to join an administration of which Chamberlain was the head, and that refusal settled the matter. On May 10 Chamberlain resigned, and Churchill crowned a lively and varied career by achieving at last the office of Prime Minister.

But by this time a new and far graver crisis confronted the Allies as Hitler smashed with the full power of his army at the Low Countries.

THE INVASION OF THE NETHERLANDS

The unsuspecting innocence of Denmark and Norway, which allowed them to be taken completely by surprise, was far from being shared by the small countries on Germany's western border. Ever since Germany's revival as a military power they had been fully aware of the dangers which would confront them in case of a new war in the west. The topography of the Low Countries, which offered fewer natural obstacles than the terrain farther east, made them the most suitable route for an invading army striking from either France or Germany. The temptation was increased by their comparative lack of artificial defence works when contrasted with the

strong fortifications on both sides of the Franco-German border. A thrust through Holland and Belgium was something which the military leaders of both Germany and the Allies had to keep in mind as an ever-present possibility.

The Low Countries, on their part, were thoroughly alert to this prospect. In the early days of the war it came very close to realization during the crisis of November; and again in January a German attack seemed imminent. The outbreak of hostilities in Scandinavia showed how exposed the small neutral nations were to ruthless Nazi aggression and heralded a more extensive German effort in the west. Belgium, on April 10, cancelled all army leaves. Holland also began taking precautions, which led by April 12 to the strengthening of her forces in the frontier areas of Limburg and Bradant and the flooding of the region around Utrecht. Martial law already prevailed in a number of special districts; and on April 19 the state of siege was extended to the whole country. With the lesson of fifth column activities in Norway before them, both Holland and Belgium began rounding up suspected persons in key positions—though in the case of Holland at least such measures proved to be far too limited in their scope.

By May 7 it was clear that such precautions were only too well founded. On that date reports reached the Netherlands of German columns concentrating rapidly on key points along the frontier. The government at once cancelled all army leaves, called up certain classes of reserves, closed a number of internal waterways, and cut off all outgoing telephone and teletype messages. The German semi-official press displayed a pained surprise at the idea that the Low Countries considered themselves threatened, and pointed insistently toward the Balkans as the real danger spot. Then, with all preparations complete, the German government cried out against Allied deceitfulness in using the Mediterranean situation as a cloak for designs upon the Netherlands which Germany must forestall by taking that area under her protection. At dawn on May 10 the German armies invaded Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg.

The Defences of the Low Countries

The defensive power of these new victims of Nazi ruthlessness, though limited by their size and their resources, was by no means negligible. The little Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, with its population of 600,000, could of course be expected to offer no effective resistance. But Holland and Belgium, both by this time fully mobilized, had under arms some 400,000 and 600,000 men respectively; and both possessed a system of defences which, it was hoped, would to some extent compensate for the lack of natural advantages in this respect.

There were also, however, serious shortcomings about which the military experts had for some time been gravely perturbed. To a certain extent these were the inevitable result of the political attitude of the two countries. In their insistence on a rigid policy of neutrality, both Belgium and Holland had refused all suggestions that they should enter into specific plans to provide for that aid from the Allies which they now so desperately needed. Holland stood proudly isolated, without any pledge of outside assistance in case of invasion. As late as April 19 Premier de Geer had asserted in a broadcast: "As far as human help goes, we rely solely upon ourselves. In addition we have promises from both sides that our neutrality will be respected as long as we actually maintain it and about that there can be no doubt. Therefore we do not want any arrangements and we even shun them." If in the outcome the Dutch showed a certain resentment at the failure of effective Allied help to arrive in time, it was this attitude that was very largely to blame.

The attitude of Belgium was similar. Until 1936 Belgium had been in a military alliance with France. But with the rise of Hitler and the prospect of a new struggle, King Leopold felt that a return to a position of neutrality was preferable to a situation which meant the certainty of a new invasion should war break out. In 1937, therefore, she was released from her engagements. But both Britain and France reaffirmed the pledge they had given at Locarno to aid Belgium in case of invasion, and the German government asserted

its determination "at all times to respect Belgian territory" provided that Belgium refrained from joining in military activity against the Reich.

As a result of this new position, Leopold felt obliged to abstain even from military conversations with the Allies. "Alliances", he said, "even defensive ones, would not serve us because, prompt as it might be, aid could not reach us before the first shock of the invader which might be overpowering and against which we must prepare to fight alone". All efforts of the Allies to reach an agreement which would facilitate the speediest possible aid were futile in the face of this attitude. Leopold believed that he could maintain neutrality if he stood aloof, but that any co-operation with the Allies would certainly invite attack. In December, following the war scare of the previous month, there was a certain contact between the military staffs, but the king rejected either unity of command or a concerted plan of campaign. Belgium, he believed, was ten times as strong defensively as she had been in 1914, and ran less risk in standing alone than in planning to accept definite aid; and even the lesson of Norway did not induce him to yield to the urging of the Allies.

The event was to prove that his calculations were over-optimistic. Belgium may have been stronger than in 1914, but she now had to meet the new and far more devastating methods of 1940, and for that task she was none too well equipped. The expense of rearming meant that she had been unable to provide some of the more costly armaments, including heavy artillery and mechanized equipment. She was short both of tanks and of anti-tank guns; and still more serious, she was weak in first line planes and anti-aircraft defence. Given the character of Hitler's *blitzkrieg*, these were deficiencies of the very first magnitude.

Moreover, the attitude of Belgium toward the Allies was paralleled by the attitude of Holland toward Belgium. The Dutch refused to consider, not only co-ordinated defence plans with Belgium, but even an effective continuity in border fortifications. Their first real defence line, along the Ijssel, was a continuation of the Belgian line of the Meuse. But it offered no great barrier; and Dutch

possession of the fortress of Maastricht meant that they held a point which was of vital importance to the Belgian defence system but which the Dutch themselves, partly because of geographical difficulties, could hardly hope to defend for more than a very brief period.

Beyond this slender line the Dutch and Belgian defences ceased to have any connection whatever. As the President of the Belgian Senate's commission of national defence pointed out on December 26, there was between the two systems an unguarded corridor forty miles wide. An enemy penetrating into this area from the east would split the two countries and threaten the Belgian position on its weakest flank. The Dutch position, consisting mainly of water defences, was the Grebbe line about twenty miles east of Utrecht, extending to the Belgian border but making no connection with the line of the Albert Canal. And in the Utrecht area was the main line protecting the wealthy and populous section of western Holland—again a line of which water defences were the mainstay. It was both a traditional and an inexpensive system which appealed to Dutch frugality; but however effective it may have been in the seventeenth century, it was hardly adequate for twentieth century warfare.

The Belgian defences were more modern and more comprehensive. In the south, the difficult terrain of the Ardennes was an advance defence protecting the main line along the Meuse. In the north, the Albert Canal offered a water defence strengthened by a chain of casemates which roughly paralleled the Dutch frontier from Antwerp to the Meuse. And in the centre, protecting the passage between the Ardennes and the Dutch border, were the forts of Liège, modernized and extended since 1914 and supplemented at the junction of the Meuse and the Albert Canal by the new fort of Eben Emael. Where the Dutch system could at best assist a delaying action, the Belgians could hope that their defences would maintain resistance until effective help arrived.

But they must have that aid, and have it quickly. Immediately upon word of the invasion, the Belgian government appealed to

Britain and France. "The Belgian government", ran its message, "is determined to resist with all its strength the aggression of which the country is once more the object. It appeals to the governments of the Republic and the United Kingdom that the aid provided by treaties and confirmed by the common declaration of April 24, 1937, be extended to it in the shortest possible time".

Allied Support

The Allies had already considered the action which they would take in such a situation. They were fully aware of the danger which would be offered to their left flank by a German thrust through the Low Countries, and their representations to Belgium on the need for common defensive measures had been one attempt to meet this threat. When Belgium refused to listen, the Allies had set about safeguarding their positions by other means. The Maginot Line, which had been designed at a time when it was expected that Belgium would be an ally of France, had not been constructed along the Belgian border which was still open when the war began. From September on, therefore, the French hastened the construction of a supplementary system of fortifications in that area. They were not as elaborate and as permanent as the Maginot Line, for they were based on the principle of defence in depth by a network of individual blockhouses interspersed with tank traps and other devices; but the French seem to have had little doubt that, properly manned, they would be quite adequate to repel the invader.

There was indeed a body of opinion in the French High Command which advocated the retention of the main Allied forces in these defensive positions even though the Low Countries would have to be left to their fate. But that was opposed by another group and by Britain, who felt that the pledge to Belgium must be implemented and that the Belgian coast must not be surrendered to the enemy without a struggle. There may also have been the feeling that a German invasion would offer an opportunity for a decisive counter-stroke. As a Belgian military writer expressed it shortly before the invasion: "Invasion of the Low Countries would involve

a great diplomatic defeat for the Reich. It seems unlikely that Germany will expose herself to such a probability”.

When King Leopold's appeal arrived, therefore, the Allies had already decided upon a plan of active assistance. Within two hours Allied troops were on the move. Their main destination was the part of the line south of Louvain, although at least one battalion was sent on to Holland in the hope of arriving in time to aid the Dutch. A few French units took up positions toward the coast, but the left wing was held chiefly by the Belgians, with the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force in the centre and the French in the south, particularly along the Meuse. The advance guards of the advancing Allies made contact with the enemy on the 13th, and by the 15th their main bodies were in position.

By that time, however, the Germans had already achieved a striking measure of success which made all Allied plans obsolete and shattered their whole concept of the nature of the war. The tactics which the Germans employed in their western drive had already been foreshadowed in Poland, but the significance of the Polish lesson seems to have been imperfectly appreciated by the Allied High Command. In consequence, although the invasion of the Netherlands was not in itself a surprise, the element of surprise was none the less present, here as in Norway, as a result of the tactical methods employed by the enemy.

These methods were made possible by the gasoline engine. The development of mechanical fighting units on the land and in the air offered new possibilities of speed and striking power of which the Nazis now took the fullest advantage. The use of dive bombers to pave the way, of tanks to effect the initial break-through, of motorized infantry to exploit or consolidate the advance, offered a new spectacle of precise and effective co-ordination. And a further element of surprise was injected by the attacks, not only on the Allied lines, but behind them as well. To a considerable extent these were assisted by those members of the Nazi fifth column, particularly in Holland, who had been prepared by precise instructions to play their essential part. But it was the dropping of troops by parachute,

and the landing of others by motor boats and transport aeroplanes, that made possible the seizure of vital positions and the conquest of Holland within five days.

The Conquest of Holland

This was the first step upon which the Germans concentrated. Simultaneously with the assault on the frontier, which captured Maastricht and overrun northern Holland, an attack was launched from the air upon Rotterdam and the key positions along the Maas. Transport planes landed at and seized the Waalhaven airport. Flying boats with further troops landed on the Maas river. German residents, who had gathered during the night on an island in the river, where the concrete building which housed the offices of a German shipping firm made an ideal headquarters, aided in seizing the bridges which gave access to the city. Further air transports landed at the airport during the day, until a British air raid put it partially out of action. Although the Dutch, after hard fighting, succeeded in driving the Germans from the foothold they had gained in the city, the Nazis continued to hold the airport and the left bank until they were reached by the main German forces driving from the east.

Again it was mechanized power which made this speedy advance possible. The Dutch defences failed to withstand the mass attacks of the German bombers or to stem the onrush of the German tanks. The water defences which had been counted on to stop the tanks were overcome when the air-assault enabled advance German detachments to cross the rivers and canals and to maintain a foothold until the engineers had thrown up bridges for the tanks to cross. The seizure by parachute troops of the Moerdijk bridge prevented its demolition and enabled the Germans to outflank the whole of the main Dutch water defences and on the fourth day of the campaign to cut off the bulk of Holland from any reinforcements from the south.

Meanwhile the chief cities of Holland were subjected to a furious attack from the air. Rotterdam was aflame and partially destroyed. Amsterdam was heavily bombed. In both Amsterdam and the Hague

fifth column elements launched attacks on key positions, aided by parachute troops. On May 13 Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch government fled to England, leaving the Commander-in-Chief, General Winkelman, in charge. Next day, with Rotterdam taken and Utrecht threatened with complete annihilation, it was clear that Holland was at the end of effective resistance. Dutch authorities asserted that in five days of fighting the army had suffered 100,000 casualties, or one-quarter of its effectives. On May 14, in order to save further destruction and slaughter, all Holland north of the Maas surrendered, and on the 17th the remaining province of Zeeland ceased its resistance. After a fortnight of military rule, the nation that had been overwhelmed in five days was placed under the rule of Dr. Seyss-Inquart—a name which awakened baleful memories of Austria and held cold comfort for the future happiness of the Netherlands.

The Battle of Flanders

The elimination of Holland as a belligerent opened up the possibility of a German encircling movement through northern Belgium on the model of the plan of 1914. It was soon apparent, however, that difficulties were to be expected in strategy as well as in tactics. As in Poland, the Germans followed the plan of breaking up the opposing forces and enveloping them in detail. Having disposed of Holland, they next sought to isolate the forces in Belgium by striking, not at their left wing, but at their junction with the main French lines.

The initial German blow which broke the Dutch defences had also swept over the first Belgian line with disconcerting speed. The prompt capture of Maastricht exposed the Albert Canal; and the capture, on the second day, of the new fort of Eben Emael allowed the invaders to circle the Liège defences at almost the same spot as in 1914 and to turn the line of the Albert Canal itself. The Belgians fell back on a line along the Dyle river, where the Allied forces joined them, but not before Namur had been circled



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(though its forts, like those of Liège, continued to resist) and Louvain reached by the Germans. But although pressure continued in this region, it was clear by May 15 that the full force of the German spearhead was being thrown against the French positions on the Meuse.

When the Allies left their prepared positions to advance into Belgium, they carried out what was in effect a right wheel, whose pivot was Sedan. Their resulting positions along the Meuse formed a right angle with the extension of the Maginot line from Montmedy to Mezieres. In the process they shifted a number of the troops who were holding this particular sector. It left that part of the line temporarily weak; but the Allies counted on the defences in the Belgian Ardennes to delay the enemy and to prevent any serious assault.

This was a serious, perhaps even a fatal miscalculation. The German mechanized forces pushed through the difficult terrain of the wooded and hilly Ardennes with astounding speed. Their swiftness overwhelmed the comparatively light forces in that section and prevented the demolition of roads and bridges which might have delayed the advance. The invaders struck the line of the Meuse while the troops who were to reinforce the Sedan sector were still moving into position. According to Reynaud, these troops under General Corap were of inferior quality, less solidly trained and less well officered than those which they were replacing. They were thinly strung out along the Meuse, and half the infantry divisions were not yet in position by May 14. When the Germans struck the Meuse between Namur and Sedan, they were able, partly because here again some of the bridges had not been destroyed, to effect a crossing in three places and achieve a break-through between Sedan and Maubeuge which threatened to outflank the whole French system of fortifications. By May 19, a corridor sixty miles wide had been driven between the French armies to the east and the Allied forces in Belgium. It was no longer merely a "bulge", as it had been described at first. It was being broadened and deepened by constant pressure

which reached its climax when, on May 21, the German columns smashed their way through to the west and reached the coast at Abbeville.

This astounding success had its basic explanation in the simple maxim enunciated by Frederick the Great: "Battles are won by fire superiority." The Germans in these encounters were able to throw a greater weight of metal than their opponents. This was due both to the German superiority in mechanical equipment and to the efficiency with which that equipment was used. As in Poland, their ascendancy in the air was used first to blast at the French airports in the mass raids on Nancy and other centres on May 10, and then to deliver the preliminary assault on the defending infantry which paved the way for the ground attack. The Allied air force struck back effectively within its limits, harrying the German supply columns and raiding deep into the Rhineland and southern Germany to strike at railway centres and at the oil depots which held the reserves so essential in mechanized warfare. On May 15 the RAF went into full action against the Germans who were crossing the Meuse, and helped to avert immediate disaster at the price of thirty-five planes lost. Throughout these days of combat the superior quality of Allied men and machines was consistently in evidence. But this could not make up for lack of numbers; and even if German losses were in a ratio of four to one, as the British claimed, the attrition was still not great enough to redress the balance in the air.

In the matter of tanks the German advantage was even greater. The Germans had at least ten and possibly twelve armoured divisions with a total of some five thousand tanks. Against these the French had at most four or five divisions and the British had one. This made for weakness in defence and still more in counter-attack. The Germans revealed their possession of flame-throwing tanks (possibly the "new secret weapon" which reduced the fort of Eben Emael) and of giant tanks of seventy or eighty tons whose armour resisted the fire of anti-tank guns and called into action the French 75's firing point-blank. It was a matter for rueful reflection that the most

effective of these tanks, and the ones hardest to stop by ordinary means, appear to have been made in Czechoslovakia.

The German superiority in these essential respects was accentuated by the close co-ordination of the two arms. The initial shock delivered by the dive bombers, which took the place of the artillery barrage of the last war, was followed immediately by a mechanized assault while the defenders were still dazed by the onslaught. Once the heavy tanks discovered the soft places in the line they crashed through and, followed by lighter armoured vehicles, fanned out rapidly and attacked the rear areas, thus forcing a hasty reorganization of the line to meet the threat from a new direction. The defenders, thus thrown off balance, were given no real chance to recover as blow after blow retained the initiative for the Germans. The efforts of the Allies to cut the corridor by counter-attacks had a few initial successes but failed in an alarming way to make any permanent impression; and through the gap between Bapaume and Peronne the Germans were able to pour reinforcements which forced the French back behind the Somme and swept up the coast to encircle the Allied forces in the north.

The Retreat from Belgium

The Allied leaders had early realized the danger to these forces that resulted from the rapidity of the German advance to the Meuse. By May 12 it was clear that this advance offered a serious threat to the Allied positions on the Dyle river, and that the situation in the south made a withdrawal desirable. At the insistence of King Leopold, however, who protested against the surrender of Brussels and Antwerp, the order was deferred until the 15th. With the German break-through at Sedan retreat became inevitable, and on May 17 the Allied forces retired behind Brussels (from which the Belgian government moved to Ostend) and occupied a line running from Lille along the Scheldt in front of Ghent to a point west of Antwerp, which the Germans entered next day.

With the German break-through to the Channel on May 21 the situation of the northern armies became extremely precarious. They

were now cut off from direct aid from the south, and dependent for supplies and reinforcements on the Channel ports. But the German sweep up the coast, accompanied by violent air attacks on the ports themselves, threatened to cut these last avenues of communications. By May 23 heavy fighting was in progress in and around Boulogne, from which the garrison was evacuated two days later by destroyers which fought off the advancing German tanks at almost point-blank range. By the 26th the Germans claimed Calais, although the Allied garrison, isolated and dependent on provisions from the air, held out in the citadel for four days. With Ostend already menaced, one single port, that of Dunkirk, alone remained open to the Allies.

Then on May 28 the last hope of holding this port seemed to be shattered when King Leopold surrendered the Belgian army to the Germans.

"In full battle", said Reynaud in a broadcast that same day, "King Leopold III without a word to the French and British soldiers who, in response to his anguished appeal, had come to the assistance of his country, laid down his arms". The bitterness of the Allies was understandable. But if the actual surrender took them by surprise, the King's intention, though perhaps not his final decision, appears to have been communicated to them some days before. Certainly there was an all-night session lasting until 5 A.M. on May 25, during which his ministers sought in vain to deter him from his course. When he persisted, they denounced his illegality in acting without ministerial sanction, and announced that the Belgian government would continue with new forces at the side of the Allies. Leopold himself sought a compromise course by asking the Germans for an armistice; but when this was refused, he chose unconditional surrender.

There is no doubt that his reason lay in the conviction that the military situation was hopeless. Churchill on June 4 said that from the time of the break-through on the Meuse "only a rapid retreat to Amiens and the south could have saved the British and French armies"; but he added that one reason for failing to effect this retreat was the fact that it would have involved the destruction of the Belgian army and the surrender of the whole of the country. This

was the prospect with which the King, who had refused to recognize it a fortnight previously, was now confronted. While the German columns were sweeping up the coast, the main German forces in the north threw their whole weight against the Belgian forces. They drove the Allies back from the Scheldt, capturing Ghent and Courtrai, and followed with a thrust which carried them across the Lys and brought Bruges under fire. As the avenue of escape narrowed, the destruction of the Belgian army became imminent, and with it the loss of all Belgium. In the hope of preserving something of his country and of his own authority, Leopold on his own responsibility made peace.

It seemed at first that his action involved the certain destruction of the Allies who had come to aid him. With their left wing suddenly exposed, and with their efforts to cut the Somme corridor now being thrown back with further losses, it appeared hopeless to believe that they could either cut their way through to the south or extricate themselves by way of Dunkirk before the trap finally closed. On May 29 the official German communiqué announced that the fate of the French and British armies was sealed.

What followed was a triumph of discipline and morale. The exposed flank was quickly reorganized to form a continuous front. The area around Dunkirk was flooded to form an extra barrier to mechanized attack. The French tank corps which was fighting around Lille conducted a heroic rearguard action under General Prioux; and even when the Germans had cut them off from the main body, part of these forces succeeded in smashing their way through. Slowly and in good order, in the face of an enemy who deployed his full might in an effort to crush them, the British and French armies withdrew toward Dunkirk.

Here the naval forces of the two countries undertook one of the most difficult of all tasks, the embarkation of a beaten army in the face of hot pursuit. It recalled to many minds the operations at Corunna over a century ago; but Sir John Moore on that occasion did not have to face an enemy air force. The German bombers

struck ceaselessly at both the retreating troops and the rescue ships, and with particular savagery at Dunkirk itself. Here the situation was Norway in reverse, with the enemy airmen again striking at the junction point between sea and land forces. This time, however, the destruction of the docking facilities was not so decisive. They were no longer essential for the handling of equipment, and circumstances made it possible to embark the men from open beaches. A vast flotilla of small craft had been collected to bring the survivors to the transports and warships which waited offshore. For five days the evacuation went on, favoured by a calm sea and partially protected for at least two days by a heavy fog. When on June 4 the Germans at last entered Dunkirk, it was a ruined port from which their prey had escaped.

In view of the magnitude of the operation, and of the exposure to attack not only from aircraft, but from submarines and torpedo-carrying speedboats, the announced loss seemed amazingly small. Britain admitted the loss of six destroyers and twenty-four small craft together with 24,000 tons of merchant shipping, in the course of the operation. France lost seven destroyers and one supply ship. How large a proportion of the original forces in Belgium were finally rescued only the high authorities could say with accuracy. Churchill announced that the navy, using nearly a thousand ships of all kinds, had carried 335,000 men across the channel. His statement of the loss in men as "over 30,000" seemed in its deliberate vagueness to cover a determined reticence. There was, however, no attempt to minimize the seriousness of the loss of material, which included over a thousand guns and the bulk of Britain's mechanized equipment as well as an undefined portion of that belonging to the French. Whatever the loss inflicted on the attacking Germans—and one neutral authority estimated it at forty per cent. of their mechanized equipment—the loss was one which, as Churchill warned, the Allies would need time to overcome.

One feature of the evacuation offered a grain of comfort for the future. That was the performance of the British air force. The

individual superiority which had been demonstrated with growing impressiveness ever since the war began was never more in evidence than in the struggle over Dunkirk. This time the British fighters had bases within flying range; and if, in their numerical inferiority, they were unable to keep the bombers off entirely, they practically nullified their effectiveness during most of the evacuation. Without this British supremacy in the air, all the gallantry of the navy could hardly have prevented the operation from degenerating into a shambles. "It was the first time", wrote an American observer, "that the British and German pursuit forces had come into actual combat over an extended period with so much at stake. The superiority of the English plane was established immediately."

German Acquisitions

The balance of gain and loss resulting from the conquest of the Low Countries and northern France was even more complex to estimate than in the case of Scandinavia. All these countries were to a considerable extent specialized producers who were far from self-sufficient in the necessities of life. Holland produced foodstuffs for less than three million out of her eight million inhabitants. Belgium, the most densely settled country in Europe, was still more dependent on imports of foodstuffs. These were countries which, like Denmark and Norway, lived by exchanging goods with other countries; and although Germany occupied an important place in that system of exchange, the process of fitting the conquered lands into the German economic system was certain to involve profound readjustments, particularly for the conquered.

In the acquisition of immediate assets, Germany could probably count a heavy balance on the profit side of the ledger. It was true that she got comparatively little in either gold or foreign exchange, the greater part of which had been quietly evacuated before the invasion. Dutch and Belgian credits in the United States, like those of Denmark and Norway, were frozen on the outbreak of hostilities by order of the American government. The bulk of the Dutch merchant marine escaped Nazi control. And although some oil stocks

may have been acquired, the great depots in such ports as Flushing and Amsterdam were carefully destroyed before the surrender.

But Holland was a great trading nation with large stocks of commodities on hand and in transit, and the warehouses in her ports, as well as such towns as Antwerp and Dunkirk, were no doubt welcome acquisitions. Holland too, like Denmark, offered a short-run food supply based on her great dairying and market gardening industries; though, again like Denmark, the maintenance of production in these fields was dependent on fodder and fertilizers from abroad, which it was doubtful if Germany could supply.

There were, however, more permanent acquisitions of an industrial nature. If Germany seized few ships, she got some of the greatest shipbuilding yards in Europe. These acquisitions in the four conquered countries gave a total capacity equal to that of Germany herself. Although they could not be adapted to the construction of large naval units without considerable time and expense, they might be made to serve for submarine construction, particularly since both Denmark and Holland had firms producing Diesel engines. Even more important were the heavy industries of Belgium and Luxemburg. Belgium had considerable coal deposits, and these were supplemented by the acquisition of northern France, including the great Lens basin which produced over 30,000,000 tons annually. Luxemburg, situated on the edge of the Lorraine iron basin, had an ore production equal to three-fourths that of Germany and supplied eight per cent. of Germany's pre-war imports. The heavy industry of Belgium, Luxemburg, and northern France would be a welcome addition to Germany's resources and a corresponding loss to the Allies.

There was one possible disadvantage from these conquests. Germany, who drew thirty per cent. of her pre-war imports from these countries, also used them as an avenue for her imports from overseas. This was particularly true of Holland, whose transit trade, in gross weight, was half as large again as her combined imports and exports. This became particularly important after the outbreak of war and the institution of the Allied blockade. Holland, whose imports from

the United States in January 1940 were double those of January 1939, clearly represented a serious gap in the Allied system. She would now be subject to its full rigours, and Germany would be unable to use her as a channel to the outside world. But the significance of this should not be overrated. The Allied control was already beginning to tighten up, as was shown by a drop in the import figures of February and March to the level of the previous year. The trade treaty signed with England on March 21 provided for the rationing of exports on the basis of pre-war figures; and Dutch merchants, wary of Allied blacklists, were co-operating in preventing essential supplies from reaching Germany. The leak had already been reduced to a trickle before the German invasion.

For the conquered countries, the most serious aspect of the new economic situation was the fact that their whole economy was based on free exchange of goods in a world market, and that basis was now shattered. For the Allies it meant the loss both of customers and of sources of supplies. Nearly ten per cent. of Britain's trade, nearly fifteen per cent. of that of France, had been with these lands. But it was the strategic aspect which offered the most imminent peril. The extension of the German frontier against England which resulted from the conquest of Norway was now further extended in a far more dangerous direction. For the first time since the days of Napoleon, England saw the Channel coast in possession of a powerful enemy. If Norway brought the Nazis within striking distance of Scapa Flow and the northern trade routes, the Netherlands gave them air bases within an hour's bombing range of the heart of industrial England and submarine bases whose importance had been only too vividly shown during the last war. Though the port facilities of Boulogne and Dunkirk had been destroyed before evacuation, and though Zeebrugge was once more blocked, it would only be a matter of time before these could again be put to use—and possibly a far more formidable use than had ever been contemplated even in 1918. And in the meantime their possession would hamper Allied communications and make it easier for Hitler either to concentrate on England or to strike with his whole weight at the heart of France.

The Capture of Paris

One characteristic of the earlier mood of complacency on the part of the Allies had been the frequent assertion that time was on the Allied side. But time, as they now began to realize, was a fickle ally. So long as Britain and France could stand behind their defences and build at leisure their organization for a prolonged struggle, it could be supposed that they were steadily overtaking the initial German lead. But even this called for speedy and energetic action if full advantage was to be taken of the breathing space; and when it came to an end, it appeared that the Allies had failed to realize how little time they might have.

With the end of the period of quiescence, time changed sides. It became apparent that Germany was determined to use the full weight of her advantage to crush the Allies before they could gain superiority in organization and equipment. Time, which they desperately needed, was now denied them as Hitler followed blows with new blows before his adversaries could recover from the earlier shock. Even while the last of the battered troops were arriving from Dunkirk, the Nazis had gathered their might for a new drive direct on Paris.

Again the preliminary warning came in the form of air raids. On June 1, the Rhone valley, including the important industrial area around Lyon, was raided for the first time. On June 3 the first bombs fell on Paris itself. To a large extent these raids appeared to have the now classic purpose of striking at air bases and destroying the defending planes on the ground. And on June 5 England, hitherto almost immune, experienced the first of three successive but largely ineffective air raids which sought out bases on the east and south coasts.

The drive itself was launched on June 5 at dawn. On a front of a hundred and twenty miles along the Somme and the Aisne the Nazi dive bombers descended on the French lines, followed by the German infantry moving in mass formation to the assault. This time the tanks, instead of leading the way, were apparently held in reserve to exploit such breaches as the infantry might succeed in making.

This procedure had a possible motive in the nature of the new defences which had been hastily organized along the line of the Somme and were specifically intended to meet the Nazi tactics of infiltration. The troops held their posts against the attacking infantry. When tanks appeared they were allowed to filter between the advance posts, to be trapped and destroyed later by the tank defences in the rear.

Such defences, though not impregnable, were confidently counted on to inflict disastrous losses. But it was soon clear that even this would not deter the German command, which was now determined on a knockout blow before the remnants of the Flanders army could be reformed or the Weygand Line made permanent. The chief attacks, delivered on the lower Somme and along the Ailette canal between the Aisne and the Oise, penetrated during the first day into the outer defences. During successive days the fury of the attack and the numbers of the attackers, instead of slackening, steadily increased. At the outset the Germans were estimated to be using forty divisions. By the fifth day this had risen to a hundred divisions—the whole of the available German first-line troops.

Under this tremendous pressure the French, now supported by British troops on their left, were steadily forced back. On June 6 the Germans claimed to have broken the Somme line at three points and to have advanced seventeen miles; and on the east their attack had reached the Chemin-des-Dames. By the 9th they had reached the Seine at Rouen and extended their attack eastward to the Argonne. The Aisne was crossed at two points, and the German advance forces were within thirty-five miles of Paris. Next day, as the western point of the pincers stabbed at the Seine and the eastern point, backed by a drive on Reims, reached toward the Marne, the French government left Paris and went first to Tours and, then, four days later, to Bordeaux. By the 12th both the Seine and the Marne had been crossed and an allied force containing at least one British division had been cut off along the channel coast. The Germans claimed that two French armies, with a total of nearly half a million men, had been put out of effective action.

Paris was now a doomed city. In an effort to save it from destruction, the Allied command decided to make no effort to defend it, but to withdraw their forces to a line farther south. On June 14 the German columns rumbled into the silent capital which had last yielded to them seventy years before. With a new fury the Nazi attack threw its weight against the extended French front to the east in an effort to smash it off from its pivot at Montmedy and to outflank the Maginot Line.

When the invasion of Holland was launched on May 10, Hitler described it as the battle which would "decide the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years". With the opening of the drive on Paris, Weygand said in his order of the day: "The battle of France has begun. The fate of our country, the safeguard of our liberties, the future of our sons depend on your tenacity." That was now the tremendous issue for both sides. It was no longer simply a question of victory or defeat, but of survival or national annihilation. And as the relentless pressure continued, and Italy threw her weight on the side of Germany, it was clear that every resource which Britain and France could summon would be needed to retrieve the situation.

THE ALLIED WAR GOVERNMENTS

The Norwegian campaign, which proved fatal to the Chamberlain ministry, had significantly an opposite effect on the position of Reynaud. Chamberlain represented the mistakes of the past. Reynaud represented a reaction against those mistakes and the promise of a new and more effective policy. Events in Norway seemed to confirm French judgment in deposing Daladier; and the Reynaud ministry, which on March 22 had barely won its vote of confidence in the Chamber, received the unanimous support of that body on April 19.

The invasion of the Netherlands added a further solidity to the support of the ministry. Internal friction within that body for the moment subsided, and external opposition diminished as the need was recognized for complete national unity to meet the new emer-

gency. One of the reasons for such opposition had been the inclusion of Socialist members in the ministry in an attempt to broaden its base—a step which led the parties of the Right to take at first an attitude of critical aloofness. Now, however, the desire for a united effort transcended political differences. On May 10 two leaders of the Conservative opposition entered the War Cabinet to give it a character completely representative of all shades of political opinion.

This new-found harmony, however, was severely tested during the following months. In particular, the spirit of moderation and compromise which had been responsible for earlier inadequacies continued to hamper the government in a number of respects. There were even indications that the former premier, Pierre Laval, had won over Daladier to new efforts of appeasement toward Italy, perhaps even to the thought of a compromise peace with Germany. Daladier's direct responsibility for the conduct of the war was ended on May 18, when in a partial reorganization of the ministry Reynaud took over the War Office and handed Daladier in exchange the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. At the same time the Ministry of the Interior was given to Georges Mandel, who had been aide to Clemenceau and was counted on to direct internal affairs with a strong hand and to animate the local authorities with a resolute and energetic spirit; and the aged Marshal Pétain was called in as Vice-President of the Council with the special task of advising Reynaud on the conduct of the war.

These were appointments which revived memories of the Tiger and the successful defence of France a quarter of a century previously. By this very fact, perhaps, they threw into contrast the spirit of Munich and the shortcomings of the men who embodied it. On June 5, following increasing friction over questions of future policy, this feeling came to a head and resulted in a further overhauling of the ministry. Daladier was dropped completely. Albert Sarraut, his close associate, lost his post as Minister of Education. Several other changes of the same general tendency were made. The result was the final elimination of the chief figures connected with Munich—

"a change", as one commentator expressed it, "from outworn conceptions and tired wills and conflicting tendencies". At the same time a further move in the direction of efficiency was indicated by the reduction of the War Cabinet from eleven to eight members.

These changes in the sphere of civil government were an outcome of the need for "new methods and new men" which Reynaud had expressed two days previously. Still more significant were the changes in the military command. The day after Pétain was called to the service of the government, General Gamelin was removed from his post of Commander-in-Chief and replaced by General Weygand, whom Gamelin had succeeded in 1935. On May 25, in a drastic shake-up, fifteen generals were dismissed from their commands. And in connection with the reorganization of June 5, General Charles de Gaulle was brought in as special collaborator of Reynaud at the Ministry of War.

Behind these changes lay Reynaud's admission, on May 21, that the classic French conception of war had been utterly routed by new developments. That conception was based on the defensive tactics of a war of position and symbolized by Gamelin and the Maginot line. It was, however, a conception about which Reynaud himself had been dubious for some time. In 1935 he had tried to introduce a bill providing for a substantial mechanized force which would give France power on the attack—a proposal which was rejected by the government of the day. General de Gaulle shared this belief in the necessity of attack based on mechanized equipment; and in Weygand, the disciple and spiritual successor of Foch, the French hoped that the very spirit of the offensive would be found embodied.

In Britain too there was a change in a similar direction. The shift of General Ironside, on May 26, from Chief of the Imperial General Staff to Commander-in-Chief of home forces, may have been partly motivated by a growing concern over the possibility of invasion. It was none the less true that his successor, Sir John Dill, was regarded as far more likely than Ironside to share Weygand's

preference for attack over defence. But the real indication of a change in attitude in Britain was shown, even more strikingly than in the case of France, by the changes in the government which followed the resignation of Chamberlain.

The Churchill Ministry

The desire for national unity which animated France in the face of Hitler's assault found an immediate parallel in Great Britain. Distrust of Chamberlain had been a barrier to a truly national government, but his replacement by Churchill at once opened the way to a union of all parties in a common war effort.

The new War Cabinet was a small inner body of five members. Churchill, Halifax and Chamberlain represented the Conservative majority, with Attlee and Greenwood as representatives of Labour. The absence of Liberal representation in this body indicated that certain political difficulties still lingered, for it would have been extremely difficult to include Sinclair while eliminating Simon, and the elimination of Simon was almost a prerequisite to Labour's co-operation. But in practice the new body offered general satisfaction to all shades of opinion. It was small enough to give promise of effective direction of policy. Its members were generally free from administrative duties—a principle which had been urged upon Chamberlain in vain. Only Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office was in charge of a specific department. The other four members held posts whose duties were purely nominal, and were thus free to devote their whole attention to general policy.

Neither the War Cabinet nor the Ministry as a whole represented a clean sweep. The Labour party, in its attacks on Chamberlain and his associates, had shown a particular antipathy toward those three knights, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Sir Kingsley Wood. The elimination of this group, popularly identified with the spirit of Munich and appeasement, was however incomplete. Simon was gently elevated to the post of Lord Chancellor with the rank of viscount. Hoare found less felicitous treatment in his appointment as special envoy to Madrid, where his greeting was a

demonstration by young nationalists demanding from this notable appeaser the surrender of Gibraltar. Chamberlain, however, sat in the inner War Cabinet, and Wood at the Exchequer occupied an office of the very first importance. But this might be balanced by the new blood in the service departments and in such posts as the Ministry of Supply, where Herbert Morrison, one of Labour's best administrators, now took charge. Alexander at the Admiralty, Eden at the War Office, and Sinclair as Air Minister, formed a promising trio who would be under the direction of Churchill himself, for the new Prime Minister was to continue to act as co-ordinator of the service departments in the capacity of Minister of Defence. And animating the ministry was the new spirit which Churchill expressed in defining the aim of his government: "It is victory, victory at all costs; victory in spite of all terrors; victory, however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival."

Two departments were calculated, under existing circumstances, to attract particular attention. The first was the Air Ministry, and particularly its effectiveness in stepping up production. Early in March Sir Kingsley Wood, then Air Minister, had expressed his confidence that the number of planes "accruing to" the Allies now exceeded German monthly production. Neutral experts were less sanguine, even when the 770 planes secured from the United States during the first six months were included in the estimates. Subsequent events were to show that the Minister's statement was decidedly optimistic. It was this sort of complacency which roused the wrath of the critics; but although this resulted in the replacing of Wood by Sir Samuel Hoare in April, the change was hardly a guarantee of new energy or effectiveness. In Sir Archibald Sinclair, however, the Ministry now had a head who gave promise of both. And as a further assurance of vigour, a special department of aircraft production was created and Lord Beaverbrook was placed in charge. This was the sort of imaginative though possibly risky appointment which was in keeping with Churchill's character. Beaverbrook was a newspaper baron, and newspaper barons have frequently been

more prone to act on overpowering impulses than on sober calculation. (Lloyd George once said of his alliance with Northcliffe that it was like going for a walk with a grasshopper.) But there was no doubt about the dynamic qualities of the new appointee or about his profound conviction of the need for increased production, and both these qualities would be a change from those of his predecessors.

The other department was that of finance. Behind the whole problem of supplies lay the question of financial policy, and Sir John Simon at the Exchequer appeared to share the reluctance of his colleagues to recognize the inadequacy of orthodoxy and moderation. The budget which he introduced on April 23 came in for severe criticism on the ground of its limited scope and its lack of imagination. Even though it provided for an expenditure of more than two and a half billion pounds, it was held by competent critics that this fell far short of the effort that should have been made; and neither the increased taxes on commodities nor the provisions for borrowing—which involved a rejection of Professor Keynes' widely discussed plan for compulsory saving—seemed adequate to the emergency. There was some doubt whether Sir Kingsley Wood at the Exchequer would be any more daring than his predecessor. But an indication of possible new departures was given on May 29, when the excess profits tax, by which the government took everything over a fixed limit, was extended from war industries to all trades and businesses; though his refusal to contemplate new taxes until the country had adjusted itself to the existing burden might still be taken to show a lack of realization of the need for haste in mobilizing the full national resources.

But the power to effect such mobilization had already been placed beyond doubt. In one of the most drastic measures ever passed by a British Parliament, the government on May 22 secured by the Emergency Powers Defence Act control over the whole property and man-power of the kingdom. It enabled the minister to requisition any industry, to "direct any person to perform any

service required", to settle wages and conditions of labour, and in general to conscript both wealth and labour in the service of the state. Its immediate purpose was to enable the state to control and reorganize the whole of war industry; and the first steps under it were the placing of all munitions factories on a twenty-four-hour, seven-day production basis, and the bringing of these industries under a new Munitions Board whose task would be the speeding up and more efficient organization of essential production.

This control at the same time strengthened the already stringent powers of the government over suspected elements within the country. The concern which had been roused by subversive activities in Norway was sharpened by the threat of actual invasion which seemed to follow from the German conquest of the Netherlands. Precautions against enemy landings, and particularly against parachute troops, involved the construction of barricades and the raising of a body of local defence volunteers. Precautions against betrayal from within led to new restrictions on enemy aliens and to the arrest of leading Fascist sympathizers, including Sir Oswald Mosley and a Conservative member of Parliament, Captain Archibald Ramsay. A bill imposing the death penalty for treachery was rushed through Parliament on May 23. In the face of a peril greater than she had known for centuries, Britain suspended her traditional liberties in the interests of national security.

NEUTRALS AND NON-BELLIGERENTS

The progress of the German war machine aroused widely diverse sentiments in the nations which stood outside the conflict. Some of them, Italy in particular, were ready to hail the Nazi successes and to hope for profit from them. But most of the states who were still untouched by the hostilities realized with a growing perturbation that the outcome would profoundly affect their own destinies; and their awakening to a consciousness of a direct concern in the issues at stake found expression in important changes of policy to meet the new situation created by the German victories.

Perhaps the most noncommittal of these Powers was the Soviet Union. The resentment against the Allies and the official friendliness toward Germany, which had characterized Molotoff's utterances at the end of March, remained in form at least the attitude of the Soviet government during the succeeding weeks. There was a tendency to view Germany's invasion of Scandinavia as an understandable result of the Allied plan to intervene on behalf of Finland, and to accept it as a further guarantee against attack from the west. Russia, engaged in applying the lessons of the Finnish war and in considering the continued problems of her domestic situation, was prepared for the moment to look with complacency on the German adventure.

As time went on, however, there were faint signs of a diminution both of Russia's partiality toward Germany and of her bitterness toward the Allies. One sign of the latter development was the Russian proposal in the latter part of April for a renewal of trade negotiations with Britain. These negotiations had been initiated in the spring of 1939, but their imperceptible progress had been completely arrested by the outbreak of the Finnish war. That particular difficulty was now out of the way, but still neither side showed any desire to rush headlong into an agreement. Britain, while ready to negotiate in principle, insisted that any treaty must take a form which would assist the blockade of Germany, and apparently hoped for an agreement on the model of the treaties recently negotiated with the western neutrals by which they promised to limit exports to Germany to pre-war levels. Russia was ready to discuss a guarantee that none of her imports would be passed on to Germany, but refused to consider any limitation on her right to dispose of her own products as she saw fit. This was a check, but not a fatal one, for by the end of May Britain had so far relaxed her insistence as to make possible the sending of a trade mission to Moscow. There were still difficulties over procedure, for the British ambassador had been absent on leave since January and the Russians were anxious for a resumption of full diplomatic relations. Even the appointment of a *persona grata* in the person of Sir Stafford

Cripps as head of the trade mission failed to satisfy the Russian demand for negotiations through a ranking ambassador. The result, however, was simply that Sir Stafford was given ambassadorial rank, and the preliminary formalities at least were thus apparently fulfilled.

German control of the Baltic gateway, however, could hardly be welcome to the Soviet Union; and the possibility of the extension of that control within the Baltic itself could not be ignored. There was especial concern over the position of Sweden, as was shown by the diplomatic conversation which resulted on May 3 in an announcement that Russia and Germany had agreed on their mutual interest in the preservation of Swedish neutrality. Russia followed this by efforts to strengthen her own position; and one outcome was the acceptance by Lithuania, on June 15, of a Soviet ultimatum which considerably extended the Russian rights acquired by the treaty of October and made Lithuania a complete military protectorate. It was a strengthening of Russia's defensive position which showed some doubt about the possible course of future German activity.

In the Balkans, too, Russia showed a growing desire for tranquillity as the best guarantee of security. On May 9 Russia announced that she had warned the belligerents, and Italy as well, to refrain from adventures in the Balkans; and on May 17 it was reported that she had made representations along the same lines to the Balkan states themselves. From the menace which she had seemed to be at the beginning of the year, Russia now appeared, as far as the Balkan states were concerned, to be transforming herself into a protector and friend.

The Balkan States

This attitude offered a measure of relief to a group of states who continued to feel that their security remained a precarious thing, completely at the mercy of the ambitions of their great neighbours or the military exigencies of the belligerents. Even the absorption of the energies of the warring nations in the campaigns in Norway or Flanders provided only a partial respite. But the fortunes of

Germany and the Allies profoundly influenced the attitude of these small nations, whose willingness to resist an aggressor varied directly with the degree to which they felt they could count on help in such resistance; and by the middle of June the growing success of the Axis was reflected in an increasing tendency on the part of the Balkan nations to adopt a conciliatory policy toward Italy and Germany.

The beginning of April found the belligerents still manoeuvring for favourable diplomatic and economic positions in eastern Europe. Britain, who had called home her Balkan envoys for consultation at the end of March, announced on April 4 the creation of a special trading company under the Treasury to handle commercial interests in the Balkan states. On the German side, the persistent Dr. Clodius was still in Bucharest, pressing for Rumanian demobilization and for more substantial deliveries of oil and foodstuffs. In spite of a lack of success in these major demands, he was able on April 20 to secure a new exchange rate and a tentative agreement acquiring certain raw materials in return for German arms and machinery. Fortified by this limited achievement, he continued his progress to Budapest and Belgrade in the hope of drawing Hungary and Yugoslavia more firmly into the German orbit.

At the same time Germany made a bid for a practical protectorate over the Danube. Intrigues and counter-intrigues reached a climax with a German charge at the beginning of April that Britain planned to block Danubian traffic by blowing up the banks of the river at the Iron Gates, and on April 10 it was reported that a cargo boat and two oil barges carrying supplies to Germany had been blown up. The seizure by Rumania, on April 8, of a number of British barges carrying dynamite appeared to lend some colour to German fears of interference, though Britain explained that the dynamite was meant to blow up these barges in case of attempted seizure by Germany. The outcome was a report that Germany intended to demand the right to police the Danube—a suggestion which was later modified to a proposal, sponsored by Hungary, that the Danubian states them-

selves should take over the policing of the river from the existing international commission—a proposal framed in a way which would allow Germany to share in that activity. This was rejected by Yugoslavia; but by the end of April it was apparent that Germany was commercially dominant over the greater part of the river, and that this was likely to mean effective military domination when steps to this end became desirable.

This pressure continued simultaneously with the campaign in Norway, which did little to distract the belligerents from their interest in the Balkans. It was, rather, an example to the Balkan states of how little they could expect their neutrality to be respected by Germany, and a warning of the dangers that might come from German sympathizers within their borders. In common with other neutrals, the Balkan states turned their attention to these elements, and to the stalwart German "tourists" who seemed to be especially attracted toward border fortifications and oil fields. The most startling event was the arrest of the former Yugoslav premier, M. Stoyadinovitch, on April 19, followed by numerous arrests and expulsions as the government discovered a plot for an uprising which was to be simultaneous with a German invasion. Similar measures were taken in Rumania; and on May 11 the Rumanian ministry was reconstructed to include a group of ministers less favourable to Germany than their predecessors. Modifying this in a curious way, however, was the gradual rapprochement between King Carol and the fascist Iron Guard, which found expression in a political amnesty on April 25. Neither Rumania nor Yugoslavia was yet ready to close the door to friendly relations with the Axis. With Germany's victory in Flanders, indeed, they made a definite bid for more friendly relations. A partial Rumanian demobilization on May 29 was followed on June 1 by the dismissal of the pro-Ally foreign minister and the appointment of a German sympathizer in his place. The release of Stoyadinovitch and his associates, which was reported on June 14, was a sign that Yugoslavia was moving in a similar direction.

The Effect on America

The extension of the war, however, had implications outside the continent of Europe. All the invaded countries except Luxemburg had outlying possessions; and the status of these territories, and particularly the ones belonging to Holland and Denmark, became a matter of serious concern to other powers both belligerent and neutral.

One immediate concern on the part of Britain was the prevention of Nazi control over Denmark from extending to the Faroes and Iceland. The Faroes, a small group of islands two hundred miles northwest of the Shetlands, were occupied by British troops shortly after the invasion to prevent their seizure as air and submarine bases. The risk that Iceland might be put to a similar use was also present, but action was for the moment deferred, partly as a result of the course taken by the Iceland authorities themselves. This island had the status of an independent kingdom, connected with Denmark only through a personal union with the Danish crown. On April 9 the legislature resolved that, since the German invasion made it impossible for the king to exercise his authority in Iceland, the exercise of the royal power would be entrusted to the ministry until further notice. With the Allied withdrawal from Norway, however, the unprotected position of Iceland meant the need for more effective guarantees; and on May 10 the British government announced that troops had been landed to protect the island against invasion, with the assurance that the force would be withdrawn upon the conclusion of hostilities.

The vast island of Greenland was also a Danish possession; and here the results of the war showed the first sign of direct intrusion on the western hemisphere. The concern of the United States was immediately aroused, and American hostility toward the idea of a German foothold so close to the American continent was clearly manifested. Although Greenland's resources were comparatively insignificant, its location made it an important link in the northern air route to Europe and a possible location for air bases uncomfortably close to the United States. As Roosevelt pointed out to Congress on May 16: "From the fjords of Greenland it is four hours by air

to Newfoundland, five hours to Nova Scotia . . . and only six hours to New England." No immediate steps were taken; but discussions were initiated with Britain and Canada, and the announcement on May 1 that the United States would send a consul to Greenland marked a first step toward the assertion of the application of the Monroe Doctrine to that country.

The invasion of Holland aroused still more disturbing possibilities. Denmark had relinquished her possessions in the Caribbean during the last war, when the United States bought the Virgin Islands. But Holland still retained the Netherlands West Indies with their important oil refineries, as well as Dutch Guiana. On May 11 an Allied detachment was landed in the Dutch islands to prevent possible sabotage; but it was announced that the American government had been kept informed of the position, and the assurance that no change of sovereignty was contemplated was for the moment acceptable to the United States.

The question of the Dutch East Indies aroused still more concern. These were possessions toward which the Japanese had for some time been casting speculative glances; and their seizure by Japan would profoundly change the strategic situation in the Pacific as well as providing valuable and needed resources to Japan. The Japanese government had already made it clear that it could not allow the acquisition of these islands by another power; and the United States on April 17 made a similar pronouncement which was in effect a warning to Japan herself. Both countries stood on the alert after Holland was invaded; but each acted as a deterrent on the other, and the Dutch themselves took spirited action through the colonial government which prevented the problem from becoming immediately acute.

But besides these tangible matters of concern, there was a rapidly growing realization in the United States of the nation's vital interest in the course of the general conflict. The utter ruthlessness of the German attacks on unoffending neutrals aroused increasing resentment; and the dawning possibility of an Allied defeat brought suddenly home the implications of a Hitler victory for America.

These sentiments were vigorously voiced by President Roosevelt. On April 15, in a speech to the conference of the Pan-American Union, he contrasted the American tradition of peace with the attitude of the European aggressors in words which, though they mentioned no specific Power, implied both a condemnation and a warning. With the invasion of the Netherlands his condemnation became more forthright. In a speech that same day to the American Scientific Congress he declared himself "shocked and angered by the tragic news from Belgium and the Netherlands and Luxemburg". On April 11, in response to an appeal from King Leopold, he wrote: "The people of the United States hope, as do I, that policies which seek to dominate peaceful and independent peoples through force and military aggression may be arrested, and that the government and people of Belgium may preserve their integrity and their freedom." How generally these sentiments were shared by the other nations of the new world was demonstrated on May 18, when the twenty-one American republics took the unprecedented step of issuing a joint declaration asserting that they protested against the latest military aggression, and that they considered "the violation of the neutrality or invasion of weaker nations as an unjustifiable measure in the conduct and success of war".

The action of the United States was not confined to words. As a result of the German aggression and of the Allied reverses the President, backed by a rising popular demand, took the lead in advocating two simultaneous courses. The first was the expansion and speeding up of the national defence, initiated on May 16 by Roosevelt's request to Congress for new appropriations of over a billion dollars. The second was an attempt to prevent this expansion from interfering with the flow of supplies to the Allies, and to speed up these supplies as the urgency became more manifest. By June the government was taking active steps to release its store of arms, either by the direct sale of old equipment or by turning in such things as planes to the manufacturers who would later deliver new models, and would meanwhile sell the equipment thus made available to Britain and France. And while these steps were being taken to make American

resources more readily available, American diplomacy was bringing increasing pressure to bear on Italy in the hope of keeping her out of the war.

Italy's Entry into the War

By the time of the invasion of Norway, Italy's attitude toward the Allies had hardened into one of implacable hostility. Whether the Brennero meeting between Mussolini and Hitler had resulted in a detailed and concerted plan might still be doubted; but the weeks which followed saw Italy beginning her positive preparations for entry into the war. On April 2 a measure was adopted providing for civil mobilization, and giving the government power to requisition the services and property of all citizens in time of war. On April 10 the press pointed out that Italy's forces were on a war footing, and during the subsequent weeks the quiet mobilization of reserves went on by means of individual notifications. At the same time the fleet was reported to have concentrated in the Dodecanese islands, from which it could strike at Allied bases in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Allies on their part made successive efforts to clarify relations with Italy. On April 17, following hostile demonstrations in Milan, the British Minister of Economic Warfare said in a warning tone that Britain would like to know where she stood with Italy. At the beginning of May it was reported that the British government had asked Italy to define her exact position within the next two weeks. Her doubt whether this would elicit any satisfactory response was shown at the end of April when she took the serious step of calling all merchant ships back from the Mediterranean and reinforcing the fleet which was based on Alexandria.


The French attitude, in contrast, was one of soft speaking in the hope of turning away the rising Italian wrath. Throughout this period Reynaud made successive friendly references to Italy, and indicated on several occasions France's willingness to discuss Italian claims. On April 20 he revealed that his direct overtures had so far met with no response. Definite concessions were offered in May in respect to Italian rights in Tunis, Djibuti and the Suez Canal,

and on June 6 Reynaud declared in a broadcast: "There is no people with whom France could not settle by pacific means the divergencies of interest that seem to oppose them." But by that time it was quite apparent that a settlement by pacific means was quite outside Mussolini's desires.

This unresponsive attitude was accentuated by Mussolini's sudden abandonment of those grandiloquent public utterances in which he had once delighted. "After my speeches," he told an audience on May 9, "you must accustom yourself to my silence. Only facts will break it." But if the leader had ceased to give tongue, the rest of the pack was in full cry. They were led by Giovanni Ansaldo, editor of the *Telegrafo* and intimate of Count Ciano, whose promise on April 14 that "the bugles will soon sound" struck the theme which he developed in subsequent editorials and broadcasts. He was faithfully echoed by other fascist figures and by the Italian press in general; and to prevent any notes of discord, the Papal *Osservatore Romano*, which alone of Italian papers maintained an impartial attitude on the war, was first attacked and in the end virtually suppressed.

At one stage it looked as though the bugles might call to an assault on Yugoslavia. The uneasy relations of the two countries, which were not improved by the despatch of large bodies of Italian "workers" to Albania, reached a state of considerable tension by the end of April as a result of hostile demonstrations in Florence. By May 21 this tension had reached a point whose seriousness was indicated by Italy's closing the Yugoslav border along the Albanian frontier and the speeding of military preparations in Albania. By the 29th, however, Italy was ready to give satisfactory assurances, and Yugoslav relief contributed to her adoption of a new policy of orientation toward the Axis.

It was in reality against Britain that the choicest Italian invective was directed. British naval control of the Mediterranean, and the tangible effect of this in enforcing the blockade against Italy, made the destruction of England an object devoutly to be wished. Ansaldo on May 5 expressed the hope of seeing an invasion of Britain. Efforts



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were apparently made to enlist Spain in the crusade by urging her to take Gibraltar; but though a Spanish military mission visited Italy, Franco appeared to have avoided committing himself too definitely. Negotiations which were in progress on the blockade seem to have been used by Italy as a foundation for complaints rather than as a means of seeking a solution, and on May 31 they were broken off completely. On June 9 Ansaldo asserted that Italy intended to take part in the second phase of the war in which "united to Germany we will carry out the war with England. We will open once and for all the locked doors of Britain. That is our conviction."

By that date everything was in readiness for the adventure. As early as April 18 it was revealed that military commissions had been exchanged between Italy and the Reich. On April 30 the new Italian battleship *Vittorio Veneto* was placed in service. On May 17 a war budget provided vast new sums for military expenses, and fascists were warned that even their party membership would not save them if they acted as traitors by opposing the entry into war. The provisions on civil mobilization came into effect on May 24. Two days later measures to conserve the oil supply were forecast when the use of private motor cars and motor boats was forbidden after June 1. And on May 29 the revoking of existing import licenses showed how close the nation was to the final plunge.

The German bombing raids on the Rhone valley on June 1, which included an attack on Marseilles by planes flying in from the sea, were no doubt intended as a practical demonstration to Mussolini that the plunge could be taken with safety. When the Council of Ministers met on June 4 the final stage was entered. Next day it was announced that Italian coastal waters were "dangerous", presumably because minefields had been laid. On June 7 all Italian ships abroad were ordered to make for the nearest neutral port. On June 9 the former party secretary, Farinacci, announced that "the hour has arrived in which all Italian demands will be realized". And next day, speaking from his accustomed balcony, Mussolini told his people that Italy had entered the war "against the plutocratic and reactionary

democracies, who always have blocked the march and frequently plotted against the existence of the Italian people”.

“The hand that held the dagger”, said Roosevelt in a speech that same evening, “has struck it into the back of its neighbour.” The Italian decision was a profound disappointment to the President. He recalled that more than three months previously Mussolini had pointed with pride to his action in keeping the war from spreading to the Mediterranean. When Italy’s attitude began to change, the President sought to bring pressure upon her to remain at peace. Representations were made on May 1, and again on May 15; and on one or other of these occasions the President offered to communicate Italy’s demands to the Allies, and to ask assurances that Italy would enter the peace conference on an equal footing with the belligerents provided she refrained from entering the war. But Mussolini declared that he could see no basis for negotiation at the present time, and showed no desire to co-operate in the interests of peace. A new effort by the United States on May 31 was once more of no avail.

In his earlier communication Roosevelt had warned the Italian leader “that in the opinion of the government of the United States any extension of hostilities in the region of the Mediterranean might result in the still greater enlargement of the scene of the conflict”. It was an implied warning that the United States, in such an event, might not find it possible to stand aloof. Now that the event had occurred, though the United States was still not prepared for a formal entry into the war, the administration did in fact move to the extreme margin of non-belligerency. “We will pursue”, said the President, “two obvious and simultaneous courses. We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation, and at the same time we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defence.”

There was the pledge that the policy which Roosevelt had long advocated—the policy of aiding the Allies by all “measures short of war”—would be pressed to the full. Five days later, in reply to a

desperate plea from Reynaud, Roosevelt in even more definite terms promised that the nation would redouble its effort, and that so long as the Allies continued to hold out they could count on ever-increasing supplies from the United States. In that last phrase, and in the implications it contained, lay both the fears and the hopes for the future of the Allied cause. But even this assurance was too uncertain to meet the desperate situation. On June 17, with the Maginot Line abandoned and the army in full retreat, France asked for terms of peace.

5

15 JUNE TO AUGUST 1940

THE DOWNFALL OF FRANCE

THE decision of France to abandon her allies and sue for a separate peace was one which had ceased, by June 17, to hold any element of surprise. For some time past, in spite of periodic assertions of the unshakable unity of Britain and France, the probability of such a step had been steadily growing. Indeed, the tone of these pronouncements themselves lent colour to the possibility. Churchill, for example, asserted on May 19: "I have received from the chiefs of the French Republic and in particular from their indomitable Prime Minister M. Reynaud, the most sacred pledges that, whatever happens, they will fight to the end." But the very urgency of this assurance might make it less effective in strengthening confidence than in awakening speculation as to why it was felt to be necessary. And in his speech on June 4, Churchill used a phrase whose significance was soon to be realized: "I have full confidence that . . . we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home and ride out the storm of war and outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone."

But it was one thing to foresee the event; it was another to explain it satisfactorily after it had happened. The search for

explanations tended almost inevitably to develop into a search for scapegoats. The blame was variously laid on the generals, the politicians, the common soldier in the French army, and the French people as a whole.

None of these explanations was completely satisfying in itself. None, however, could be disregarded entirely. Politics undoubtedly made a contribution, if not to the actual defeat, at least to the situation which made defeat possible—though in this matter there was an undue tendency in some quarters to stress the miscalculations of the Left, while ignoring by implication the more sinister or more misguided activities of the Right. To a certain extent, however, the conflicts of French politics did contribute to France's unpreparedness. Ever since 1918, social issues had been growing in acuteness. An increasing impatience with the intransigence of the ruling groups on the part of the masses had been answered by an increasingly stubborn resistance on the part of the possessing classes to any substantial measure of social or economic reform. This growing preoccupation with internal issues had undoubtedly affected the ability of France to adopt a vigorous and decisive course in foreign policy. This was particularly true after 1935, when the implications of the social struggle extended to the international sphere, and Berlin and Moscow came to symbolize the chief menaces or refuges for either side. The result was a semi-paralysis of decision in foreign affairs which helped to prepare the diplomatic—and perhaps also the military—foundation for the ultimate catastrophe.

Then there was the sudden discovery by some observers of a widespread defeatist sentiment among the French people. The discovery was not wholly convincing, but it did perhaps indicate certain relevant features of the national morale. Few would contend that the war was greeted in France with any striking measure of enthusiasm. She went into it, not to repel an imminent invasion, but to check a potential enemy before he became so strong that military resistance to him would be impossible. A Hitler who dominated eastern Europe might well mean a France subjugated without even a

battle. This was the view of those who favoured resistance on the Polish issue. But it was a debatable view, and one which certain groups in France were ready to debate. Doubts about its validity may well have increased popular discouragement when the war began to go badly, and so have aided Hitler's agents and allies within the country in weakening the popular resistance. What made all this difficult to gauge was the lack of any effective leadership for the spirit of resistance at the critical moment. No Gambetta arose to summon the nation to new and heroic efforts; and the slogan *Il faut en finir* which had marked the nation's attitude toward the struggle was an inadequate foundation for a spontaneous effort in the face of such swift and overwhelming defeat.

But when all this was taken into consideration, one central fact remained. That was the military defeat. The French army, so high in prestige when the war began, had been shattered by a superior enemy. Whatever the general situation in France may have contributed to this result, it was still the military debacle which stood most in need of explanation.

The Military Collapse

It could not be explained entirely in terms of the quality of the French soldier. He at least was not responsible for the inferiority in equipment and the faulty disposition of reserves which were so glaringly apparent after May 10. At most it could be said against him that his fighting spirit lacked the desperation which might have risen partially above these deficiencies and given the High Command a little extra time in which to retrieve some of its mistakes. He had been prepared for one kind of war; he found himself fighting a different and appallingly unfamiliar one. He was subjected to an unprecedented concentration of fire-power which made anything he could do in reply seem puny. He found himself fighting for ten days on end against German forces which were renewed every two or three days. Above all, he felt that he was being overwhelmed time after time before he had a chance to come to direct grips with the enemy.

Eventually he began to feel that his own particular detachment was being left alone and unsupported to bear the weight of the assault. When the struggle took on the aspect of a forlorn hope, his morale was in many cases inadequate to sustain it further, and disintegration set in. Yet if this was a common case, there were many exceptions, and instances of the French troops maintaining a gallant and stubborn resistance even after the armistice negotiations had begun. One British commentator, writing in *The Fighting Forces*, paid them generous tribute: "The faults that caused defeat could not be charged against the French soldier. There is no man more attached to his native soil than the peasant of France, no man more truly patriotic . . . The true causes lay in two things—faulty preparation and lack of preparation."

For these faults much of the blame lay at the door of the French High Command. Their faulty preparation was not only material but intellectual. Their rigidity of mind was illustrated by their refusal to admit that the lessons of the Polish campaign had any serious application to the problem of French defence. Their over-confidence in defensive tactics made them underestimate fatally the power which new weapons and methods had given to the attack. Yet while they centred their thinking around the Maginot Line, they failed to develop it consistently. With the problem of the Belgian frontier staring them in the face, they neither provided adequate fixed defences nor evolved an effective counter-stroke to a prospective German invasion. And when the success of the German drive shattered all their postulates, they still clung to the remnants of their obsessions, and allowed essential reserves to be pinned down to the eastern fortifications when the fate of France was at stake along the Meuse and the Somme.

This was one factor in the Allied weakness, not merely in initial defence, but still more gravely in the vital matter of counter-attacks. In the days following the German break-through to the Channel this weakness was only too evident. For several days the Germans held a precarious corridor as narrow as twelve miles. The closing of this gap would have isolated substantial German forces and delayed if not halted their advance through Flanders.

Only one serious attempt was made to achieve this end. It was launched by the British forces on May 22 with only two divisions and without French support. Though it gained some ground in the Arras sector, it was too weak to effect a break-through; and, lacking strength to develop their gains, the British divisions found themselves driving into a trap and were forced to withdraw. A more ambitious though still limited plan was, however, developed just at this time by Weygand. It called for a synchronization of a new thrust in the north, in which two British divisions would again take part, with a drive by the main French army in the south. It was originally timed for May 25, but the need to rest and reform the British divisions brought its postponement to the 26th. That, however, was too late. By that date the German attack on the Belgian army made its collapse imminent, and all available British forces were rushed north to its support. Deprived of the expected British aid, the French dropped their plan, and with the Belgian surrender all chance of reviving it disappeared.

The significance of this episode lay not merely in its revelation of the imperfect co-ordination between the Allied commanders. It showed also the scantiness of the available reserves when for the lack of aid from two British divisions the main French army felt itself unable to launch even a limited counter-attack. Still more alarming was the French inability to regain even local positions of the first importance. This was shown by their failure to recapture the bridgeheads which the Germans had seized along the Somme. When the Battle of France began, these were the avenues for the German mechanized assault; and the tanks launched from these bridgeheads were able to pierce the Weygand line and begin the final disruption of the whole front.

The Battle of France revealed with increasing clarity the French inferiority, not only in equipment, but more surprisingly in numbers. It had been claimed officially that France had mobilized between five and six million men. But even allowing for between twenty and thirty divisions on the Italian frontier, it was difficult to divine where these men could be, and the suspicion grew that these numbers were

largely mythical. At a later date Paul Baudoin, in a statement which contrasted the French and British efforts and which had thus no motive for underrating that of France, gave the mobilization figure as three million. According to Pétain, the French at the height of the final drive could only put sixty divisions in line against one hundred and fifty German divisions. "It is probable," wrote an American engineering officer, "that on June 5 when the blow fell, the combat power of the Germans between Abbeville and Montmedy was twice that of the French. And since the Germans possessed the initiative and superior mobility, this proportion could easily be made four to one at selected spots. The French simply lacked the power to prevent a break-through."

"The objective of the new operative phase," said the German High Command, "was to break through the French northern front, forcing a split-up of the French Army units toward the southwest and southeast and thereafter destroying them." The way was opened when the French were driven from the line of the Somme, and with the crossing of the Seine and the Marne the objective was within reach. The French armies in this area were methodically cut into fragments. Belated efforts to bring reinforcements from the sector behind the Maginot Line were hampered by the disruption of communications, due not only to bombing behind the front, but also to the fact that the advance had cut the most direct railway lines. The attempt to retreat to the Loire broke down when the troops found the roads clogged by streams of refugees and the swift German mechanized advance overran the retiring French. The Loire itself was ineffective as a line of defence, and the retreat allowed the Germans to pour in behind the Maginot Line and aided the success of the frontal attack which pierced the defences at two points. Some of the troops in that area continued to resist to the end, but all hope of a coherent front had disappeared. On June 9 Weygand, with ironic ambiguity, told the army: "This is the last quarter-hour. Hold fast!" But when the last quarter-hour had passed, the main French army was finished as an effective fighting force.

The Political Collapse

When Weygand replaced Gamelin as commander of the Allied forces, he succeeded to a cause which he felt to be already lost. That conviction was strengthened as the military situation went from bad to worse; and by the time the Germans launched their attack on the Somme line, Weygand had reached the firm conclusion that this was the final test, and that if the French were once more obliged to give way, surrender was inevitable.

In this belief he was supported by a growing group within the government. The cabinet crisis of June 5 had resulted in the elimination of the more active advocates of a separate peace. But among the new members introduced to stiffen the spirit of resistance were some, such as Paul Baudoin, who within a few days moved over to the peace party; and others who had been firm in spirit up to that time became convinced that, when Paris was surrendered, no further hope remained. On June 12 the question came to a head when the Cabinet, meeting at Tours, was told by Weygand that the battle was lost and that nothing remained but to ask for an armistice.

There was still considerable resistance to this proposal. Even though it might be admitted that the possibility of continued resistance on the soil of France was almost at an end, there was still the possibility of carrying on the struggle in the colonies. Reynaud had made himself the voice of those who stood for no surrender when—in words already partially falsified—he had written to Roosevelt on the 10th: “We shall fight in front of Paris; we shall fight behind Paris; we shall close ourselves in one of our provinces to fight, and if we should be driven out of it we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight and if necessary in our American possessions.”

To this, however, both Weygand and Pétain, supported by a section of the Cabinet, were firmly opposed. Weygand was apparently obsessed by the increasing disorganization of civil authority and the danger that it might lead to revolution. He was even alleged to have told the Cabinet that Communist riots had broken out in Paris—a report which Mandel immediately scotched by calling up the Chief

of Police in the capital and securing an authoritative denial. But the fear was none the less present; and accompanying it was the hope that, by making peace before all was lost, some remnant of French independence might still be saved. Pierre Lazareff, editor of *Paris-Soir*, credited Pétain with words which, even if apocryphal, undoubtedly expressed the views of the peace party: "Let us immediately ask for an armistice while our fleet and a large part of our army are intact and the Maginot Line still holds. Later we will be at the mercy of the victor. . . . We cannot leave our nation to herself and to the invader. Let us stay on our sacred soil to take care of our people. And before the hour rings when the victor, with nothing to fear, refuses to discuss terms, let us secure from him the assurance that our young men and our towns be spared so that we will still have in our hands the possibility of a renaissance."

But if the future of France was the first consideration, it was not the only one. Britain was France's ally, and France was bound to her by pledges which could not in honour be ignored. On March 28, after a meeting of the Supreme War Council in London, a joint declaration had been issued by the two governments in these words:

The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government . . . mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

They undertake not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security.

Finally, they undertake to maintain after the conclusion of peace a community of action in all spheres for so long as may be necessary to safeguard their security and to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law, and the maintenance of peace in Europe.

The Cabinet, however, decided that Britain must be asked to release France from her engagement; and Reynaud, yielding to the prevailing sentiment, secured an interview with Churchill who, accompanied by Halifax and Beaverbrook, flew to Tours on the 13th.

The British ministers refused at this stage to release France from her pledges, but promised all available help to stem the German advance. (The British air force had in fact been heavily engaged throughout, and all the troops that could be collected in Britain, including a force of Canadians, were being rushed to France). They did, however, agree that Reynaud should make a fresh appeal to the United States, and that in case of an unsatisfactory reply the situation should be examined afresh.


Reynaud's earlier message on June 10 asking "new and ever larger assistance" had been answered by a promise that efforts would be made to hasten and increase the flow of supplies. To Reynaud's "new and final" appeal on June 13 for "clouds of aeroplanes from across the Atlantic", the President could only answer that the government would make every possible effort under present conditions, and he felt impelled to add the warning that this carried no implication of military help, since only Congress had power to make such commitments.

On the 16th, in the light of this reply, France once more appealed to Britain. The response was a startling proposal for the merging of the two empires in order to continue the war in common. A single war cabinet should be set up, the two parliaments should be formally associated, and the Union should appeal to the United States "to fortify the economic resources of the Allies and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause". It was an implicit assurance that the French cause would be fought to the last Englishman. But the peace group in France found in this proposal a cause for alarm rather than for enthusiasm. They felt that France would lose her independence and would sink into subjection to England. Sooner than risk this they preferred to throw themselves on the tender mercies of Nazi Germany.

England was now resigned to the prospect of French defection. Although she made it clear that she herself was determined to continue the struggle, she reluctantly acquiesced in French overtures for an armistice. But the message from the British government to this effect contained one all-important condition. The French fleet

was to be sent to British ports and to remain there during the negotiations.

On the evening of the 16th Churchill was about to start out for a further meeting with Reynaud when news reached him that the



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FRANCE, SHOWING OCCUPIED ZONES

(Dotted line shows point of furthest German advance.)

French ministry had fallen. In the face of growing pressure by the peace party and increasing defections to it, Reynaud had felt impelled to resign. He had apparently never considered an attempt to rally support in parliament or the nation against the advocates of surrender. He may have hoped by his resignation to dissolve the existing ministry and to gain the opportunity of forming a new and

more resolute one. But President Lebrun was now on the side of the peace party. Instead of giving Reynaud a fresh mandate, he turned to Pétain.

The ministry announced by the aged Marshal was composed, not only of the chief members of the peace party, but predominantly of representatives of the Right. The chief figure was Pierre Laval, who had by now emerged as the chief adversary of Reynaud and the real architect of the peace bloc. All hesitations were now at an end. Pétain at once initiated overtures to Germany through the government of his old pupil, General Franco. On June 17 he announced to the French people: "I have applied to our opponent to ask him if he is ready to sign with us, as between soldiers after the fight and in honour, a means to put an end to hostilities."

The Armistice Agreements

To Hitler, Pétain's phraseology must have sounded a trifle old-fashioned. The question of honour was likely to weigh less with him than the practical question of effective ends. He might have to take into account the French feeling for that abstraction sufficiently to avoid imposing terms which would provoke France to fight on rather than to submit. But short of that he would demand the maximum—and on a basis which would open the way for indefinite extensions in the future.

On June 18 Hitler discussed the prospective terms with Mussolini at Munich. The presence of the Duce was a reminder that parties other than France and Germany were concerned. It was not quite clear whether France had intended to go on fighting Italy, or whether—as seemed not improbable—her government had simply overlooked the fact that Italy was a belligerent in view of the modest nature of her belligerency. In any case, France was at once called upon to remedy this oversight; and on June 20, somewhat belatedly, a request for an armistice was forwarded to Rome.

Next day, while the French troops continued to battle the steadily advancing Germans, Hitler and his staff met the French negotiators. The railway car in which Foch had sat was dragged to the spot in the

forest of Compiègne where the armistice of 1918 was signed. In this symbolic setting the representatives of defeated France confronted the victorious Germans. After being treated to a brief historical lecture on Germany's past woes and present innocence, they were handed the German demands with the assurance that Germany did not intend to give the terms "the character of an insult to so brave an opponent". Later discussions secured modifications in certain respects, and on the 22nd the terms were accepted. But even this did not bring an end to hostilities, which were to cease only when satisfactory terms had been arranged with Italy as well. On the 24th France came to terms with Rome; and by this time the German troops stood on a line which ran roughly across France from Lake Geneva to the mouth of the Gironde. At 1:35 A.M. on June 25, a full eight days after their leaders had admitted their cause to be hopeless, the French troops were at last allowed to lay down their arms.

The French government from the beginning of the negotiations had asserted that only an honourable peace would be acceptable. "If the French are obliged to choose between existence and honour," said Baudoin, "their choice is made." This assurance was repeated emphatically during the succeeding days. But as the conclusion of the armistice was delayed, and as the German press and radio continued to point out that a beaten country must surrender unconditionally, the perturbation of the government grew. Renewed resistance was still fleetingly contemplated, but in the minds of the French leaders this was a course of despair, only to be adopted in the last extremity. By the time the armistice terms were communicated to them, they were in a mood to accept with relief almost any provisions which would leave even the form of independence to a French government.

This was about all that was left by the armistice agreements. The concessions to Italy, it is true, were so minor as to be almost an open gesture of contempt by Germany for her junior partner. By a nice irony, Italian territorial gains were limited to the occupation of the few miles of French soil which had been won in a belated drive during

the four days preceding the armistice. There was a gesture toward the security of her frontiers, however, by the creation of demilitarized zones along both her Alpine and her African colonial borders; and full rights were conceded her in the port of Djibuti and along the French section of the Djibuti-Addis Ababa railway.

For the rest, the Italian terms substantially followed those of the German armistice, which left France disarmed and dismembered. Two-thirds of France was to be occupied—at French cost—by German troops. This included not only the chief industrial areas of France, apart from Lyon, but also the whole of the Atlantic coast to the Spanish border. The French army was to be at once demobilized, except for a small force for domestic purposes whose strength would be set by the victor. All forts and military equipment were to be handed over. Air activity even in the unoccupied area was forbidden, and in this area the air fields were to be placed under German and Italian control. All French merchant shipping was to be called home and to remain in French ports until further notice. German prisoners of war were to be released, but French prisoners of war were to remain in German prison camps until the conclusion of peace. France was to surrender on demand all German citizens named by the German government—a peculiarly shameful concession which would throw thousands of refugees into the triumphant arms of the Gestapo. The fleet was to be disarmed in French ports under German and Italian control, with the solemn assurance that these Powers had no intention of using it themselves.

But these terms were only the beginning. Details of their application were left to an armistice commission sitting at Wiesbaden, where the Germans could bring constant pressure on the impotent French delegates. Germany and Italy both reserved the right to cancel the terms if they decided that the French government had failed to fulfil its obligations. And permanent peace terms would wait until the achievement of a complete Axis victory, when a helpless and disrupted France would have dictated to her the particular rôle she was to play in the servile organization of Hitler's New Europe.

These were the terms of which Pétain said: "Honour has been saved. Our government remains free. France will only be governed by Frenchmen."

The Pétain Dictatorship

The Frenchmen who governed from Vichy were however determined that France should be governed on a very different basis from that of the past seventy years. The new régime represented a temporary liquidation of that central issue in French politics—the completion or the destruction of the principles of the Revolution of 1789. The forces of the Right were now resolved to use external defeat in order to secure internal victory. To these men, the Republic with its motto of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity was anathema. They determined to replace freedom by discipline, equality by authority, fraternity by organization modelled on that of their totalitarian conquerors. With the new slogan of Work, Family, Fatherland, they set out to uproot the traditions which had moulded the spirit of France for the past century and a half.

The first step was the scrapping of the existing constitution. On July 9 the French Chambers, with about one-third of their members absent, passed a resolution ceding full powers to the Pétain government. Next day this was ratified by the Chambers sitting together as a National Assembly. On July 11, President Lebrun abandoned his powers to Marshal Pétain as Chief of State. On the same day the transformation was completed by the issuance of three decrees which abrogated the chief provisions of the existing constitution and placed in Pétain's hands full legislative power as well as control of diplomacy, the army, finance, and all civil and military appointments. The decrees foreshadowed the creation of new legislative assemblies but made no provision for them. In the meantime the existing Chambers were to continue legally in existence, but since they were adjourned indefinitely and could meet only at Pétain's discretion, their part in public affairs seemed effectively at an end.

A series of decrees followed whose effect would be a radical transformation of French life. They foreshadowed the creation of a

state whose economy would be predominantly agricultural and would avoid competition with industrial Germany; the suppression of political parties and trade unions; a repressive policy, not only toward Jews and foreigners, but also toward such organizations as the Freemasons; an increased authority to the Church, and new inheritance laws intended to safeguard the peasant basis of agriculture. Even the local divisions—the departments which were created by the Revolution and were the basis of the Napoleonic administration—were abolished in favour of the older provinces. “The government,” said Pétain, “will support with all its power all institutions likely to prevent the corruption of morals and likely to protect real happiness. . . . France must return to her agricultural and peasant character primarily, and her industry must rediscover its traditional quality. It is therefore necessary to put an end to the current economic disorders by rational organization of production and corporative institutions.”

But this flattery of imitation, however sincere, made little impression on Germany. Pétain had hoped that France at peace would retain enough strength to guarantee her independence of policy. Laval, with his dreams of a Latin bloc, had believed that an orientation toward the fascist system would incline Mussolini to protect France against Hitler and to use her as an ally who might help to balance the power of an over-mighty Germany. Both were rudely undeceived. Neither the progress toward a totalitarian dictatorship nor the inauguration of a court to try those leaders who were accused of responsibility for the war served to still the persistent carping of the Nazis. The government was harried by constant pressure for further measures. The resources of occupied France were hampered by the closing of the border of the occupied zone, which not only cut communications and supplies, but left the southern area still burdened with a mass of refugees. The request of the government to be allowed to return to Paris, though based specifically on the armistice terms, was rejected; for although the request might show that Pétain had no expectation of pursuing a policy which would offend the conquerors, the Germans had no desire for a possible rival

authority in the occupied zone. The organization of that zone, and particularly the measures to attach Alsace more closely to the Reich, showed a German determination to keep France divided and to multiply difficulties which would create continued confusion and prevent that renaissance which the French government so fondly envisaged. More and more the Pétain régime seemed to be composed of harried old men, striving to keep some footing amid circumstances which they could neither understand nor control. A faint realization of this seemed to be dawning on Pétain when he complained to a group of journalists on August 20: "We are bound absolutely by the clauses of the armistice. The Germans hold the rope and twist it whenever they consider the accord is not being carried out."*

Britain and the French Fleet

The attitude of Britain toward the terms of the armistice was one of mingled anger and concern. There was a sincere sympathy with France in her desperate plight. But there was also the conviction that in Britain's continued resistance lay the hope, not only of her own survival, but of the restoration of French independence and integrity. It was natural that the terms of her surrender should rouse emotions, not only of "grief and amazement" such as Churchill expressed, but of resentment at a government which had broken its pledges and given into the hands of the enemy the means of striking a serious and perhaps a fatal blow at a former ally.

There was in consequence a hope that, in spite of the Pétain government, French resistance might continue at least in the colonial sphere. This was encouraged by reports from Morocco and Syria and Indo-China which indicated that the military commanders there were determined to fight on, and by the establishment in London of a committee under General de Gaulle which summoned all free Frenchmen to continue the fight at Britain's side. But something of the sort had been foreseen by the Germans, who had introduced into

* One report credited him with a more picturesque phrasing: "France is hamstrung by a frontier from the Atlantic to the Alps. Whenever we do something the occupying authorities dislike they pull on the hamstring."

the armistice terms a clause binding the French government to forbid resistance by any French citizens or any portion of the armed forces. Pressure was now brought on Vichy to quell these incipient revolts. The governor of Indo-China was replaced. Weygand flew to Syria and persuaded the commander, General Mittelhauser, to accept the armistice. Morocco was somehow persuaded to fall in line. The success had still a certain quality of precariousness. At the end of August, following a British pledge of full economic and military support to any area which would join in the common cause, French Equatorial Africa accepted the leadership of de Gaulle, and there were reports of a growing restiveness in New Caledonia and Indo-China. But in the vital Mediterranean area, where the French colonies were so essential a part of the whole defensive scheme, they not only ceased to be assets but in certain cases even became liabilities.

Even the question of what would happen in the French empire, however, important as it was, took second place to the question of what would happen to the French fleet.

The British acquiescence in France's negotiation of a separate peace had been accompanied, when it was communicated to Reynaud, by one vital condition—that the French fleet should be sent to British ports and remain there during the negotiations. When the Pétain government took power, they were at once reminded of this condition. The immediate despatch of the French navy was not secured, in spite of direct pressure by several British ministers who established contact with the French leaders; but repeated assurances, including a personal promise by Admiral Darlan, were given that the fleet would not be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy.

The actual terms of the armistice could hardly be regarded as an adequate fulfilment of that assurance. It was true that they contained a promise that the ships would not actually be used by Germany and Italy. But the world had come to know only too well the value of such promises; and it was inconceivable that, with a weapon against British naval ascendancy lying within reach, the Axis should not seize and use it. Even if, with unaccustomed delicacy, they sought to keep

within the forms of legality, the release clause in the armistice made it possible for them to repudiate this as well as other clauses on the pretext that France had failed to keep the letter of the agreement, and in such a case France could do nothing but submit. The armistice was a mere paper guarantee which offered no security whatever.

As in the case of the French colonies, there was at first some hope that the French fleet would refuse to submit. But once again the authority of the Pétain government, possibly backed by German threats of personal reprisals, checked whatever impulses the French sailors may have felt to defy the armistice. It was clear that, so far as the decision lay with them, they would not only refuse to continue the fight, but would submit to seeing their ships placed at the disposal of Germany.

It was of the utmost importance to prevent such an outcome. As matters stood, even if the French fleet were immobilized, Britain would retain a margin of superiority at sea. But if the French fleet went over, that margin would completely disappear. The Axis would then have 19 capital ships against Britain's 14, 46 cruisers against Britain's 60, and about 250 destroyers against Britain's 182. The margin of superiority in submarines which the Axis already enjoyed would be increased to a ratio of three to one.

The French fleet, apart from a few units in American waters, was grouped at the beginning of July in three main divisions. A portion of the fleet, blocked from entering French ports, was in British harbours, chiefly Portsmouth and Plymouth. This included the battleships *Paris* and *Courbet*, two light cruisers, some submarines—including the *Surcouf*, the world's largest—and some two hundred smaller craft. At Alexandria, in company with a British squadron, lay the battleship *Lorraine* and four cruisers as well as lesser vessels. In other African ports, and principally at the new base of Mers-el-Kebir near Oran, lay the two new and powerful battle cruisers *Strasbourg* and *Dunkerque*, as well as the battleships *Bretagne* and *Provence* together with several light cruisers and destroyers. Over the first two groups Britain might hope to exercise some measure of

control; but it was essential that the disposition of the ships in Algerian waters should be settled definitely and at once.

Early in the morning on July 3 the ships in British waters were boarded by strong British detachments which met with no resistance, except briefly on the *Surcouf* where a misunderstanding caused a sharp clash resulting in two deaths. On the same morning a British squadron appeared off Oran and an ultimatum was presented to the commander, Admiral Gensoul. By this he was required to act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:

A. Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the Germans and Italians.

B. Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews will be repatriated at the earliest possible moment.

C. If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.

Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships are not to be used against the Germans or Italians unless they break the armistice conditions, then sail them with us with reduced crews to the West Indies—Martinique, for instance, where they can be demilitarized to our satisfaction, or perhaps entrusted to the United States to remain over until the end of the war, the crews being liberated.

If you refuse these fair offers I must with profound regret require you to sink your ships within six hours. Failing the above, I have the orders of His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships falling into German or Italian hands.

The French Admiral was thus offered at least five possible courses of action, two of which carried the assurance that his ships would be kept out of the hands of any belligerent, including Britain. He rejected them all. Negotiations throughout the day failed to change his decision. He announced his intention of fighting, and during the parley the French ships were engaged in preparing for action. Eight and a half hours after the proposals had been presented, the British

commander, under orders from the Admiralty to complete his mission before dark, reluctantly broke off discussions and opened fire on the French ships.

The French ships replied to the best of their ability. But though they had got steam up during the period of delay, they were in an unfavourable position against the British ships, particularly since British aircraft had sown mines across the entrance to the harbour. In spite of this, the *Strasbourg*, together with some smaller craft, managed to dash past the British forces and escape to Toulon. She was pursued by aircraft and hit by at least one torpedo, but in spite of this damage she made good her flight. The remaining battleships were less fortunate. In a sharp engagement lasting ten minutes, the *Bretagne* was sunk, the *Provence* was set on fire, and the *Dunkerque* was heavily damaged and driven ashore. A major portion of the French fleet was effectively disabled or destroyed.

During the next few days other steps were taken to make success still more certain. A bombing attack was launched against the crippled *Dunkerque* to make quite sure that she was out of action. The new battleship *Richelieu*, which was almost ready for service, and which lay in the West African harbour of Dakar, was put out of action on July 8. The French squadron at Alexandria agreed to the surrender and demobilization of its ships. The incompleted *Jean Bart* was at Casablanca and was unmolested, since it was certain to be useless to the enemy for some time to come. By July 8, no French capital ship remained undamaged and at large.

The tragic irony of these proceedings, coming within a month of French naval co-operation in the Dunkirk evacuation, needed no emphasis. Their probable effect on the relations of the former Allies was equally clear. Already the Pétain government had shown considerable irritation over the British attitude toward the armistice and had even sought to lay the blame for the French collapse on the inadequacy of British aid. With the battle of Oran this growing strain reached the breaking point, and formal relations between the two countries were severed. Such British actions as the application

of the blockade, to France, the requisitioning of French merchant ships, and the bombing of French ports and air bases in the occupied zone, added further to this resentment. From alliance the two countries were moving rapidly toward open antagonism if not actual armed hostility.

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

"What has happened in France," said Churchill on June 17, "makes no difference to British faith and purpose. We have become the sole champions now in arms to defend the world cause. We shall do our best to be worthy of that high honour."

Britain was in fact the last remaining obstacle to the complete triumph of Hitler. There were no longer any Allies against him in any but a technical sense. It was true that refugee governments existed and claimed to be the legitimate rulers of the conquered countries. The sovereigns of Norway and the Netherlands had found refuge on British soil. A Czech National Committee under Dr. Benes had been formed in London, and received British recognition as a Provisional Government on July 21. A Polish government in exile had maintained its existence after the fall of Poland, and Polish armed forces had continued to fight by the side of the Allies. After the armistice the Polish government and troops removed themselves to British territory, and on August 5 a military agreement defined the basis of their co-operation with the British forces. A similar agreement was reached on August 7 with the French committee under General Charles de Gaulle, accompanied by the assurance of Britain's determination to restore the independence of France when victory had been gained.

But however useful these might be as fragments saved from the disaster, the fact remained that not one of these governments exercised any effective jurisdiction over a single foot of European soil. In the colonial sphere matters were slightly different. The continued authority of the Netherlands government over the Netherlands East Indies was by no means a negligible asset. The prospect of renewed

resistance in the French colonies was welcomed and encouraged. But any serious hope for the defeat of Germany rested for the moment on Britain, and on Britain alone.

The immediate problem was to erect an effective bulwark against the advancing sweep of Nazi conquest. Ultimately the means and resources must be found which would enable Britain to pass to the offensive. But for the moment the downfall of France removed any prospect of seizing the initiative, and forced Britain to adopt a defensive policy against the imminent prospect of invasion.

This possibility, which had already loomed large with the German conquest of the Low Countries, came still closer with the surrender of France. The armistice terms, added to previous territorial gains, put Germany in possession of the whole European coastline from Finland to Spain. Not since Napoleon had Britain been faced with such a situation, and the Channel was no longer the absolute barrier that it proved to be in 1805. The submarine, the aeroplane, and the motor torpedo boat all afforded new striking weapons against protecting British sea power and new methods of covering the swift transport of a landing force. Troops dropped by parachute or carried by transport planes might hope to gain a foothold and establish bridgeheads as points of entry for the larger invasion by sea. Three thousand miles of coastline gave the enemy a wealth of sea and air bases in which to collect the necessary forces and from which to launch diversified attacks which might mask the real direction of his main effort. A successful landing on British soil was no longer completely outside the realm of possibility.

It was certain, however, to meet with formidable obstacles. Whatever modifications might have been introduced by new weapons, the fact remained that the British navy was still supreme on the sea. The British air force had convincingly demonstrated its defensive power during the evacuation of Dunkirk. The British troops who had been saved by that brilliant feat had suffered only comparatively minor losses during the subsequent period; and they had gained not only a first-hand experience of the new methods of warfare, but a conviction of their own superior fighting quality when they met the

enemy on anything like equal terms. An invader would encounter neither untrained levies nor an army sapped in its morale, but—perhaps for the first time—a body of seasoned troops whose fighting spirit had been increased rather than diminished by past experiences.

In leadership and organization as well the defenders had an opportunity to profit, not only by a knowledge of German methods, but by the lesson of French mistakes. Total war called for the organization and direction of the whole national effort. But in France the unpreparedness of the civilian authorities and population had contributed to the confusion of the military situation. Military movements were hampered by the refugees who clogged the roads. Civil disorganization enabled enemy agents to create further confusion by the spread of false rumours and the issuance of false orders. The lack of a prescribed rôle for the ordinary civilian in case of a military emergency had played its part in the ultimate debacle.

To avoid a repetition of these difficulties in England, a number of steps were taken to instruct and organize the civilian population. The principle of local responsibility, adopted as the basis of Air Raid Precautions, was extended more generally. Defence areas were created in which responsibility would be fully in the hands of designated persons in case the area should be isolated. Instructions were issued on the methods for dealing with parachute troops and for blocking roads against tanks and landing fields against aeroplanes. A force of Local Defence Volunteers, composed of men not fitted or not yet required for army service, was raised and armed for the specific purpose of dealing with such efforts to create confusion behind the lines as had been so successful in the Low Countries. Alternative routes of transport and communication were worked out, while at the same time the principle of decentralization was expected to enable each locality to carry on even if communications were cut.

At the same time the military defences were transformed. The coast of Britain bristled with gun emplacements designed to bring a withering cross-fire to bear on possible landing places. Beaches were protected by barbed wire and other obstacles. A network of defences, carefully camouflaged, extended inland, and behind them stood two

million men in arms. The more important areas were completely evacuated by civilians, and special defence areas were created which eventually embraced a strip of twenty miles along the bulk of the coast as well as several inland regions. On August 19 a precautionary order declared the whole of Britain a defence area—a step which made it possible for the Minister of Home Security to vest almost complete dictatorial powers in the hands of thirteen regional commissioners. Parliament had previously wrung from the government the right of appeal against summary sentences by such special courts as might be set up; but apart from this safeguard the fate of every civilian would, during an emergency, be at the mercy of the local dictator.

Along with these steps went a new intensity of effort to supply the equipment in which the armed forces were still seriously deficient. There was still a reluctance to adopt totalitarian methods of economic organization; but in spite of criticism, a new vigour was evident in war production. And while Britain roused herself to greater efforts, she found herself backed by new efforts on the part of the Dominions. Canada, which planned a corps of two complete divisions and embarked on a speed-up of air training, also quickened the tempo of her production of supplies and eliminated some of the obstacles by adopting a closer co-ordination with American war industry. Troops from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa arrived in England, and the South African air force participated in the defence of Kenya. And behind the Empire stood the resources of American industry, now urged on to greater productivity by a more lavish flow of war orders from Britain and by the co-operative policy of the Roosevelt administration. So long as Britain could keep the seas open, she seemed assured of ever increasing resources in men and materials.

There was, however, one significant exception to this unity of effort. Alone among members of the Commonwealth, Eire had declared her neutrality on the outbreak of war. This neutrality, in spite of successive unhappy examples of the fate of weak neutrals, she was determined to preserve; and the possibility that Ireland might become a stepping stone for a German invasion became a major consideration in Britain's defensive plans. Negotiations were initiated

between London, Dublin, and Belfast in the hope of finding a formula which would reconcile British security with Irish political necessities. But Eire's insistence on the abolition of Irish partition was a stumbling block, and the most that could be gained was the right of Britain to send aid once an invasion had actually taken place. Precautionary measures, such as the stationing of troops on the border of Ulster and the mining both of the Irish Sea and the passage between the Orkneys and Iceland, were the most that could be taken. Eire, for all her lack of desire to share the fate of Holland, still appeared determined to fight the first comer.

The Peace "Offer" and the Budget

There had been rumours that the Germans were using Eire as an intermediary to sound out Britain on the question of peace—rumours which were countered, on the German side, by reports that Sir Samuel Hoare was acting as the agent of a peace party in Britain and making overtures to the Axis. The latter report may have covered efforts by the Germans themselves to sound out the possibility of peace talks. In any case, the idea that Germany would not be averse to negotiations received a measure of confirmation from Hitler himself in his speech to the Reichstag on July 19.

But although the speech mentioned peace, it hardly suggested a practical basis for its conclusion. The brief, almost scornful passage in which Hitler stated his conviction that "I can see no reason why this war must go on", was less an offer of negotiation than a demand for surrender. The Fuehrer alternated his usual diatribes against his adversaries, and particularly the British leaders, with proud boasts of Germany's strength and invincibility. His "last appeal to reason" made no effort to show Britain what she would gain by peace; it merely threatened her with complete annihilation if she continued the war.

The official reply was contained in Lord Halifax's broadcast of July 22, which exposed the impossibility of any lasting peace with Hitler. An unofficial answer was the launching of a widespread series of air raids on German objectives. But the real response of Britain

was implicit in the budget which Sir Kingsley Wood presented to the House of Commons on July 23.

This was the third budget presented to the nation since the war began. Each of the previous ones had called for increased and unprecedented sacrifices on the part of the taxpayer. The present budget carried those demands still further. It provided for an expenditure of £3,467 million—about seventy per cent. of the normal national income. In order to provide three-fifths of this from taxation, the basic income tax was raised to eight shillings and sixpence in the pound; the surtax and estate duties were increased; duties were raised on such amenities as tobacco, wines, beer and entertainments; and a new purchase tax, designed to fall with especial weight on luxury commodities, was added to these burdens. The provisions left no doubt that Britons faced a more Spartan level of existence than they had heretofore enjoyed. But criticism was directed, not at the severity of the levies, but at their moderation, and particularly at the fact that a deficit of £2,200 million was left to be covered by loans. The public reaction testified to the willingness of the British people, not merely to continue the war, but to make the utmost effort to pay for it as they went.

Air Power and the Blockade

If in the face of this stubborn British attitude the Nazis decided to deliver a knockout blow against their one remaining enemy, they were confronted with one preliminary and essential task. That was the gaining of undisputed command in the air. It was necessary not only to protect the actual landing of troops, but even more to make it possible to land them at all. Britain's command of the sea could not be seriously disputed by any naval means at the disposal of the Axis. Only by air supremacy could they hope to challenge British sea power, even temporarily, and thus make possible the passage of an invading force in defiance of the British fleet.

The preliminary phase began on June 18 with the inauguration of daily air raids on England. They were not, for the moment, on any large scale. In many cases they appeared to be designed to test out

the British defences, to discover vulnerable objectives such as airfields and industrial plants, and to give their pilots some familiarity with an area hitherto strange to them. These were generally night attacks. The German command was organizing its bases on the coast of France—including the Channel Islands, which had been evacuated by the British as untenable at the end of June—and until this process was completed they were hardly ready for raids in force.

At the beginning of July new tactics were adopted. These were marked by daylight raids in increasing strength. The establishment of new bases permitted daylight operations by bringing the fliers close to their objectives and so making it possible for fighters to accompany the bombers. At the same time objectives as well as methods showed a change. Although bombs were dropped on both airports and industrial plants, these were no longer the main targets. The greatest violence was now directed against British ports and shipping.

This suggested that for the moment the Nazi objective was less the destruction of British air power than the strengthening of the blockade. The efforts of the belligerents to strangle each other economically, which had been overshadowed by more dramatic military developments, had continued without relaxation; and now that the clash of arms was once more limited, the economic struggle emerged once more as a major factor in the conflict.

The sweep of German conquest had seriously increased the problem of Britain's maintenance of the blockade. It gave Germany greater assets, and the fall of France seriously decreased the blockading forces. Where Britain had hitherto counted on the help of the French navy, the burden now fell on her alone, increased by the fact that Italy was an active belligerent instead of a malevolent neutral. The loss, however, was not unqualified. The British fleet, which had been joined by naval units from other conquered countries, now took over such French warships as had entered British ports before the Armistice, and manned some of them with the French seamen who were willing to continue to serve. The weakening of German seapower as the result of the invasion of Norway lightened

one part of the task of the British fleet and left it less exposed to dangers in home waters. No capital ship was sunk or even seriously damaged between June 15 and September 1. The lighter vessels, however, on whom fell the bulk of the duty of convoy, did not fare so well. Britain, it was true, admitted the loss of only thirty destroyers since the beginning of the war, and the loss was more than taken care of by new construction. But part of her destroyer force was needed in the Mediterranean, and the figures were silent on the number which had been damaged and laid up for repairs. There was a process of attrition which, without threatening to be fatal, made the acquisition of fifty over-age destroyers from the United States in September very welcome indeed.

In spite of these disadvantages, there were indications that the blockade was losing none of its effectiveness. The very fact that there were fewer neutral susceptibilities to consider was something of an asset. The blockade was applied to occupied France after the armistice. The unoccupied area, as well as Spain, was subject to rationing at British discretion. An extension of the navicert system at the end of July imposed even stricter control. The protests of the Germans, and particularly their appeals to humanitarian sentiments, were loud and long. They pointed to the prospect of crop failures in certain parts of Europe, and insisted that the blockade would mean general starvation. But experts estimated that, though there might be a certain food stringency, starvation would only result from the maldistribution consequent on the wholesale Nazi looting of food supplies from the conquered countries; and the British authorities contrasted this claim of imminent famine with such assertions as that of Dr. Funk: "England's present position is catastrophic, particularly as regards her food supplies, whereas the German food supplies are absolutely assured." Churchill on August 20 reaffirmed the British determination not to relax the blockade on Germany or the countries within her power. What he did promise, however, was immediate aid to any territory which genuinely regained its freedom. "Let Hitler bear his responsibility to the full," he said, "and let the peoples of

Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the day when it will be broken." It was hardly a proposal likely to mollify the German leaders.

This stranglehold by sea was powerfully supplemented by the activities of the British air force. British bombers had not waited for raids on England to start dropping bombs on Germany. From the day of the invasion of the Lowlands they had launched attacks on German communications and concentration points; and their objectives were steadily extended until they reached Berlin itself. They did not spare the occupied lands, and the ports and air centres in occupied France, as well as in the Low Countries and Scandinavia, suffered devastating attacks. Many of these were objectives which were within range of fighter escorts and which could be raided in daylight. German territory was more remote and was raided chiefly at night—a method which might make for less accurate bombing but which involved smaller losses than daylight raids. The British raiders were at a comparative disadvantage, for while a raid on England could hit almost without warning, a raid on a German objective involved a longer flight over territory in possession of the enemy. There were substantial ground defences, and the British fliers paid tribute to the concentration of German fire and the accuracy of their shooting. But the British pilots had undergone, as a rule, a more intensive training than their German counterparts, and had benefitted from the experience of the leaflet raids early in the war. They pushed home their raids with a daring and tenacity which, in the opinion of impartial observers, made their work far more effective than that of the German fliers.

Their objectives were to a large extent economic in nature. They aided the defence of Britain by hitting at Nazi air bases. They struck at ports which might be submarine bases or troop concentration ports for invasion. But their widest objective was to damage the Nazi war potential by striking at the sources of production and the routes of supply. Oil depots, aircraft and munition factories, synthetic oil plants and refineries, were the objectives mentioned night after night.

Ports and railway junctions came in for almost equal attention. The canal systems of western Germany and the Netherlands were rendered hazardous if not actually unusable, and the destruction of the great viaduct in the Dortmund-Ems canal ruined a particularly active freight route. The concentrated industrial area of the Ruhr and the busy ports and manufacturing centres of northwest Germany became accustomed to raids of increasing intensity; and estimates of the number of British planes engaged rose, by the end of August, as high as eight hundred a night. Even this could not completely cripple the German productive system, but it was expected to contribute to that long process of attrition of which the blockade was the backbone.

The Germans on their side smashed at both ports and shipping. The port of Southampton and the naval base of Portsmouth were the objects of particularly savage raids, but the successive attacks reached objectives from eastern Scotland all the way round to the Bristol Channel. The Straits of Dover saw raids of increasing intensity as the Nazis sought to deny their use to British shipping. When the effectiveness of air attack on ships themselves was limited by armed convoys and by the use of balloon barrages which were towed behind the ships, the Germans supplemented it by the use of motor torpedo boats, and ultimately by long range shelling. Gun emplacements, probably supplemented by railway mountings, had been constructed in multiple lines from Boulogne to Dunkirk so that a barrage could be laid to command the Channel along a stretch of between fifty and seventy miles. On August 22 a few of the guns of long-range calibre opened up on a passing convoy, though without sinking any of the ships, and followed this next day by a bombardment of Dover. British guns replied and British bombers sought out the emplacements, and this form of attack was abandoned for the moment, with no clear indication of what purpose had been served by undertaking it on so limited a scale.

The effect of these varied activities on British shipping seemed hardly proportionate to their intensity. There was a marked rise in shipping losses toward the end of June and the first part of July, reaching a figure of 114,137 tons lost in the week ending July 7. But

from that date there was a steady though moderate decline to the figure of 52,899 tons for the week ending August 18. In the whole first year of the war the total British loss was given as just under two million tons, with Allied and neutral losses slightly less.* But the British loss had been replaced by new construction or by seizures, and not more than two or three per cent. of the shipping moving in and out of British ports was destroyed by enemy attack. Convoys continued to use the Channel, and British ports, including the port of London, continued to function. If the Nazi objective was to cut Britain off from the outside world, it was still a long way from being attained.

By the end of July the raids were increasing in intensity, both as to numbers of planes engaged and as to the length of time the attacks were sustained. But the numbers were still comparatively small, and even the losses sustained by the raiders (which Britain estimated at 307 in July) could hardly be called severe. A German official asserted at the end of the month that fully half the Nazi fliers had not yet seen action. If that was so, the situation was considerably modified during the next few weeks.

On August 8 there began a series of mass daylight raids which lasted, with a few intermissions, for the next two weeks. The number of raiders, starting in the hundreds, rose ultimately to well over a thousand. The attacks were in many cases still directed against ports and shipping. But much of the increased energy burst upon Britain's air defences in an effort to wreck the airports and destroy the defending planes.

British air power answered blow for blow. Not only were raids on Germany intensified and extended; they reached out in a 1600-mile range to northern Italy as well. The defending fighters took a mounting toll from the German attackers, amounting on the average to more than 15 per cent. In spite of the severity of the assault, it was clear that the Royal Air Force had been anything but immobilized.

* This was a preliminary estimate by the Ministry of Shipping. Figures issued by the Admiralty on September 10—British losses 1,539,196 tons, Allied 462,924, neutral 769,213—represented a more optimistic minimum.

The situation once more called for a change of tactics. The Germans appeared to be counting on their superior numbers (which, however, they were far from using to the full) to beat down the British air force. But the natural advantage of the defensive combined with the superior quality of British flying had shown that this at least could not be achieved by mass daylight raids. The result was their abandonment in favour of night raids over widely dispersed targets. This was a form of flying in which the Germans were less experienced than in daylight flights, and the accuracy of both their bombing and their navigation would inevitably be reduced. (The dropping of bombs on Eire on August 26 suggested inexperienced pilots who were off their course.) But the bombers, even without a fighter escort, would sustain fewer losses, for neither side had evolved a satisfactory answer to night attacks; and the dispersed nature of the raids, which hit at twenty different places on August 28, might allow the Germans to engage the full strength of the defenders and wear them down by constant pressure of numbers.

The objectives were also widespread. Aerodromes and aeroplane factories occupied a prominent place, but other industrial establishments, as well as ports and railway centres, were also targets. Particular attention was paid, not only to the port of London, but to the air defences and the network of communications which surrounded it. For the first time the metropolis, which had expected to be a target immediately on the outbreak of war, experienced a persistent series of attacks which, once started, showed no signs of abating.

The effectiveness of these methods after a fortnight's continuance was still hard to estimate. The admitted damage was probably fairly extensive in certain localities. But it did not appear that the basic resources of England's war effort were at all seriously impaired, or that the damage done to her air defences was ever more than purely temporary. Nor were there any signs of a serious weakening of British morale. If German air power was to prepare the way effectively for invasion, it seemed that it had still the major part of its task ahead.

There were grounds, however, for the repeated warnings by British leaders against too great optimism. Germany was still far from the peak of her air effort. Germany, with four or five thousand first line planes and several times that many in reserve, had as yet used only a fraction of her strength in any single raid. Germany's estimated loss of 1335 planes over Britain—the bulk of them during August—might be three or four times that of Britain, but it was still less than Germany's production during a single month. And while Britain now claimed a production rate equal to if not superior to that of Germany, it would be some time before she would reach anything approaching numerical equality. For the moment, however, she was encouraged by the knowledge that the superior quality of her machines and her pilots had proved adequate to the occasion, and that—even more important than the loss of machines—the loss of pilots by the invaders was draining Germany's trained personnel. For the future, she must look first of all to the approaching equinoctial tides as a possible danger period. But if Hitler failed to seize that season to launch his invasion, he would find himself in the uncertain period of autumn gales and mists—those days of unstable weather ranging from watery sunshine to fog and hail which the English weatherman, with invincible optimism, used to describe as “mostly fair”.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS

The entry of Italy into the war swung the numerical odds heavily against the Allies. Her seventy divisions gave her an estimated strength of a million and a half troops, of whom perhaps a million were first line. Her air force included between two and three thousand first line planes with an equal number in reserve. The quality of these forces might be open to some question in view of recent performances. Italian planes, although good on the whole, did not appear to be up to the standard of the latest types in Britain and Germany. The army was somewhat spotty in both training and equipment. But the seven divisions of Alpine troops were generally rated as excellent; there were three armoured and three motorized divisions which had

recently been organized with German aid, although possibly they still fell short of the German standard; and several "swift" divisions combining cavalry with motorized troops were a unique and potentially valuable feature of Italian army organization.

At the same time, some doubts remained about the army's fighting quality, and these doubts extended to the strength of Italy's war potential. She was a country seriously deficient in the resources necessary for a prolonged struggle. Practically all her essential war materials came from abroad, and the bulk of them would now be at the mercy of the blockade. Cotton, rubber, almost all essential minerals, came from overseas. The domestic food supply was none too adequate, and rationing had begun even before Italy entered the war. Finances had been strained by adventures in Ethiopia and Spain, and the annual budget, as outlined in May, envisaged a deficit of over a billion dollars. Italy's dependence on foreign coal had been vividly illustrated by her dispute with Britain in March, and her lack of a domestic oil supply was even more serious. Some of these deficiencies, such as coal, might possibly be supplied from Germany. The lesson of League sanctions during the Ethiopian crisis had led Italy to attempt the creation of a domestic oil reserve and the development of Albanian oil deposits. The slackness of the Allied blockade in the hope of weaning Italy from the Axis had allowed her to build up reserves of other commodities. But even with this margin, it seemed probable that Italy would find her resources inadequate to anything but a short and successful war.

There were, however, few signs at the outset that Italy herself was ready to launch a *blitzkrieg* on the German model. Her leaders had boasted of the contribution she had already made to German success by keeping half a million Allied troops immobilized during her precarious non-belligerency. It almost seemed that her rôle as a belligerent would be little different. For all her previous clamours for Nice and Savoy, she was in no hurry to seize them. It was only on June 21, after France had actually requested an armistice and the end of her resistance was assured, that Italy launched a cautious drive across the Alps. Even then her progress in four days of fighting failed

to gain Nice, and the occupation of the coveted territories was denied her by the terms of the armistice. She might still hope to gain them at the final peace; but in the meantime her European activities did little to add to her warlike reputation.

But Italy also had colonial ambitions, and the prospect of satisfying them might well seem brighter after the collapse of France. So long as the Allies stood together, Italy's possessions in north Africa were in a precarious position. Libya lay between the French forces in Tunis and the British in Egypt. Eritrea and Ethiopia were cut off from the homeland by British command of the Suez Canal and surrounded on three sides by hostile territory. And if Turkey should join with the Allies, Italy's hold on the Dodecanese might be anything but secure.

The defection of France transformed the whole situation. The Allied defences in this area were anchored at the two points of Tunis and Syria. When the French commanders in those areas decided to abide by the armistice terms, the strategic position was vitally changed. The French forces in Syria (which Baudoin placed at 60,000 men, but which at their peak were possibly double that figure) represented fully half the strength of the Allied army in the Near East. Their withdrawal left a serious gap between Turkey and the British forces in Palestine which weakened the backing on which the Turks had counted and contributed to their decision to remain neutral. The removal of any threat from Tunis, with its naval base at Bizerta and its fortified border backed by at least 50,000 French troops, allowed Italy to disregard what would otherwise have been a major threat to Libya. The eventual surrender of French Somaliland, profoundly changed the situation in east Africa. Italy's colonies, which had hitherto lain between two fires, were now in exactly the reverse position. It was Egypt and the Sudan that now felt the pinch of Italian forces planted on either side, and numbering half a million men.

For the time being the operations amounted to little more than skirmishing. Air forces on both sides at once became active in attacking each other's bases. The Italians from Eritrea raided not

only the adjacent British colonies, but also the important naval and air base at Aden. British fliers attacked bases and supply depots in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Alexandria was subject to frequent attacks. Border posts such as Sollum and Merseh Matruh received frequent attention, and Italian raiders struck tentatively at Haifa and Port Said. The British retaliated by pounding at Libyan coastal bases, particularly Tobruk, which was a main concentration point for any projected invasion. Both ground forces conducted border raids, and the British light tank patrol proved especially effective in carrying out harassing operations across the desert areas along the frontier.

As the offensive tactics of the Italians became bolder and more definite, the nature of their objective became clear. For the moment the preparations needed to cross the three hundred miles of desert bordering Libya, and the rainy season in parts of the Sudan, delayed a concerted drive on the Nile valley. There was every reason to expect, however, that ultimately a co-ordinated attack would be launched from Libya and Ethiopia. In the meantime the Italians were engaged in mopping up British advance posts which might embarrass them in the rear, and in seizing border positions as jumping-off places for eventual attack.

In this latter activity they had little success on the Libyan border. They recovered Fort Capuzzo, which the British had seized in the opening days of the campaign, but the garrison found itself in a distinctly uncomfortable position, particularly after the British succeeded in cutting their water supply. In the Sudan, however, the Italians seized the important trading and communications centres of Kassala and Galabat, which might prove useful bases for an attack toward Khartoum and the junction of the White and Blue Niles. On the border of Kenya they succeeded after three weeks' attack in capturing the fortified post of Moyale, and followed this by cutting off the Dolo salient, thus materially shortening their frontier in this region and removing a useful base for British raids.


Their most striking success, however, was the capture of British Somaliland. The French surrender of Djibuti had left that colony in

a somewhat orphaned position. It possessed the two small ports of Zeila and Berbera and a coastline which bordered the entrance to the Red Sea. It had thus a certain strategic significance; but Italian possession of Eritrea and Djibuti already gave them more important bases against Aden and the Red Sea route which would be only slightly strengthened by further acquisitions. Economically the colony was of negligible importance, and surrounded as it was by Italian territory it was only defensible at considerable cost against a determined drive. Its advantage as a base for possible diversions against the Italian forces was limited, but the possibility was sufficient inducement for Italy to undertake its reduction. When a triple attack on the colony was launched on August 4, the British had already decided to put up what resistance they could with the forces on the spot but to make no serious effort at reinforcement. Against two Italian divisions, equipped with artillery and tanks, a British force of 7,000 could at best put up a delaying action. On August 19 the British troops were withdrawn under the guns of British warships and Italy was left in possession of the colony.

This was a success which, if not a major one, was at least not to be minimized. But it still left the Italians delaying their stroke against their main objectives of Egypt and Suez; and behind that delay lay their failure to destroy the British naval position in the Mediterranean.

Naval Operations

One of the things upon which Italian spokesmen had been particularly insistent was their ability to gain control of the Mediterranean. British ascendancy had hitherto been based on the three key points of Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria. These, according to the Italians, would be made untenable by the new weapons and methods of sea warfare. Their new fortified base at Pantelleria would block the passage between Sicily and North Africa and isolate the British forces in the Levant. Malta, only fifty miles from Sicily, seemed to lie at the mercy of bombing planes. Alexandria was within reach of the Italian bases in the Dodecanese. Even



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EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Gibraltar was within flying distance of Sardinia. As for the waters of the Mediterranean, Italian submarines beneath and Italian bombers above would ultimately deny their use to British surface ships, and the phrase *Mare Nostrum*—that myth to which Italian jingoes clung so tenaciously—might at last become a reality.

These calculations were not to be dismissed too lightly. If the French fleet, based particularly on Toulon and Bizerta, had remained in action, the Italian prospects would have remained slim. But when the whole burden of operations in the Mediterranean fell on the shoulders of Britain, it was bound to impose a real strain on her naval resources. She could no longer concentrate the bulk of her battle fleet in home waters without serious risk to her Mediterranean position. In the Mediterranean itself the necessary division of her forces into two squadrons, with the stronger one at Alexandria, meant a risk of a superior Italian concentration against each in turn. The two squadrons together were probably slightly superior to the Italian navy in capital ships, of which Italy had five in action and another recently completed. But in smaller craft, and particularly in destroyers and submarines, Italian numbers were far greater than Britain could hope to match.

This balance of forces helped to determine Italy's tactics. She never expected to stand up to the British fleet in a major naval engagement. The enthusiasm with which Italian merchant ships proceeded to scuttle themselves on the outbreak of war showed how little their nation expected to gain immediate command of the sea. Italy counted rather on hit-and-run tactics and upon a process of attrition. Her light fast ships, in which protection was sacrificed to speed, were designed to prey upon commerce and to swoop upon inferior forces, but to escape before the British battleships came within range. For the final stroke against these battleships the Italians depended not so much on their own capital ships as on the submarine and, above all, on the aeroplane. In their eyes the bomber was the answer to British sea power. The Mediterranean theatre was to be the real testing ground of the question of bomber versus battleship, and Italy's whole future prospect depended on a favourable answer.

That answer was not forthcoming up to the beginning of September. Far from being driven from the Mediterranean, the British fleet was becoming steadily bolder in its operations there. It was still operating from its bases in spite of the Italian air force. Even Malta, which was subject to determined and continual bombing from the first day of the war, continued to act as at least a depot for warships and convoys. British merchant ships continued to traverse the Mediterranean under naval protection at the same time as the British fleet was imposing obstacles to Italy's communications with Libya. At the beginning of September it was revealed that the British squadron in the Levant had been reinforced, without molestation, by modern ships which nearly doubled its strength—an indication that the new battleships of the *King George V* class were now in service. And in the few brushes which had taken place in the interval, the initiative and the advantage clearly rested with the British.

The first important clash took place on July 9 in waters over which Italy had claimed complete ascendancy. A British squadron, engaged in convoying supply ships from Malta to Alexandria, sighted an Italian naval force south of Crete. This force, consisting of two battleships, a considerable number of cruisers, and some twenty-five destroyers, at once retired, and the British ships took up a chase which carried them into the central Mediterranean and only ended when the Italian ships came under the protection of their own shore batteries. One of the Italian battleships was hit at long-range and a cruiser was damaged by an aerial torpedo. The British ships, which returned to the work of convoy, were subjected to strong air attacks during the next two days; but although the Italians described the bombing as "unmerciful" and insisted that it had driven the British ships in flight to Alexandria, the British claimed that no hits had been scored on any of the ships. At the same time the Gibraltar squadron carried out a wide sweep in the western Mediterranean without encountering any Italian ships. It too was attacked by bombers who reported that they had hit those favourite targets for Axis claims, the *Hood* and the *Ark Royal*—a claim which was flatly denied by Britain.

The indications from this action that the Italian navy was none too successful either in hitting or running were supported by a further engagement on July 19 when the cruiser *Sydney* and accompanying destroyers made contact with two fast Italian cruisers and sank one of them, the *Bartolomeo Colleoni*, which unwisely tarried long enough for shots to be exchanged. And in an extensive six-day operation between August 30 and September 5, during the whole of which the Italian battle fleet kept prudently well out of range, the arrival of reinforcements was covered by air attacks on Sardinia and by the bombing and shelling of Italian bases in the Dodecanese. When to these operations were added the previous bombardments of coastal bases in Libya, it seemed that the British fleet could still use the Mediterranean almost at will.

These developments had certain political effects as well. It had generally been estimated that the chief importance of the loss of British Somaliland would be the blow it dealt to British prestige. But there were indications that this was offset by other factors. The Italian press, for example, reviving the grievances of Italians in Tunis, found occasion to complain that the French authorities ignored Italian successes and saw only the power of the British navy. It was a point of view which appeared to have some influence on other neutrals as well.

One of these was Spain. It seemed inevitable that the entry of Italy into the war would increase the temptation for Spain to join, particularly since there already existed a strong sentiment among the Falangist leaders in favour of Germany. The collapse of France and the arrival of German troops at the Pyrenees changed the strategic position and offered prospects of direct German aid if Spain should join the Axis. An official Spanish proclamation on June 12 significantly announced Spain's "non-belligerency", not neutrality; and the occupation of Tangier, coupled with a rising clamour for the return of Gibraltar—a demand publicly endorsed by Franco on July 17—foreshadowed the possibility of direct action. By August, however, belligerent tendencies were less in evidence. Italian air raids against Gibraltar had accomplished little except to hasten the evacuation of

civilians. Italian sea power was noticeably missing from the western Mediterranean. Protests against the British blockade, and particularly against interference with gasoline imports, began to subside, and an agreement in the latter part of August brought practical acceptance of British control. Spain had at least deferred the merging of her destiny with that of the Axis powers.

A similar resistance was shown by Greece. By the middle of August, Italy was bringing pressure on Greece to renounce the British guarantee which she had accepted in 1939. When the first overtures proved ineffective, a campaign of menace was opened, based on alleged Greek terrorist activities on the Albanian frontier. Greek merchant ships were seized, Greek destroyers were bombed by Italian planes, and a Greek cruiser was sunk by a submarine whose ownership Italy indignantly denied. Greece on her part sought aid from any willing source. Appeals to Germany to moderate Italian pressure were paralleled by staff talks with Russian experts and efforts to get assurances of Turkish aid. Ultimately, in the face of a firm attitude on the part of Greece, Italy dropped the matter and turned her attention to Egypt which she proceeded to menace with imminent invasion. Greece still held to the British guarantee—perhaps because she had a striking example of the results of renunciation in the fate of Rumania.

The Partition of Rumania

The smashing victories of Germany in the west confirmed certain tendencies in Rumanian policy which had already set in at the end of May. The appointment of the pro-fascist Gigurtu as foreign minister was followed by clear indications of an orientation in favour of Germany. A trade agreement, it was true, was concluded with Britain on June 6, but it represented the last faint signs of hesitation on the part of King Carol. With the downfall of France his mind was made up. On June 21 a royal decree provided for the creation of a totalitarian state with Carol in complete control. It was an unmistakable sign of his decision to throw himself into the arms of the Axis powers.

His reward came promptly. It was the partition of his kingdom and the loss of his throne.

The signal was given by Russia. Already the Soviet Union had taken advantage of Germany's advance to consolidate her position in the Baltic. The ultimatum to Lithuania demanding full military occupation and the establishment of a favourable government was followed by the imposition of similar demands on Latvia and Esthonia. Changes of government paved the way for the complete absorption of these republics. Elections held under Communist auspices on July 14 gave favourable majorities. On July 21 the three Assemblies passed resolutions applying for admission into the Soviet Union. Their request was accepted by the Supreme Soviet at the beginning of August. An area which Germany had once counted as her particular sphere of influence had been surrendered to Bolshevism.

None of this, however, distracted Russia's attention from the Balkans; and with Carol's move the time had come for the regaining of Bessarabia before Germany should commit herself to a guarantee of Rumania's borders. On June 26 an ultimatum called for the return of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and demanded a reply during the following day. Rumania suggested discussions of the proposal while trying frantically to get a promise of support from Germany and Italy. But neither power was prepared to risk a breach with Russia, and the Soviet Union insisted upon immediate compliance. An hour before the expiration of the time limit, Rumania agreed. During the next four days the Russian troops—who used the manoeuvre as a chance to test their powers of speed and mobility—had taken over twenty-one thousand square miles with a population of some four million.

It was only to be expected that Rumania's other neighbours should be encouraged by this step to clamour for immediate satisfaction of their own claims. Bulgaria, who sought to regain the part of Dobruja lost in 1913, was in the happy position of having the unanimous approval of almost everyone except Rumania herself. Hungary, whose demands were more extensive and more intransigent, was not so

favoured, and the Magyars were growing extremely impatient with the admonitions to patience repeatedly offered by Germany and Italy. Delegates from Hungary went as pilgrims to Munich on July 10, where they were treated by Ciano and Ribbentrop to homilies on the beauty of harmony between neighbours and the virtues of agreement



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THE DIVISION OF RUMANIA

by negotiation—precepts decidedly at variance with the common practices of the Axis powers. But Hungary was now determined to have satisfaction even at the risk of war.

This was the last thing the Axis wanted. Their desire was for peace and economic collaboration on the part of the Balkans. While trying to induce moderation in Hungary, they made it clear that Rumania must make some concessions. Rumania was now completely dependent upon the will of the dictators. She had formally proclaimed her full conversion by renouncing the British guarantee and forming a fascist administration with Gigurtu as premier. To satisfy

Germany's economic needs she seized the leading oil company, the Astra Romano, in which Britain was heavily interested, and requisitioned both tank cars and river barges which in some cases were also British property. Britain retaliated by seizing a number of Rumanian ships and threatening more stringent reprisals; but Carol, even if he had wanted to, could not now escape the choice he had made.

The necessary consequence was the cession of territory to Hungary and Bulgaria. At the beginning of August the cession of the southern Dobruja was agreed to in principle, though discussions about the details of the transfer continued throughout the month. A Rumanian delegation which visited Salzburg and Rome in the latter part of July had been convinced that some effort must be made to meet the Axis desire for a settlement of Balkan difficulties; and by the middle of August the talks with Hungary had begun. But the two sides were still far apart, and by the 22nd the negotiations had reached a deadlock.

Germany and Italy now decided to settle the matter out of hand. The two Balkan countries were summoned to a conference at Vienna. There on August 30 an award was handed down which ordered Rumania to cede approximately half of Transylvania to Hungary and to evacuate it within a fortnight. Although the Rumanian foreign minister, who called the award "a sentence we could not even discuss", asserted that it was accompanied by a German guarantee of the remaining Rumanian territory, the acceptance of the decision produced a popular outburst which threatened resistance to the occupation and which resulted in the overthrow of the king.

It did not matter that Carol had no other choice open to him. He had assumed personal direction of policy; he must therefore bear the consequences of the disasters which followed. But paradoxically enough, it was the Iron Guard with its pro-German sympathies which capitalized on the resentment against a German decision to overthrow Carol in the name of patriotism. Carol himself had temporized with this body, but mutual resentments remained; and now that the Iron Guard decided to take its revenge, Carol found that he had no other body of support on which he could rely. He tried to find a compromise

by summoning General Antonescu to the premiership. But Antonescu's sympathies lay with the Iron Guard, and his recent imprisonment for his political views (he had twice been arrested in July) hardly disposed him kindly toward the monarch. On September 5 he took office, but only after Carol had abdicated almost all his power into the hands of his new premier. But in spite of this the demonstrations against the king continued to grow in violence, and the Iron Guard, flushed with its triumph after years of repression, threatened to get beyond control. On September 6 Carol abdicated and went into exile, and his son Michael ascended the throne for the second time in his eighteen years. But the real power was in Antonescu's hands, and he publicly proclaimed his intention of using it to complete the transformation of Rumania into a fascist state firmly attached to Germany and Italy.

THE AMERICAS AND HITLER

The rapid success of Hitler's armies awakened lively emotions in the new world. They were not, it is true, entirely uniform. The existence of totalitarian leanings in certain Latin American republics inclined some of their leaders to a cautious sympathy with the Nazi advance, and these feelings were typified by a speech by President Vargas of Brazil which indicated an inclination toward Nazi ideology. But the more characteristic sentiment was a growing alarm at the crumbling of defences which now began to appear as bulwarks of the Americas themselves.

This sense of a direct interest in the outcome of the struggle was sharpened by the emergence of certain definite problems as a result of the German advance. The question whether her European conquests would lead to the acquisition of the colonies of the conquered lands roused memories of the situation which had led to the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine a century before. The phenomenon of the Fifth Column as a forerunner of conquest brought an alarmed realization of the extent to which a similar movement was at work in a number of American republics. The trade of Latin America, already seriously dislocated by the war, faced further difficulties as Hitler's grip clamped

down on most of their remaining European customers. And behind these practical questions lay the more general speculation of how the Americas would fare in a world dominated by a victorious Hitler. Some observers were still able to face that prospect with relative optimism. But more were inclined to agree with Roosevelt when he described it as "the helpless nightmare of a people without freedom . . . the nightmare of a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, un pitying masters of other continents."

The United States administration, indeed, was stimulated to pursue with increasing vigour the policy which had guided its activities ever since the outbreak of war. In particular it pressed three simultaneous courses—the strengthening of the national defence, the co-operation with the other American republics in a common defensive system for the western hemisphere, and the strengthening of Great Britain in her continued resistance to the Nazi advance.

It was natural that the revelation of new methods of attack by the German army should lead Americans to review their military system in the light of recent developments. It was equally to be expected that military officials would call, not only for increased numbers of men, but for even greater increases in mechanized equipment, particularly tanks and planes. But while the deficiencies of the army came in for widespread discussion, the naval side of the picture appeared even more fundamental. Hitherto the navy's function had been primarily the defence of the Pacific. The danger of any serious attack from the Atlantic side had practically been eliminated by the ascendancy of the British navy. But the crisis over the French fleet, and the prospect of a German invasion of England, made it essential to consider what would happen if that ascendancy should come to an end and the burden of controlling the Atlantic should be added to the tasks of the United States navy.

The influence of these considerations was seen in the unprecedented rise in American defence appropriations. Legislation providing \$1,784 million was already pending when Hitler invaded the Netherlands. Following that event, the President requested a further

appropriation of over a billion dollars. By July 10, total defence appropriations had reached \$5,252 million. On that date the President sent a further request for \$4,848 million to provide for increased expansion. By that date there was also under consideration a project for the creation of a two-ocean navy at an initial cost of some four billion dollars. A total of ten billion dollars was thus to be spent on defence during the 1941 fiscal year, with another ten billion in prospect before naval expansion was completed in 1947.

Other steps looked forward to the twin problems of manpower and resources. A bill which was still under discussion at the beginning of September envisaged compulsory military training based on the selective draft. A proclamation of September 1 called up 60,000 of the National Guard for active service. A war resources board was set up, and extensive powers were vested in the President to control the export of vital commodities by license or embargo. With the prospect that developments in the Pacific might interfere with essential supplies of rubber and tin, two government corporations were set up to accumulate reserve supplies of these vital commodities. The coming of autumn saw a gigantic preparedness program in full swing.

The Havana Conference

These domestic measures, however, were only one aspect of the problem. The United States could, with comparative ease, be made immune from any attack from Europe, at least for the immediate future. But it was also highly desirable to prevent any outflanking of the United States defences by fascist infiltration into Latin America. Effective defence was a problem for the whole hemisphere which called for the co-operation of the Pan-American states.

That these republics felt in real danger from Nazi activities was shown by a number of episodes. At the end of May, Uruguay took steps to deal with what she believed to be a Nazi plan for a military uprising and seizure of the country. A well-supplied organization was uncovered, with "support posts" in the key centres and frontier connections with similar groups in Argentina and Brazil. Investigation by a Congressional committee produced evidence which was believed

to show that Uruguay was the centre of a Nazi South American organization, directed from the Foreign Ministry at Berlin and closely supervised by German diplomatic agents. Revelations of extensive economic penetration in Brazil, where the substantial German population was closely organized, and of plans for a Rightist coup in Chile at the middle of July, were sufficiently impressive for the United States, which had already sent a cruiser to visit Uruguay, to despatch two more warships to these particular countries. An abusive note by Spain and the recall of her envoy from Chile on July 16 was taken as evidence of totalitarian pressure; and even more direct pressure was threatened by notes from Germany to five Central American states warning them against taking unfriendly steps at the forthcoming Havana conference. However isolated and even exaggerated some of these episodes may have been, they at least showed a definite Nazi interest in Latin America. But it was still doubtful whether these countries would co-operate in a defensive pact which, since the chief burden of implementing it must rest on the United States, might strengthen the hegemony of that nation over the western hemisphere.

The question of European colonies offered somewhat similar difficulties. Allied occupation of the Dutch islands in the Caribbean had been accepted, but German seizure of these or of the French possessions in case of victory would be a very different matter. Even as things stood, the watch kept by a British squadron on French naval units in Martinique might develop into an embarrassing situation. Hitler on his part denied in an interview that he had any designs on the new world, but neither this nor a more official disclaimer by Ribbentrop was very convincing. On June 17 a joint resolution was adopted by Congress asserting a refusal to recognize the transfer of "any geographic region of the western hemisphere from one non-American Power to another non-American Power". But even without transfer, effective control might be gained through a puppet government in France or Holland. It would not, however, be tactful of the United States to act on her own initiative in a region where other American states might claim a prior interest, and some agreed form of procedure was desirable in the interest of solidarity.

The economic problem was an even more vexing one. Seventy-five per cent. of the trade of the countries south of the Caribbean was normally with Europe. They exported primary commodities and imported manufactured goods; and while the United States stood ready to supply them with imports, she had little need of their exports apart from a few things such as fruit and coffee. Europe, even a German-dominated Europe, was likely to be essential to the prosperity of Latin America—a fact which Herr Funk emphasized on July 25 in a warning against the adoption of unfriendly economic steps. He had particularly in mind the American suggestion of a cartel, financed by the United States, to buy up and dispose of Latin American surpluses. But the practicability of the plan was uncertain; and while the states of Latin America were quite ready to be financed with American funds, it was doubtful whether they would make in return the concessions to solidarity of policy which the United States desired.

These were the chief questions of the Pan-American conference which met at Havana on July 21. If the success of the conference was inevitably limited, it none the less represented a real advance along the road to co-operation. By the Act of Havana adopted on July 29 (though its final validity rested on ratification by the signatories), the principle of non-transfer of colonies was ratified, procedure for action upon this principle was laid down, and measures to restrict fifth column activities were recommended. There was no joint defence pact, and the resolution on economic matters offered no positive measures of co-operation; but the possibility of taking steps in these fields to meet a future emergency was undoubtedly brought nearer.

Bases and Destroyers

While this effort at continental solidarity was proceeding, the United States was also seeking ways to strengthen the hands of Britain against the Nazi threat. And these two objectives, which had once seemed quite distinct, now showed a growing connection with each other and with the United States' problem of national defence.

The policy of the Administration was still to confine aid to Britain to "measures short of war". This was a policy which was endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican nominating conventions which met during the summer. It had been reaffirmed by Roosevelt when, in his message to Congress on July 10 asking further defence funds, he asserted: "We will not use our arms in a war of aggression. We will not send our men to take part in European wars." It was a policy which seemed on the whole to represent the outlook of the vast body of the American people.

It remained a question, however, what effective help could be given short of armed aid. There was still a reluctance to repeal the provision of the Neutrality Act barring loans to belligerents. American defence preparations could be integrated with British war orders in a way which would stimulate industry without interfering with the flow of supplies to Britain. Stocks of arms could be released by the government for resale, and these enabled the British forces to be swiftly re-equipped at a time when invasion was believed to be imminent. But these stocks were soon exhausted, and little more could be done directly to provide military equipment. Naval equipment, however, was available in the form of 123 destroyers which had been laid up as over-age, and which would be a very welcome addition to Britain's hard-pressed naval strength.

There were both obstacles and incentives to their sale. Their condition was no barrier, for a hundred of them had been put in commission after the outbreak of war, and some fifty would be almost immediately available for service. The real obstacle lay in certain provisions of the Hague Convention supplemented by American legislation which forbade the sale of such ships to belligerents; but the legal advisers of the President were confident that adequate loopholes could be found. The incentive was the desire to prevent the defeat of Britain and to maintain the British navy as a first line of defence. For the moment Britain's superiority in capital ships was not endangered; but her shortage of destroyers was shown by the shipping losses, which suggested a partial break-down of the convoy system through lack of means. If Britain's vital supply lines were to

be kept open, it was desirable to strengthen her in this department. Although the United States was planning a two-ocean navy, it would not be ready for five or six years. The maintenance of the British fleet, at least during that interval, was devoutly to be wished.

Britain, on her part, had motives quite apart from her need of destroyers to meet any reasonable terms that the United States might demand. Her interests in the Pacific were in increasing danger before the advance of Japan. The weakness of her position in the Far East was shown when she agreed to close the Burma Road to supplies to China, and to withdraw her remaining garrisons from North China, including Shanghai. If the United States should also be compelled to withdraw from the Pacific through fear of Europe, British interests in the Orient would be further weakened. It was thus a reasonable policy to contemplate increasing American confidence in as well as dependence upon the British navy, and to reassure her about her Atlantic defences by permitting her to establish naval and air bases on British soil.

A full development of the latter policy, however, involved the co-operation of a third party. Canada as a self-governing Dominion was no longer subject to dictation by the Mother Country, however amenable she might be to persuasion. At the same time, Canada as a virtually independent state was becoming more interested in the idea of Pan-American solidarity, although she had still to accept a seat at a Pan-American conference. She was thus in a position to facilitate or hamper the project for defensive arrangements between Britain and the United States.

The agreement reached by President Roosevelt and Premier King at Ogdensburg on August 18 was thus a desirable if not actually a necessary prelude to the wider arrangements. It was important less for any detailed provisions than for its possible implications. It provided for the setting up of a joint defence board to "consider in the broad sense the defence of the northern half of the western hemisphere." It did not, however, provide for any specific action under specific conditions. It was not a formal alliance, nor did it explicitly

give the forces of one nation the right to use the territory of the other. But the United States could not in any case see a potential enemy in control of Canada, as Roosevelt had recognized two years before when he pledged American aid against an invader; nor could the United States allow Canada to endanger her own security if America were ever involved in a major war. Practically, the two countries were bound together; and the essential task of the Defence Board, which began its sessions at Ottawa the following week, would be to prepare the necessary steps to be taken when an emergency should arise.

Britain was now prepared to act. On August 20 Churchill announced his government's agreement in principle to the lease of bases by the United States. On September 3 Roosevelt informed Congress that he had completed arrangements for the sale of fifty destroyers and that the United States would acquire seven bases on British territory in the Caribbean and an eighth in Newfoundland on a lease of ninety-nine years. It was a long step forward in hemispheric defence, and a happy augury to Britain of continued American aid.

It was also a further pledge, if pledge was needed, of continued British resistance. One ground for opposition to the sale of destroyers had been the contention that even these would not enable Britain to survive the German onslaught, and that these American ships might eventually be turned against the United States when they had been surrendered as part of the British fleet. Now, in announcing the sale, Secretary Hull revealed a British pledge that the fleet would neither scuttle nor surrender under any conditions. It was a mere echo of Churchill's defiance to the invader on June 4 after the evacuation of Dunkirk:

We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight on the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills, we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this

island, or a large part of it, were subjugated and starving, then our empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, would carry on the struggle until in God's good time the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old."

HITLER'S NEW EUROPE

The anniversary of the invasion of Poland saw almost the whole of continental Europe prostrate under the Nazi power. The changes in twelve months of warfare were little short of cataclysmic. Of the twenty-five nation-states on the continent, only seven stood with their boundaries unchanged or their soil free from a foreign invader. Four hundred thousand square miles of territory had changed hands. A hundred million people found themselves subjected to alien rule, and three-quarters of them had passed under the rule of Germany.

For these people the change meant more than mere conquest. It meant the utter destruction of a way of life whose tradition reached back for centuries. In the civilization which had been evolved by western Europe two elements were basic. One was the Greek concept of intellectual freedom, of full and untrammelled inquiry and of individual judgment as the only sure guides in the search for truth. The other was the concept fundamental to Christianity, the concept of the brotherhood of man and the value of every individual without distinction in the eyes of his Maker. Both these traditions were utterly repudiated by Nazi philosophy. Neither faith nor reason was to be the guide, but a primitive brute emotionalism which recognized no claims but its own and no power save that of unrestrained physical force.

This outlook, purely destructive in its implications, could tolerate none of those spontaneous expressions of community life which were so characteristic of western existence. It was not only political freedom that must disappear. All cultural and economic modes which sprang from popular initiative were equally dangerous. Religion must be regimented. Trade unions must be abolished. Education must be based, not on the search for truth, but on the deepening of the

obscurantism in which the new rulers found their only safety. All avenues for the free communication of ideas, whether literature or radio or press, must be hermetically sealed, lest a ray of light should penetrate to awaken questions in the starved minds of a subject population. Europe—a docile and apathetic Europe—was to lie forever under a pall of silence maintained by darkness and by fear.

This Europe was singly to serve its new master. To the supreme German race—or to the group of terrorists who were the masters of that race—the rest of the continent was to be tributary. In conquered Poland, while the aged were herded eastward to starve in a land stripped of its resources, two million able-bodied peasants were transported to forced labour in Germany. In crushed Czechoslovakia the once thriving industrial system was turned wholly to the benefit of Germany. In the west, the conquered countries stripped of their supplies faced a winter of hunger if not of actual starvation, and the impending ruin of their economies was illustrated by the prospect that Denmark would have to slaughter one-third of her hens and nearly half her hogs for lack of ability to feed them. The broad and diverse channels of trade which these countries had once enjoyed, the freedom to adapt their production to world markets, now disappeared, and their productive efforts were now to be directed to serve the needs of a Germany who would be a monopoly customer—on her own terms.

To assure this subservience, the conquered lands were to be robbed of vigour and intelligence. No leaders were to be left to rouse resistance to the conqueror. The destruction of the chief elements of character and intelligence was left in the expert hands of the Gestapo. In Poland and Czechoslovakia the concentration camps were filled with pastors and professors and political leaders who were slowly killed or broken in spirit by calculated tortures. “The Pole is a servant,” said a German administrator, “and must only serve. We must inject a dose of iron into our spinal column and never admit that Poland may ever rise again.” In the west the list of proscripts lengthened as the Nazis sought out one by one the chief liberal

thinkers and leaders; and the despairing tide of refugees swelled steadily as refuge after refuge was overrun by German arms.

In these features lay the ultimate horror of the German advance. There was enough of physical horror to shock even a world becoming inured to brutality—the slaughter of refugees on the roads, the wanton destruction of defenceless Rotterdam, the indiscriminate savagery of air warfare in general. But crowning this was the slower agony of those millions of decent inoffensive people, pursuing their own modest lives in peace with their neighbours, free to speak their minds without offence and to associate with their fellows in worship or recreation or in organizations for the bettering of their own lot and that of their community, who now found all that swept away and their minds and bodies delivered to a tyranny of barbarism. It was a revolution which, for all its pretences, had no aim at a more abundant life, but only at the creation of a servile society in which the German Reich, ringed by helot nations, would stand as arrogant receiver of tribute through the power of its victorious arms. It was against this darkness of spirit that Britain, at the end of the first year of war, stood alone as the bulwark of the faith of free men in the ultimate survival of freedom.

DOCUMENTARY APPENDIX

I. The Locarno Pacts

A. *Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, October 16, 1925.*

I. The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee . . . the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers . . . and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 [of the Treaty of Versailles] concerning the demilitarized zone.

II. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of—

1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary.

2. Action in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.

III. Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means . . . all questions of every kind which may arise between them. . . .

IV. (1) If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation . . . has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

(2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present Treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

(3) In case of a flagrant violation . . . by one of the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the Party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary . . .

B. Extracts from the Treaty of Versailles.

Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine.

Article 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind . . . are in the same way forbidden.

C. Treaty between France and Czechoslovakia, October 16, 1925.

I. In the event of Czechoslovakia or France suffering from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at this day between them and Germany . . . France, and reciprocally Czechoslovakia, acting in application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to lend each other immediately aid and assistance, if such failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms. . . .

D. Extract from Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, May 21, 1935.

The German Government . . . will scrupulously observe every treaty voluntarily signed by them, even if it was drawn up before they took over the Government and power. They will therefore, in particular, observe and fulfil all obligations arising out of the Locarno Pact so long as the other parties to the Treaty are also willing to

adhere to the said Pact. The German Government regard the respecting of the demilitarized zones as an extremely difficult contribution for a sovereign State to make to the appeasement of Europe.

II. Germany and Austria

A. *Extract from Hitler's speech, January 30, 1934.*

The assertion that the German Reich intends to overpower the Austrian state is absurd and can by no means be proved or substantiated . . . I must most sharply refute the further assertion of the Austrian Government that any attack against the Austrian state will be undertaken or is even contemplated.

B. *Extract from Hitler's speech, May 21, 1935.*

The German Government will unconditionally respect all other clauses of the Versailles treaty affecting the mutual relations of the nations, including the territorial clauses . . . Germany has neither the intention nor the will to interfere in domestic Austrian affairs, to annex Austria, or to unite Austria with the Reich.

C. *Austro-German communiqué, July 11, 1936.*

1. Following the declarations made by the Führer and Chancellor on May 21, 1935, the Government of the German Reich recognizes the full sovereignty of the Austrian Federal State.

2. Each of the two Governments considers the internal political structure of the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as part of the internal affairs of that country, over which they will exercise no influence, whether directly or indirectly.

3. The policy of the Austrian Federal Government, both in general and toward the German Reich in particular, shall always be based on principles which correspond to the fact that Austria has acknowledged herself to be a German State . . .

III. Germany and Czechoslovakia

A. *Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, October 16, 1925.*

The President of the German Empire and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic;

Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries;

Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals;

Agreeing that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent;

And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States;

Have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect . . .

1. All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it might not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice . . .

B. Statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March 14, 1938.

I am informed that Field Marshal Goering on March 11th gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin—an assurance which he expressly renewed on behalf of Herr Hitler—that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular on March 12th, Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least fifteen kilometres from the Czechoslovak frontier. On the same day, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of October, 1925.

C. Extract from Hitler's speech, September 26, 1938.

The philosophy of our people of the new Third Reich is based on the maintenance and safeguarding of the existence of our German

people. We are not interested in oppressing other peoples. We do not wish at all to have other nationalities among us . . .

I assured Mr. Chamberlain, and I repeat here, that if this problem is solved there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany.

And I further assured him that at the moment that Czechoslovakia has solved her other problems . . . the Czech State no longer interests me. I give him the guarantee: we do not want any Czechs any more.

IV. Germany and Poland

A. *German-Polish Agreement, January 26, 1934.*

. . . Both Governments announce their intention to settle directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their mutual relations.

Should any disputes arise between them and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by peaceful means . . . In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes . . .

The declaration is valid for a period of ten years . . .

B. *Extract from Hitler's speech, January 30, 1934.*

Germans and Poles must reconcile themselves to the fact of each other's existence . . . Whatever may be the differences between the two countries in the future, an attempt to remove them by warlike actions would have disastrous effects which would bear no relation to any possible gain. The German Government was, therefore, fortunate to find in Marshal Pilsudski . . . the same broad-minded view, and to embody this mutual view in a treaty which must not only be equally profitable to the Polish and the German people, but also represents a great contribution to the maintenance of general peace.

C. *Extract from Hitler's speech, September 28, 1938.*

In Poland there ruled no democracy, but a man; and with him I succeeded, in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years in the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realise that here are two peoples which must

live together and neither of which can do away with the other . . . It was a real work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva.

D. Extract from Hitler's speech, April 28, 1939.

The worst is that now Poland . . . believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland . . . The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the international press, led as you know to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance . . . This obligation is contrary to the agreement which I made with Marshal Pilsudski some time ago . . . I therefore look upon the agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I at one time concluded as having been unilaterally infringed by Poland and thereby no longer in existence.

V. The Coming of War

A. Pledge by Prime Minister Chamberlain, March 31, 1939.

I now have to inform the House that . . . in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to that effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government.

VI. Germany and Russia

Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, September 29, 1939.

The German and Soviet Governments, having by agreement signed a definite settlement of questions arising out of the dissolution of the Polish State and having in this way created a sure basis for a durable peace in Eastern Europe, declare that it is their unanimous opinion that it would be in the real interests of all nations to end the state of

war that exists between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other.

The two Governments will therefore make joint efforts—if necessary in agreement with other friendly Powers—in order to attain this aim as soon as possible. In the case of the efforts of these two Governments being without success, the fact will then be proved that Britain and France are responsible for the continuation of the war.

In the case of the war's being continued, joint consultations will take place between the German and Soviet Governments on the subject of the necessary measures.

The German and Soviet Governments, after the dissolution of the former State of Poland, consider it as their exclusive task to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the nationalities living there a peaceful existence corresponding to their particular races.

They have agreed to the following articles:

1. The German and Soviet Governments fix as the frontier of their imperial interests in the former territory of Poland the line marked in the attached map. This line will be defined again in a complementary protocol.

2. The two parties recognize as final the frontier of their imperial interests fixed in Article 1. They will refuse all interference by third Powers in this settlement.

3. The new political settlement necessary in the territories west of the line fixed in Article 1 will be established by the German Government and the territories east of this line by the Soviet Government.

4. The German and Soviet Governments consider the aforementioned settlement as a sure basis for the increase of the friendly relations between their two peoples.

VII. Russia and Esthonia

Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Esthonia, September 29, 1939.

1. The two contracting parties undertake to render to each other every assistance, including military, in the event of direct aggression, or the menace of aggression, arising on the part of any great European Power against the sea frontiers of the contracting parties in the Baltic

Sea, or their land frontiers across the territory of the Latvian Republic, as well as against bases indicated in Article 3.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to render to the Esthonian Army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favourable terms.

3. The Esthonian Republic assures the Soviet Union of the right to maintain naval bases and several aerodromes for aviation on lease terms, at reasonable prices, on the Esthonian islands of Oesel, Dagoe, and in the town of Paldiski (Baltiiskii Port).

The exact sites for the bases and aerodromes shall be allotted and their boundaries defined by mutual agreement.

For the protection of the naval bases and aerodromes the U.S.S.R. has the right to maintain, at its own expense, on the sites allotted for the bases and aerodromes, Soviet land and air armed forces of a strictly limited strength, their maximum numbers to be determined by special agreements.

4. The contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances or participate in any coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

5. The realization of this pact should not affect in any extent the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their economic systems and State organizations.

The sites allotted for bases and aerodromes shall remain the territory of the Esthonian Republic.

VIII. Turkey and the Allies

Treaty between Turkey, France and Great Britain, October 19, 1939.

1. In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, the French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with the Turkish Government and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

2. (i) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power.

(ii) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the United Kingdom will collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

3. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Rumania by their respective declarations of April 13, 1939, remain in force Turkey will co-operate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.

4. In the event of the United Kingdom and France being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by that Power against either of those States without the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together.

It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent neutrality toward France and the United Kingdom.

5. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3 above, in the event of either:

- (i) Aggression by a European Power against another European State which the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality against such aggression, or
- (ii) Aggression by a European Power which, while directed against another European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties, a menace to its own security, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective.

Extract from Additional Protocol

The obligations undertaken by Turkey . . . cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.

IX. American Neutrality

Extracts from the United States Neutrality Act of 1939.

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1. (a) That whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign States, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, the President shall issue a proclamation naming the States involved . . .

Section 2. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation . . . it shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any State named in such proclamation . . .

(c) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation . . . it shall thereafter be unlawful to export or transport . . . from the United States to any State named in such proclamation, any article or materials . . . until all right, title and interest therein shall have been transferred to some foreign government, agency . . . or national . . .

Section 3. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation . . . and he shall thereafter find that the protection of citizens of the United States so requires, he shall, by proclamation, define combat areas, and thereafter it shall be unlawful, except under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed, for any citizen of the United States or any American vessel to proceed into or through such combat area . . .

Section 5. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation . . . it shall thereafter be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to travel on any vessel of any State named in such proclamation, except in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed . . .

Section 7. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation . . . it shall thereafter be unlawful for any person within the United States to purchase, sell, or exchange bonds, securities, or other obligations of the government of any State named in such proclamation . . . or of any person acting for or on behalf of the government of any such State . . . issued after the date of such

proclamation, or to make any loan or extend any credit . . . to such government, political subdivisions, or person.

Section 9. This joint resolution . . . shall not apply to any American republic engaged in war against a non-American State or States, provided the American Republic is not co-operating with a non-American State or States in such war . . .

Section 11. Whenever during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President shall find that special restrictions placed on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United States by the submarines or armed merchant vessels of a foreign State will serve to maintain peace between the United States and foreign States, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and foreign States, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security of the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any such submarine or armed merchant vessel to enter a port or the territorial waters of the United States or to depart therefrom, except under such conditions and subject to such limitations as the President may prescribe . . .

X. Russia and Finland

Treaty of Peace between Russia and Finland, March 12, 1940

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the President of Finland on the other side, guided by a desire to put an end to the hostilities that arose between the two countries and to create stable and mutually peaceful relations, convinced that a definition of the exact conditions of ensuring mutual security, including the security of the cities of Leningrad and Murmansk, as well as the Murmansk Railway, corresponds to the interests of both parties, found it necessary to conclude a peace treaty for these purposes . . .

1. Hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Finland shall cease immediately in accordance with procedure provided for in the protocol appended to this treaty.

2. The State frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Finland shall be established along a new line in accordance with which

the territory of the U.S.S.R. will include the entire Karelian isthmus with the town of Viborg and Viborg Bay with its islands, the western and northern shores of Ladoga Lake with the towns of Kaekisalmi, Sortavala and Suojaervi, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, territory east of Maerkeajaervi, with the town of Kuolajaervi, part of the peninsulas of Rybachi and Sredni in accordance with a map appended to this treaty.

A more detailed description of the frontier line will be determined by a mixed commission of representatives of the contracting parties, which commission must be formed within ten days from the date of the signing of this treaty.

3. Both contracting parties undertake mutually to refrain from any attack upon each other, not to conclude any alliances and not to participate in any coalitions against one of the contracting parties.

4. The Republic of Finland expresses consent to lease to the Soviet Union for thirty years with an annual payment by the Soviet Union of 8,000,000 Finnish marks the Peninsula of Hangoe and the waters surrounding it in a radius of five miles to the south and east and three miles to the west and north of the peninsula, and a number of islands adjoining it in accordance with the appended map, for the purpose of creating there a naval base capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland against aggression; for the purpose of protecting the naval base the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain there at its own expense land and air armed forces of necessary strength.

Within ten days from the date when this treaty becomes effective the Government of Finland shall withdraw all its troops from the Peninsula of Hangoe, and the Peninsula of Hangoe together with adjoining islands shall pass under the administration of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with this article of the treaty.

5. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to withdraw its troops from the Petsamo region voluntarily ceded to Finland by the Soviet State in accordance with the Peace Treaty of 1920. Finland undertakes, as provided by the Peace Treaty of 1920, to refrain from maintaining in

waters along her coast of the Arctic Ocean naval or other armed ships exceeding armed ships of less than 100 tons displacement, which Finland has a right to maintain without restriction, also not more than fifteen naval and other armed ships with a tonnage of not more than 400 tons each.

Finland undertakes, as was provided by this same treaty, not to maintain in said waters any submarines and armed aircraft. Finland similarly undertakes as was provided by the same treaty not to establish on that coast military ports, naval bases and naval repair shops of a greater capacity than necessary for the above-mentioned ships and their armaments.

6. As provided by the Treaty of 1920, the Soviet Union and its citizens are granted the right of free transit across the Petsamo region and back. The Soviet Union is granted the right to institute a consulate in the Petsamo region. Freights in transit across the Petsamo region from the U.S.S.R. to Norway, as likewise freights in transit across the same region from Norway to the U.S.S.R., are exempted from inspection and control, excepting only such control as is necessary for regulation of transit communications.

Said freights are also exempted from payment of customs duties, transit and other duties. The above-mentioned control of transit freights is permitted only in the form observed in similar cases in accordance with established usages in international communications.

Citizens of the U.S.S.R. travelling across the Petsamo region to Norway and back from Norway to the U.S.S.R. have the right of free transit passage on the basis of passports issued by the Soviet organs concerned.

Soviet non-armed aircraft shall have the right to maintain air service between the U.S.S.R. and Norway across the Petsamo region, with observance of general operating rules.

7. The Government of Finland shall grant the Soviet Union the right of transit of goods between the U.S.S.R. and Sweden, and with the aim of developing this transit along the shortest railroad route, the U.S.S.R. and Finland find it necessary to build, if possible, in the

course of the year 1940, each party on its territory, a railway line connecting the town of Kandalaksha with the town of Kemijaervi.

8. When this treaty comes into force, economic relations between the contracting parties will be restored and with this end in view the contracting parties will enter negotiations for the conclusion of a trade treaty.

9. The present peace treaty comes into force immediately upon being signed and is subject to subsequent ratification. The exchange of ratification instruments shall take place within ten days in Moscow.

(An additional protocol provided for the cessation of hostilities at noon on March 13, and for the progressive withdrawal of the Finnish troops from the ceded areas).

XI. The French Armistice Agreements

A. Summary of Terms of Armistice between France and Germany, June 22, 1940.

1. Immediate cessation of hostilities in France and colonies and at sea. French troops already surrounded to lay down arms.

2. Provision for occupied zone (defined in an additional protocol with attached map).

3. "In the occupied parts of France the German Reich exercises all rights of an occupying Power. The French Government obligates itself to support with every means the regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights, and to carry them out with the aid of the French administration."

French authorities to be instructed to co-operate. Germany, after peace with England, will limit occupation of west coast to extent absolutely necessary.

"The French Government is permitted to select the seat of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government guarantees the French Government and its central authorities every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a position to conduct the administration of unoccupied territory from Paris."

4. "French armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air are to be demobilized and disarmed in a period still to be set. Excepted are only those units which are necessary for the maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix their strength."

Remaining French forces in territory to be occupied will be withdrawn to unoccupied territory and demobilized, first handing over their arms and equipment.

5. As a guarantee, Germany may demand surrender of tanks, warplanes, guns and other equipment in the unoccupied territory. Germany will decide the extent of such deliveries.

6. Weapons and equipment which remain in unoccupied France to be put in store under German and Italian control. Manufacture of new material to stop at once.

7. Fortifications in occupied France, together with plans, to be handed over in good condition. French to remove mines and other obstructions on German demand.

8. "The French war fleet is to be collected in ports to be designated more particularly, and, under German and Italian control, to be demobilized and laid up, with the exception of those units released to the French Government for the protection of French interests in its colonial empire. . . .

"The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it does not intend to use the French war fleet which is in harbours under German control for its purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for the purpose of guarding the coast and sweeping mines.

"It further solemnly and expressly declares that it does not intend to bring up any demands respecting the French war fleet at the conclusion of peace.

"All warships outside France are to be recalled to France, with the exception of that portion of the French war fleet which shall be designated to represent French interests in the colonial empire."

9. All information about naval mines and defences to be furnished. French to clear away the mines on German demand.

10. French Government to prevent any part of its armed forces from continuing hostilities against Germany or from leaving the country; to prevent armaments being taken to England or abroad; to forbid French citizens to fight in the service of other Powers.

11. French merchant shipping to be suspended until resumption authorized by Germany and Italy. Ships abroad to return to France or to neutral harbours. Confiscated German ships to be returned.

12. Aeroplane flights over French territory to be prohibited. Aerodromes in unoccupied territory to be placed under German and Italian control, and foreign aircraft to be turned over to Germany.

13. All military stocks and establishments in occupied territory, as well as port facilities and communications, to be handed over undamaged.

14. All wireless stations on French territory to cease transmission.

15. French Government to facilitate transit of freight between Germany and Italy across unoccupied territory.

16. French Government to repatriate population to occupied territory.

17. French Government to prevent transfer of valuables and stocks from occupied to unoccupied territory or abroad.

18. France to pay the cost of German occupation.

19. France to surrender German war and civil prisoners. "The French Government is obligated to surrender on demand any Germans named by the German Government in France as well as in French possessions." France to prevent the removal of German prisoners abroad.

20. French prisoners to remain in German hands until conclusion of peace.

21. France responsible for security of material to be handed over to Germany.

22. German Armistice Commission to oversee carrying out of terms. France to have a delegate to represent government and receive German instructions.

23. Armistice to come into effect when France concludes armistice with Italy. Hostilities to end six hours after Germany notified by Italy that agreement concluded.

24. "This agreement is valid until the conclusion of a peace treaty. The German Government may terminate this agreement at any time with immediate effect if the French Government fails to fulfil the obligations it assumes under the agreement."

B. Summary of Terms of Armistice between France and Italy, June 24, 1940.

1. Cessation of hostilities in all spheres.

2. "When the armistice comes into force and for the duration of the armistice, Italian troops will stand on their advance lines in all theatres of operations."

3. In France, demilitarized zone 50 kilometres beyond Italian lines; in Tunis, as drawn on an attached map; in French African territories bordering on Libya, a zone 200 kilometres wide.

"For the duration of hostilities between Italy and the British Empire, and for the duration of the armistice, the French Somaliland coast shall be entirely demilitarized.

"Italy shall have full and constant right to use the port of Djibuti with all its equipment, together with the French section of the Djibuti-Addis Ababa railway, for all kinds of transport."

4-5. Provisions for evacuation of demilitarized zone.

6. So long as war with Britain continues, bases of Toulon, Bizerta, Ajaccio, and Oran to be demilitarized.

7-8. Provisions for demilitarization of naval bases.

9. Demobilization and disarmament of French land forces. In colonies, provisions for demobilization to be guided by need for maintaining order.

10. Italy may demand surrender of arms and equipment of French troops which face Italian forces.

11. German and Italian control of arms remaining in unoccupied zone. Production of munitions to cease.

12. Demobilization of French fleet (on terms prescribed in Article 8 of armistice with Germany).

13. France to render harmless all mines in demilitarized naval bases.

14. France to prevent its armed forces and citizens from engaging in hostilities against Italy.

15. France to prevent war material being sent to Britain or other Powers.

16-17. French commerce suspended and ships to be called to home or neutral ports. Confiscated Italian ships and cargoes to be restored.

18. No aeroplanes to leave French territory. German and Italian control of air facilities.

19. Wireless transmission from French territory forbidden. Wireless communication between France and colonies to be arranged by Italian armistice commission.

20. "Goods shall be freely transported between Germany and Italy through French unoccupied territory."

21. "All Italian prisoners of war and Italian civilians who have been interned or arrested and sentenced for political reasons, crimes or on account of the war shall be handed over immediately to the Italian Government."

22. France responsible for good condition of material to be handed over.

23-5. Provisions for the creation of an Italian Armistice Commission and the procedure for enforcement of the armistice terms.

26. "The convention shall remain in force until the conclusion of a peace treaty, but may be denounced by Italy at any time in the event that the French Government does not fulfil its obligations."

CHRONOLOGY

1939

SEPTEMBER

- 1—German invasion of Poland.
- 3—Britain and France declare war on Germany.
Liner *Athenia* sunk.
- 4—British air force bombs German warships at Kiel.
- 6—First British troops arrive in France.
- 16—Britain starts convoy service for merchant shipping.
- 17—Russian troops invade eastern Poland.
- 18—British aircraft carrier *Courageous* torpedoed.
- 27—Warsaw surrenders.
- 29—German-Soviet treaty of friendship, providing for division of Poland. Esthonia signs mutual assistance pact with Soviet Union.

OCTOBER

- 5—Latvia signs mutual assistance treaty with Soviet Union.
- 6—Hitler's Reichstag speech offering peace based on conquests.
- 10—Lithuania signs mutual assistance pact with Soviet Union.
Daladier rejects Hitler peace basis.
- 12—Chamberlain rejects Hitler peace basis.
- 14—British battleship *Royal Oak* torpedoed in Scapa Flow.
- 16—German planes bomb British naval base at Rosyth.
- 17—Turkey and Russia break off negotiations.
- 19—Turkey signs mutual assistance pacts with Britain and France.
- 23—German seizure of American freighter *City of Flint* revealed.

NOVEMBER

- 3—*City of Flint* released by Norwegian authorities at Haugesund.
- 4—United States neutrality law amended, modifying embargo on arms sales to belligerents.
- 7—Offer of peace mediation by King Leopold of Belgium and Queen Wilhelmina of Holland.
- 8—Hitler escapes bomb attempt in Munich beer hall.
- 13—Russo-Finnish negotiations suspended.

- 26—Russia accuses Finnish troops of frontier shooting.
- 27—British order-in-council providing for seizure of German exports.
- 28—Russia denounces non-aggression treaty with Finland.
- 30—Attack on Finland launched by Soviet Union.

DECEMBER

- 10—Announcement that British troops are in the Maginot Line and in contact with the enemy.
- 13—German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* defeated in battle of the River Plate; takes refuge in Montevideo.
- 14—League of Nations condemns Russia for attack on Finland and expels her from the League.
- 17—Germans scuttle *Graf Spee* off Montevideo.
- 20—Captain Hans Langsdorff, commander of the *Graf Spee*, commits suicide.
- 24—Pope Pius XII makes appeal for peace.

1940

JANUARY

- 4—Germany creates General Council for War Economy under Goering.
- 5—Mr. Leslie Hore-Belisha resigns post of War Minister in British cabinet. Replaced by Mr. Oliver Stanley.
- 6—Conference of Hungarian and Italian Foreign Ministers in Venice. Trade treaty between Russia and Bulgaria.
- 8—Britain introduces ration cards for butter, sugar, bacon and ham.
- 10—British bombers raid Heligoland.
Carol of Rumania confers with Regent Paul of Yugoslavia.
- 13—Trade treaty between France and Spain.
- 14—Netherlands cancels army leaves. Belgium mobilizes.
- 16—Loss of 3 British submarines announced.
Trade agreement between Germany and Hungary.
- 20—British destroyer *Grenville* sunk.
British take 21 German sailors from Japanese ship *Asama Maru*.
- 24—Chamberlain renews British pledge of support to Belgium.
Loss of British destroyer *Exmouth* announced.
- 26—Trade treaty between Britain and Greece.

FEBRUARY

- 1—Britain sets up Export Council.
Finnish President offers to negotiate peace with Russia.
Russians start offensive against Mannerheim Line.
- 2—Meeting of Balkan Entente in Belgrade.
- 6—Britain agrees to return nine of the Germans taken from the *Asama Maru*.
- 7—Rumania assures Britain that oil exports to Germany will not be increased.
- 8—Turks seize Krupp shipyards at Istanbul.
- 9—Sumner Welles mission to Europe announced.
- 12—Trade treaty between Russia and Germany.
- 14—Anglo-Italian trade negotiations break down.
- 16—Destroyer *Cossack* rescues 299 British seamen from German prison ship *Altmark*.
Sweden refuses to intervene on the side of Finland.
- 17—Finns announce retirement from a sector of the Mannerheim Line.
- 19—British destroyer *Daring* lost.
- 20—British trade mission recalled from Italy.
- 21—Allied warships reported off Murmansk.
- 24—Turkey declares state of emergency following reports of troop clashes on Russian border.
Trade agreement between Germany and Italy.
- 25—Scandinavian conference reaffirms neutrality.
Mr. Sumner Welles in Rome.
Russia and Turkey agree to withdraw troops from frontier.
- 26—Finns admit loss of Koivisto.

MARCH

- 1—Britain embargoes shipments of German coal to Italy.
France introduces food restrictions.
Mr. Sumner Welles in Berlin.
- 2—Liner *Domala* attacked in Channel by German aircraft.
- 3—Russians claim to have reached Viipuri.

- 5—Britain floats war loan of £300,000,000.
Allied Supreme War Council decides to help Finns.
- 6—Trade agreement between France and Italy.
- 7—Russo-Finnish peace negotiations in Moscow.
Mr. Sumner Welles in Paris.
- 9—Agreement on coal dispute between Britain and Italy.
- 10—Ribbentrop visit to Rome.
Mr. Sumner Welles in London.
- 11—Ribbentrop audience with Pope.
Trade treaty between Britain and Norway.
- 12—Trade treaty between Britain and Denmark.
Peace signed between Russia and Finland.
- 15—Mr. Sumner Welles in Rome.
- 16—German air raid on Scapa Flow.
- 18—Meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at Brennero.
Trade treaty between Britain and Spain.
- 19—British air raid on German air bases on island of Sylt.
Conference of Turkish and Allied staffs at Aleppo.
- 20—Fall of Daladier government in France.
- 21—Paul Reynaud forms French war cabinet.
- 22—British submarine *Ursula* sinks German freighter *Heddernheim* in Kattegat.
- 23—Count Teleki, Hungarian Premier, in Rome.
British submarine *Truant* sinks German freighter *Hugo Stinnes* in Kattegat.
- 26—British troops take over another section of Maginot Line.
Anglo-Italian trade talks resumed.
- 27—Loss of French destroyer *La Railleuse*.
- 28—Meeting of Allied Supreme War Council.
- 29—Molotoff speech reaffirms Russian neutrality.

APRIL

- 2—Italy adopts measure providing for civil mobilization in wartime.
German air raids on Scapa Flow.
- 3—Chamberlain ministry reorganized.

- 4—British government sets up commercial corporation for trade with Balkans.
- 5—British air raid on Wilhelmshaven.
Allied notes to Norway forecast action to prevent German use of Norwegian waters.
- 8—Allies announce the laying of minefields at three points in Norwegian waters.
German air raid on Scapa Flow.
German transport *Rio de Janeiro* and tanker *Poseidon* torpedoed off Norway.
- 9—German invasion of Denmark and Norway.
Iceland suspends exercise of royal power by King of Denmark.
- 10—First battle of Narvik.
Belgium cancels army leaves.
- 11—British air raids on air base at Stavanger.
- 12—British bomb air base at Kristiansand.
Holland takes defence precautions.
- 13—Second battle of Narvik.
- 14—First Allied force lands at Namsos.
- 15—Germans occupy Kongsvinger.
- 17—British forces land at Andalsnes.
Naval bombardment of Stavanger.
- 18—British forces make contact with Norwegians.
- 19—Holland declares state of siege.
Reynaud wins unanimous vote in French Chamber.
Britain informs Russia of readiness to discuss trade treaty.
- 21—Bombing of Danish air base at Aalborg.
- 22—Trade agreement between Germany and Rumania.
- 23—Germans claim victory at Lillehammer.
British war budget.
- 24—Germany takes direct control of occupied area in Norway.
- 25—Germans claim control of railway from Trondheim to Sweden.
- 26—Allies announce withdrawals north of Lillehammer.
Rumania issues political amnesty.

- 27—Ribbentrop's pronouncement on reasons for invasion.
- 29—Italian protests on Allied blockade.
- 30—Germans claim capture of Dombaas.
Britain orders merchant ships from Mediterranean.

MAY

- 1—United States urges Italy to maintain peace.
- 2—Allies announce evacuation of Andalsnes.
- 3—Evacuation of Namsos and southern Norway revealed.
- 4—Netherlands arrests of suspects.
- 7—Netherlands defence preparations.
German demand for passage of troops through Hungary reported.
- 8—Chamberlain secures majority of 81 in debate on Norway.
Yugoslavia opens trade negotiations with Russia.
- 9—British troops occupy Iceland.
- 10—Germany invades Luxemburg, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Chamberlain resigns. Churchill becomes Prime Minister.
Opposition members join Reynaud cabinet.
- 11—Germans capture Maastricht and Eben Emael.
Allied forces occupy Netherlands West Indies.
Allies bomb Rhineland.
- 12—Dutch admit German crossing of Ijssel and Maas.
Germans overrun Luxemburg, claim Liège citadel.
- 13—Germans cross Moerdijk bridge.
Netherlands government flees to England.
- 14—Capture of Rotterdam. All Holland north of Maas surrenders.
Germans reach Meuse. Allies evacuate Namur and Sedan.
- 15—Germans cross Meuse line at three points, penetrate extension of
Maginot Line.
- 16—Paris under military rule.
President Roosevelt asks new defence appropriations.
- 17—Dutch abandon resistance in Zeeland.
Germans take Brussels. Belgian government moves to Ostend.
French line broken south of Sedan.

- 18—Capture of Antwerp.
Reynaud cabinet reorganized.
Pan-American declaration condemns German invasion of Low Countries.
- 19—Weygand replaces Gamelin as Allied Commander-in-Chief.
Germans claim crossing of Scheldt, capture of Le Cateau and St. Quentin.
Germans annex districts of Eupen and Malmedy from Belgium.
- 20—Germans reach Peronne, claim Laon.
- 21—Germans break through on Somme, capture Arras and Amiens, reach channel at Abbeville.
Britain adopts national conscription of property and labour.
- 23—Germans reach Boulogne.
Sir Oswald Mosley and associates arrested.
- 25—Germans take Ghent and Courtrai, reach Calais.
Fifteen French generals removed from commands.
- 26—Sir John Dill succeeds Sir Edmund Ironside as Chief of Imperial General Staff.
- 27—Allies driven back from the Lys. Germans widen Somme gap.
- 28—King Leopold surrenders the Belgian army.
- 29—Allies announce capture of Narvik.
Yser sluices opened to flood Dunkirk area. Allies begin evacuation.
- 31—Italy breaks off commercial negotiations with Britain.

JUNE

- 1—German bombing raids on Rhone valley.
Swiss shoot down German planes.
- 2—Eden says four-fifths of Flanders force evacuated.
- 3—Air raids on Paris.
- 4—Evacuation completed. Germans occupy Dunkirk.
- 5—Germans launch attack on Somme-Aisne front. English coast bombed.
Italy announces that coastal waters are "dangerous".
Reynaud cabinet reconstructed.
- 6—Germans advance seventeen miles below Abbeville.

- 7—Allied advance lines withdraw along whole front.
Italy orders ships to neutral ports.
- 8—Weygand Line pierced south of Bresle river.
Egypt evacuates children and aged from Alexandria.
- 9—Germans reach Rouen and Gisors, launch new attack on Argonne.
- 10—Italy declares war on Britain and France.
Germans cross Seine, reach Beauvais.
French government leaves Paris for Tours.
- 11—French withdraw to Marne.
Air raids on Malta and on Italian bases in Libya.
- 12—Germans cross Marne. Fighting around Reims.
Air raids on northern Italy.
Egypt breaks off diplomatic relations with Italy.
- 13—Allies decide not to defend Paris.
Reynaud makes "new and final" appeal to Roosevelt.
- 14—Germans occupy Paris, attack Maginot Line.
French government moves to Bordeaux.
Spanish forces occupy international zone at Tangier.
- 15—Germans claim Verdun. Maginot Line outflanked.
Russian military occupation of Lithuania.
- 16—Fall of Reynaud ministry in France; Pétain forms ministry.
Russian troops occupy Latvia and Esthonia.
- 17—France asks Germany for armistice.
Joint resolution of U.S. Congress barring transfers of colonies.
- 18—Hitler and Mussolini confer at Munich.
Beginning of consistent air raids on England.
- 20—France asks Italy for armistice.
- 21—Hitler meets French delegates at Compiègne.
King Carol of Rumania assumes dictatorial powers.
- 22—Armistice signed between France and Germany.
- 23—General de Gaulle forms French National Committee.
- 24—Armistice signed between France and Italy.
- 26—Russian ultimatum to Rumania demands return of Bessarabia.
- 27—Rumania cedes Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.
- 28—Britain announces evacuation of Channel Islands.

JULY

- 1—Rumania renounces British guarantee.
- 3—Britain seizes French warships in British ports. Battle of Oran.
- 4—Italians capture Kassala and Galabat.
- 5—France decides to break off diplomatic relations with Britain.
First air attack on Gibraltar.
- 8—French warship *Richelieu* put out of action by British.
- 9—Brush between British and Italian naval forces in central Mediterranean.
Announcement of demilitarization of French warships at Alexandria.
- 10—French National Assembly abolishes constitution.
Hungarians confer with Ribbentrop and Ciano at Munich.
- 11—Pétain draws up new basic laws for France.
- 14—Elections in Baltic States.
- 15—British withdrawal from Moyale.
- 16—Italians claim occupation of Dolo salient.
- 19—Hitler in Reichstag speech demands that Britain stop fighting.
- 21—Baltic States ask incorporation in Soviet Union.
Pan-American Conference opens at Havana.
- 23—Third wartime budget in Britain.
- 24—Rumanian government seizes Astra Romano oil company.
- 26—British detain Rumanian tankers at Port Said.
Rumanian delegates confer with Ribbentrop and Hitler at Salzburg.
- 27—Hitler receives Bulgarian delegates.
- 28—Mussolini receives Rumanian delegates.
- 29—Pan-American Conference adopts Act of Havana.
- 31—Britain adopts stricter navicert system to tighten blockade.

AUGUST

- 4—Italians invade British Somaliland.
- 8—Beginning of large daylight air raids on Britain.
- 9—Rumania reported to have agreed to cede southern Dobruja to Bulgaria.
- 13—Italian pressure on Greece to renounce British guarantee.

- 14—British begin air raids on northern Italy.
- 15—Germans bomb Croydon and Tilbury.
Greek cruiser torpedoed.
- 16—Greek ships bombed by Italian planes.
- 17—Germany declares total blockade of Britain.
British warships shell Italian bases in Libya.
- 18—Canada and U.S. agree to establish joint defence board.
- 19—British announce evacuation of Somaliland.
Whole of Britain proclaimed a defence area.
- 20—Churchill announces a readiness to cede bases to U.S.
- 22—German long-range guns shell convoy and English coast.
First air raid on metropolitan London.
- 23—Anglo-Spanish agreement on blockade.
- 24—Deadlock in Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations on Transylvania.
- 25—First British air raid on Berlin.
- 26—German planes bomb four towns in Eire.
Baltic States ratify incorporation in Soviet Union.
- 29—Vienna conference on Transylvania question.
- 30—Vienna award gives half Transylvania to Hungary.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The original character of this work made it undesirable to burden the pages with reference footnotes. It might be useful here, however, to indicate briefly the chief sources on which the material is based.

The essential foundations are the news despatches and special articles in *The Times* and the *New York Times*. Other newspapers have been used for press association despatches or for particular features, but these two are basic throughout.

Almost as essential are the *Foreign Policy Reports* (twice monthly) and the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* (weekly), published by the Foreign Policy Association, and the *Bulletin of International News* (fortnightly) published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Some twenty journals of information and opinion, from weeklies to quarterlies, have been consulted regularly as they appeared. These are typified by such periodicals as the *New Statesman* and the *Nineteenth Century* in England, and the *Nation* and *Atlantic Monthly* in the United States. A number of French reviews were consulted in the earlier stages, but although these would have been useful under other circumstances, they usually became available too late for any significant advantage to be taken of their material.

Several periodicals should be specially mentioned. The *Economist* is of course invaluable. The factual monthly summary of the chief developments provided by *Events* is unexcelled. *Foreign Affairs* and the *Round Table* are eminent and authoritative quarterlies whose discussions, though more general and interpretative, contain material not easily found elsewhere. Special articles in *Time* and *Fortune* in many cases serve this same purpose; and use has also been made of *Current History*. The *Illustrated London News*, besides an extensive weekly commentary by Captain Cyril Falls, offers much information on various technical points which the non-specialist will find useful.

In addition to these periodicals, others of a more specialized nature have been consulted on particular topics. These include the *Army*

Quarterly, the *Infantry Journal*, *Great Britain and the East*, the *American Political Science Review*, and the *Commerce Reports* of the United States Government.

Documents have been taken chiefly from the *New York Times*, the *Bulletin of International News*, and *International Conciliation*.

Two brief volumes should be mentioned as useful for background material. These are *Handbook of the War* by John C. de Wilde, David H. Popper and Eunice Clark (Boston, 1939), and *World in Arms* by R. Ernest Dupuy (Harrisburg, 1939). The Information Papers on various topics put out by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, both offer excellent brief summaries of the material on certain specific subjects, and could be used to supplement the background discussions in this volume.

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